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Summary 
 
To date, the vast literature on theories of psychology, and psychology as a practice, still 
remains a reflection of Western experiences and conceptions of reality. This is so despite 
“psychology” and “psychotherapy” being studied and implemented by Africans, dealing with 
Africa’s existential issues, in Africa. In this context, a distorted impression that positions 
psychology and psychotherapy as irreplaceable and irrefutable Western discoveries is created. 
This perception creates a tendency in which psychotherapists adopt and use universalised, foreign 
and imposed theories to explain and deal with African cultural experiences. 
 
In recent years, African scholars’ quest to advance “African-brewed” conceptions, definitions 
and practices of “psychology” and “psychotherapy” is gaining momentum. Psychologists dealing 
with African clients are increasingly confronted with the difficulty, and in some instances the 
impossibility, of communicating with, and treating local clients using Western conceptions and 
theories. Adopting the dominant Western epistemological and scientific paradigms constitutes 
epistemological oppression and alienation. Instead, African conceptions, definitions and practices 
of “psychology” and “psychotherapy” based on African cultural experiences, epistemology and 
ontology are argued for. 
 
The thesis defended in this study is that the dominant Western paradigm of scientific 
knowledge in general and, psychology in particular, is anchored in a defective claim to neutrality, 
objectivity and universality. To demonstrate this, indigenous ways of knowing and doing in the 
African experience are counterpoised against the Western understanding and construction of 
scientific knowledge in the fields of psychology and psychotherapy. The conclusion arising from 
our demonstration is the imperative to rethink psychology and psychotherapy in order to (i) 
affirm the validity of indigenous African ways of knowing and doing; (ii) show that the exclusion 
of the indigenous African ways of knowing and doing from the Western paradigm illustrates the 
tenuous and questionable character of its epistemological and methodological claims to 
neutrality, objectivity and universality. Indeed the Western claim to scientific knowledge, as 
described, speaks to its universality at the expense of the ineradicable as well as irreducible 
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ontological pluriversality of the human experience. This study’s aim is to advance the argument 
for the sensitivity to pluriversality of be-ing and the imperative for wholistic thinking. 
 
 
Key words: African epistemology, psychology, psychotherapy, indigenous knowledge, African 
experience, moya, kalafi ya semowa, thuto ya semowa, oral tradition and discourse, science, 
ontology, ubuntu and African philosophy.  
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CHAPTER 1 
 
It is easier to imitate the so-called scientific and universalist tradition, the established 
masters of classical Western thought than to try and break new ground toying with 
questionable assumptions inspired by African culture. So we expect to continue to read 
more commentaries on Kant and Hegel, more elucidations on the innumerable-isms of the 
history of philosophy, including the trendy but for us in Africa, most awkward 
anachronism called post-modernism. 
(Okere, 2005b, p. 19) 
 
Introduction 
 
Statement of the Problem 
 
“Psychology” has for many decades been seen as a universal monolithic Western “science”. 
Being a Western construction, this “science” has always claimed supremacy over other forms of 
knowing and knowledge systems. Subsequently, Western “science” has become a partial 
representation of human experiences. Western science is constructed out of experiences and 
conventions of one sector of the human race, denying other forms of experiences and knowledge 
systems existence and expression. This “science” has established itself as the “absolute human 
norm” through which the whole world has to be understood and experienced. On the basis of this 
Western universal claim to “science”, other forms of knowing and experiences have been 
excluded and subjugated from the field of science as a universal human enterprise. Western 
“science” has therefore become problematic and highly questionable by those whose experiences 
are deemed inferior and insignificant, such as the African indigenous peoples. In this regard we 
therefore ask the following questions: “What science?”, “Whose science?” and “For whom?” 
Science constructed from an epistemology foreign to indigenous Africans for example, cannot 
therefore be seen as representative and reflective of their experiences. In such an instance, tension 
between Western “science” and African indigenous experience as a form of science exists. It is 
for this reason that the current conceptions of Western “science” need to be deconstructed to put 
“science” in its appropriate context.  Such reconstructions and deconstructions demand a 
dialogical engagement (not a monologue) with these epistemologies to dispel the intellectual 
property right paradigm that the West claims over other worldviews. Kuokkanen (2006, p. 253) 
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strongly argues for this recognition by stating that: “In the process of dismantling the hegemony 
of the Eurocentric intellectual and philosophical conventions and the privileging of the Western 
systems of knowledge, indigenous epistemologies have an important role of raising questions of 
relevant research regarding indigenous communities and contribute to our understanding of 
different ways of knowing and theorizing.” 
 
This call is certainly not new to the discourse of science. Feminists (for different reasons 
though) have been calling for the dismantling of the discriminatory and distortion-ridden Western 
conceptualisation and practice of science. Harding and Hinkikka (1983, p.  ix) in challenging 
science in the feminist context posit that: “We must root out sexist distortions and perversions in 
epistemology … metaphysics, and the philosophy of science – in the ‘hard core’ of abstract 
reasoning thought most immune to infiltration by social values”. Indigenous peoples of the 
world, the Maori and the Africans for example, are faced with the same struggle, to have their 
experiences and epistemological conventions recognised alongside Western epistemologies.  It is 
for this reason that we will argue in this study that indigenous healing knowledge systems indeed 
represent scientific sites of knowledge, research and theory that are methodologically consistent 
with African indigenous experiences. 
 
An attempt to answer questions such as “what science?” and “whose science?” and “for 
whom?” creates a much more interesting and complex scenario. Such an intellectual inquiry 
enterprise as a form of human knowledge generation process becomes a necessary reflective 
condition. Answering these questions is not as homogeneous and simple as the West claims. In 
this regard as well, the Western claim has seriously undermined the fundamental understanding 
that knowledge construction is both experience related and context bound. According to Okere, 
Njoku and Devisch (2005, p. 1), different cultures “need to be empowered to realise, work on and 
appropriate the riches embedded in their own local knowledge tracks and trajectories”. This 
observation by these authors is in direct contradiction to the old notion that authentic knowledge 
comes from Western scientific conventions only.  From this Western “science” perspective, for 
knowledge to be “scientifically” justifiable and acceptable, it has to satisfy the following two 
broad conditions or demands: 1) to be linked or fall under “monolithism” of “science” as a 
Western discovery, and that, 2) by virtue of being of a Western discovery, it is therefore 
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“universal”. It is important to note that it is this Western “science” claim to universality that 
ought to be questioned. This claim has created a “myth” that only Western knowledge is 
“universally scientific” and representative of all other forms of knowledge systems. Dussel 
(1980, p. 8) questions this Western position of divinity in the absolutes by stating that “from this 
premise, the West established itself as the centre, the experience of centrality around which all 
‘experiences’ are centered, considering itself the archetypal”. Okere et al. (2005, p. 5) describe 
this imposed hegemonic dichotomous relationship as consisting of “subject (the one who knows) 
versus object (the known, the measurable), ‘developed or modern’ versus ‘not-yet-developed or 
traditional’. In this ‘othering’, rather than genuinely being an enriching centre for the dialogue of 
civilisations, the colonial school turned out to be a rigid institutional setting for entrenching 
monologue if not an Invention of Africa”. 
 
Aims of this Study 
 
The proposed tasks to be undertaken are therefore, first, to dispute the above Western claim to 
universal knowledge and science, and secondly to establish the authenticity of African indigenous 
“psychology” and ways of healing, “psychotherapy” even within the tenuous and restrictive 
Western notions of “science” or, outside of it. Thirdly, to construct and adopt appropriate 
indigenous vernacular concepts in “psychology” which are consistent with the African cultural 
experience and ontology. The African indigenous ways arising from this form of science must 
and should demand methods consistent with the indigenous knowledge systems and 
epistemology. “These indigenous philosophies, which consider and situate an individual in his or 
her community and knowledge as rooted in and stemming from a specific context, will expose 
the narrow conceptions of reason and rationality, by emphasizing their relation to social, cultural 
and historical frameworks” (Kuokkanen, 2006, p. 253). This dualistic rationalisation clearly 
serves and is employed to justify the self-imposed privileged colonial position, by relegating the 
indigenous peoples’ worldviews, values, histories and conceptions of knowledge to the periphery. 
As Kuokkanen, (2006, pp. 252-253) observes, “today, the legacy of this exclusion is reflected in 
views according to which indigenous theoretical and methodological practices are considered 
either a (unnecessary) supplement or having value only if they have something to offer to the 
Western discourse. Although we now ‘have’ indigenous studies programmes at many 
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universities, they still occupy a marginal position and remain in ‘academic’ reservations”. The 
“myth” and the mechanisms of exclusion by Western “science” as a “universal” knowledge 
discoverer have systematically presented other forms of knowledge systems such as those of 
indigenous Africans as inferior to those of the West. In Okere et al.’s (2005, p. 1) observation, 
“this deceptive myth about knowledge production, has had the negative impact of stereotyping, 
blackmailing, inferiorizing and derailing the production and sharing of knowledge and its 
artefacts in cultures other than the West. The colonial encounter, with its assumptions and 
presumptions, helped to rub in this vision of reformist modernity and to muffle the voices of the 
colonised cultures”.  
 
The above statement draws our attention to what Ramose (2002) refers to as colonial 
epistemicide. Given that science, properly construed, is universal and open-ended, the Western 
“psychology’s” epistemological dominance is not justifiable, since neither the content nor the 
direction of science can be predetermined and foreclosed beforehand. Science must therefore 
recognise all realities. The aim of the process of colonisation has been to subject and to relegate 
other knowledge systems to second-class knowledge systems, whose very survival ought to be 
dependent on the recognition and approval by only itself (the West). It is this knowledge 
subjugation to the self-imposed Western dominance that has inaugurated the struggle for 
epistemological dialogue predicated on the principle of equality of cultures. The premise for such 
intercultural participation needs to be based on the position that all knowledge systems are unique 
and equally important in the construction of world knowledge pools. 
 
Arguably, Okere et al. (2005) indicate the extent to which Western knowledge construction 
has been forcibly imposed on Africans. The implications of such an imposed dominant discourse 
need to be interrogated on three different levels, the epistemological, ethical and methodological, 
to demonstrate its problematic nature. At the level of epistemology, knowledge construction, 
cultural practices and truth from the West cannot be exclusively and wholly representative of the 
African experience. Africans have their own unique ways of doing and practicing things that are 
informed by their local knowledge, experiences and epistemologies. Keeney (1979) supports this 
view by arguing that it is impossible not to have an epistemology. It must be added that an 
epistemology is embedded in culture. In our understanding an epistemology to a very large extent 
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describes the cultural beingness, practices and existential experiences within a given environing 
context of the people concerned. Okere’s (2005a, p. 22) analysis of Plato’s definition of 
epistemology indicates the extent to which our epistemology is an indivisible part of our being, 
he summarises epistemology as “a study of a variety of the ways of knowing …, man’s peculiar 
activity in which there are levels of being which would form the object of knowledge – the non-
living, the living, the vegetable world, the animal world, human beings and God”. Clearly, given 
all these levels of being and knowing, there cannot be a single way of knowing, as the West 
claims. Therefore the Western claim of knowledge construction from an epistemological point of 
view is inconsistent with its very conception of “science”, if this proceeds, as it must, from the 
position that science originates from experience.  Dewey (1958, p. 3), points to this inseparability 
of “science” and “experience” by stating that “… everything designated by the word ‘experience’ 
is so adequately incorporated into the scientific procedures and subject-matter that to mention 
experience would be only to duplicate in a general term what is already covered in definite 
terms”. Experience therefore includes amongst other things humans’ acquired forms of 
knowledge, belief, morals, culture, history and one’s relationship with the broader cosmology.  
 
From an epistemological point of view, as Okere, (2005a, p. 25) observes, “all humans by 
nature desire to know, and therefore all humans do have some form of knowledge which is 
coloured by its own cultural structuring, according to the specifications of its own environment”. 
It is clear therefore that the current Western claim as the sole generator of scientific knowledge 
does not stand. This claim presents an incomplete field of human knowledge because it does not 
acknowledge the contributions of the other branches of the human family to science (Okere, 
2005a). 
 
At the level of ethics, the forcible imposition by the West of its knowledge as a single reality 
on Africans is also problematic and should therefore be questioned. The question to be asked here 
is, can human relations and coexistence be run on the basis of force and manipulation? It is worth 
noting that the Western colonial epistemicide appealed to the “right of conquest” as justification 
for its imposition. In his interrogation of this “right of conquest by the West”, Ramose (2002, pp. 
464-470), “I conquer, therefore I am the sovereign…” demonstrates the philosophical and 
ideological foundations of conquest and how this is related to the exclusive Western claim to 
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reason, … to land,  to knowledge, … and to the right to sovereignty. Dussel (1980, p. 8) refers to 
this archetypal “I” one-way relationship that we mentioned earlier on as the “I conquer”…“I 
enslave” and the “I vanquish”. Relations based on such forcible imposition have resulted in 
African knowledge systems being denied any meaningful existence or relegated to the periphery. 
 
This imposition is both immoral and unethical because it takes away the Being of Africans, 
which is so central to all human existence. Dussel (1980, p. 53) maintains that “to alienate is to 
sell someone or something, to pass it on to another proprietor. The alienation of a people or of a 
single individual makes its victim lose their Being by incorporating them as a moment, an aspect, 
an instrument of another’s Being”. This kind of alienation has prompted scholars such as 
Oluwole (1997) to argue for the inclusion of African experiences in knowledge construction, 
such as the African oral tradition as a viable, reliable and scientific knowledge discourse. 
Drummond, (2006, p. 3) provides a very comprehensive indigenous understanding of knowledge 
conception and practice by observing that, “knowledge is also a shared treasure, not one solely 
for the benefit of an individual. It serves the interests of the group. Knowledge emerges from 
community experience and community history, passed on to new generations through stories, 
games, songs, incantations and genealogies: it is a community resource and individual 
discoveries must be taken back to the community to augment that resource”. It is with the above 
communal connectedness of the African people that we argue that, to import a factual generalised 
Western “scientific” norm or law into a context such as the above indigenous context is to engage 
in what Dewey, (1938, p. 444) sees as, “the fallacy vitiating the view that scientific laws are 
formulations of uniform unconditioned sequence of change arising from taking the function of 
the universal proposition as if it were part of the structural content of the existential proportions”.  
 
The implication of this generalisation is interrogated by Okere (2005a, p. 20) who sees the 
Western “science” as having partially succeeded with indigenous people, by stating that, “the 
success of the West has tended to marginalise other forms of knowledge and other contributions 
to knowledge and, thus to impoverish an otherwise potentially rich and complex world 
knowledge landscape”. Although Okere thoroughly interrogates the “science” question on 
different levels and from different perspectives, we do not agree with his conclusion that the 
West has “succeeded” in marginalising African indigenous forms of knowledge systems. It is for 
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us imperative to question whether this is indeed “success” or coercion. In our view, the very act 
of forcible imposition indicates failure to persuade. Force in this instance is an ethics’ problem, 
because the product thereof is the result of forcible imposition. If the West succeeded as Okere 
(2005a) puts it, the effects would have created equal knowledge systems based on dialogical 
engagement and therefore acceptable to the indigenous people as well. Okere’s (2005a) own 
writings and many other contributions such as those of Sogolo, Ramose, Bujo, Wiredu, Oluwole, 
Ajei, Drummond, Kuokkanen, Nabudere and this very study to mention but a few, instead clearly 
indicate how discredited and unethical this “scientific” imposition has been and is continuing to 
be questioned. 
 
An observation to be made here is that the “success” referred to was, and still is, a 
“monolithic” construction. There was no dialogue, nor was there any consideration of the context 
and experiences of Africans when what is regarded as “science” was conceptualised and 
subsequently “universalised”. The West unilaterally used her philosophical and cultural 
experiences to conceptualise what “science” is, and then imposed the formulated “meaning” onto 
other forms of knowledge systems. From an ethical point of view, African knowledge systems 
have been coerced into the dominant Western paradigm, and the assertion by Okere that this was 
a “success” does not therefore hold. An ethical question to be posed in the context of this study 
is, what moral position does the West hold to impose its definition and practice of “psychology” 
under the myth of “science” on Africans? In his discussion of the “science” question, Okere 
(2005a, p. 20) draws our attention to the fact that “science remains only one of many forms of 
knowledge and the West only one of its producers”. The methodology by which this science is 
constructed therefore also becomes questionable. 
 
At the level of methodology, there are also problems associated with the Western 
methodology when applied to African issues and context. If we start form the premise that 
methodology arises from a particular experience, culture and epistemology, as argued by Okere et 
al. (2005) and Dewey (1958), then the Western methodology, acquired from Western experience 
and knowledge cannot account for and be consistent with African experiences. Knowledge and 
methodology cannot be separated since the former is constructed and acquired using the latter’s 
means. Therefore a critique of Western methodology informed by African experience is both 
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necessary and imperative. Methodological inquiry issues and problems will be discussed in detail 
in Chapter 2. 
 
We have pointed out at the beginning of this discussion that “psychology” is predominantly 
seen as a Western product. “Psychology”, as we know and study it today within academic 
settings, is a branch of science emanating from the West. As a field of “science” that claims 
universality and objectivity, “psychology” cannot evade the perception that it carries the identity 
of Western “science” and therefore carries the reputation of its carrier, that is, “universal 
science”. By extension, “psychotherapy” is a branch of “psychology” and therefore also 
subscribes to the “universal science” claim and fraternity. It can therefore be argued that 
“psychotherapy” as seen from the West claims to be a universal reality. It is this mythical claim 
that has systematically denied a voice or space to other “psychotherapy” knowledge systems to 
coexist alongside other world psychotherapy realities. This somewhat selective, blind, narrow 
and rigidly defined Western “science” ironically denied the field of psychology and 
psychotherapy specifically, what we refer to as an epistemology of interactive ecologies, rooted 
in the wholistic approach of Africans to life issues. This topic will be discussed in detail in 
Chapter 4.  
 
It is to us of critical importance to investigate why it is that “psychology”, having an inquiry 
and treatment method that result in a therapeutic effect, continues to be blind to the fact that 
therapeutic effects can also be achieved through other forms of therapeutic methods which are 
culturally and locally relevant, such as those of Africans. If we follow the argument that the 
method of inquiry in any given context arises from the knowledge systems and experiences of the 
people concerned, then the authenticity of local cultural knowledge systems as scientific 
enterprises cannot be denied. This argument is supported by Okere et al. (2005, p. 2), who state 
that, “such variegated approach to mining the wisdom and ecological advantages of various 
cultural groups will enhance the sharing of knowledge in a spirit of both vertical and horisontal 
border-linking exchanges of riches found in different cultural contexts and knowledge fields”.  
 
The practical imperative expressed in the above articulation is that the construction of 
collaborative and respectful dialogical engagement platforms by all interacting forms of 
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psychotherapy knowledge systems, will most likely result in shared experiences and knowledge 
pools based on different cultural experiences. This is in our considered opinion, an indication that 
diversity is a necessary condition in human relations and needs to be recognised and respected, 
instead of being thwarted in the name of universality and homogeneity. In many “psychotherapy” 
training contexts, the group composition is culturally diverse. By their very nature, these training 
groups’ composition define the contexts as those of diverse cultural interactions from which 
group members can learn to embrace and deal with differences effectively. In our opinion, such 
equal engagement would broaden the knowledge landscape in the field of psychology. 
 
The Western Culture of Dominance and Psychology 
 
The above scenario is far from being realised in the current contexts of psychotherapy training 
programmes. The dominant epistemology and inquiry frameworks in psychology and 
psychotherapy curricula in undergraduate, and postgraduate studies are still deeply and 
profoundly rooted in Western thinking. In South African universities, the content of current 
Master’s of clinical psychotherapy training programmes are decided and predominantly run by 
trainers of Western descent. Their Western training, philosophy, experiences and cultural 
background have entrenched and maintained theories and treatment methods based on, and 
adopted from, Western epistemologies and cultural experiences. It is not surprising therefore to 
find that more than eighty percent of trainees in Master’s clinical training programmes are of 
Western descent. In most previously white-dominated universities, these institutions still select 
on average one or two African students for training each year, fourteen years post-apartheid.  
 
In one of the absurdities of our time, the staff of a training programme at a previously black 
university (now merged with a previously white university) situated in a black township consists 
of all-white trainers. Even more bizarre, the composition of trainees in this counselling training 
programme is 99% white. This domination is occurring despite the fact that such training is 
taking place in the African university context, where Africans are overwhelmingly in the 
majority. In this state of affairs, at best Africans continue to be consumers of foreign knowledge 
and, at worse, they are in a systematically orchestrated plan, totally excluded from psychology. 
Instead of psychology producing psychologists and knowledge systems which are consistent with 
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and relevant to the Africans’ existential realities, much of the practice of psychology continue to 
be centred around and positioned as an elitist white middle class profession (Wilson, Richter, 
Durrheim, Surendorff, & Asafo-Agyei, 1999). 
 
Under these circumstances, indigenous African communities serve the role of research 
subjects for academic qualifications and conference case presentations, rather than as contributors 
of an authentic knowledge base. Even universities which are supposed to promote diversity 
continue to enforce unitary modes of thinking.  The absurdity of this scenario can be seen in the 
very name, university. Okere (2005a, p. 25) argues that “the universitus studiorum, the institution 
for all knowledge, the institution where the matter and business of science is most directly carried 
on, negates the claim of one unique science. The concept of universitus studiorum has been 
predicated on the need to cater for a plurality of sciences serving the promotion, preservation and 
enhancement of all human knowledge”. How universities came only to teach and represent some 
selected group and knowledge system, that is, Western knowledge and science is very interesting. 
A psychology that is premised on this kind of academic and cultural discrimination cannot claim 
to cater for the needs and challenges faced by the majority of black communities. This imbalance 
accounts for the grossly insignificant number of African psychologists trained through these 
programmes in the past six decades. No wonder then that African candidates and students are 
regarded as “incompetent” and of “low standard” in selection and training processes and 
programmes. The experiences, epistemologies and theories on which these selections for clinical 
master’s training programmes are based, rely on content that is alien to the African experience. 
These training programmes are characterised by the selective proliferation of literature (certainly 
not African) on “psychotherapy”, and by controlled and very “carefully” chosen African students 
that are “trained” as “psychotherapists”.  
 
The above sketched context is based on my experiences as a trainer, researcher and 
“psychotherapist” faced with inconsistencies and contradictions based on epistemological, 
theoretical and methodological conflicts and incongruities in my daily dealings with African 
students and clients. Consequently, I have found myself questioning the relevance and value of 
“psychology” and “psychotherapy” in the broader African context. 
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Rationale for the Study 
 
In this study, we would like to argue that the West (in the context of the psychotherapeutic 
domain), cannot claim to be universally objective based only on Western conventions of 
psychotherapy without, 1) recognising its subjectivity, 2) coming to terms with the reality that for 
peaceful future knowledge co-existence the emancipation of other knowledge modes and forms 
representative of all peoples of the world is a moral and scientific imperative. The case to be 
made here is that etiologically, epistemologically and methodologically psychotherapy may not 
exclusively be a Western product. Africans, like all the other peoples of the world, have their 
unique myths, stories, histories and rituals that give them identity and differentiate them from 
other peoples of the world. Their social circumstances, cultural practices and lived experiences 
define who they are, and logically define what “psychology” and “psychotherapy” are to them.  
 
The direction to be followed in this line of reasoning is that the West has to admit that 
Africans have to reconstruct their own reality in respect of their healing practices, consistent with 
their lived experiences. Harding and Hintikka (1983, p. x) in support of this argument, maintain 
that “what counts as knowledge must be grounded on experience, because human experience 
differs according to the kinds of activities and social relations in which humans engage”. The 
experiences of some Africans differ from Western experiences upon which “psychotherapy” is 
grounded. Therefore the experiences of which current “psychology” and “psychotherapy” claims 
are made are exclusive and unrepresentative. There is no problem if the present Western 
conceptualisation and practices of “psychology” and “psychotherapy” are applied within their 
appropriate Western cultures and contexts. The problem is when “psychotherapy”, studied and 
formulated from a predominantly Western experience, is taken to be an all-inclusive reality.  
 
Africans need “psychotherapy” training programmes that reflect their wholistic approach to 
life and experiences, which will otherwise be consistent with and relevant to African philosophy 
and cultural practices (Wiredu, 1980). To come to this level of understanding of one’s cultural 
background, philosophical reflections become imperative. Hermeneutically, Okere (2005b, p. 2) 
argues that “all that we ever understand is made possible by a prior understanding. We go from 
the known to the unknown and, prior to any new knowledge we pre-know”. It follows therefore 
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that prior to the present Western formulations and practice of “psychology” and “psychotherapy”, 
Africans pre-knew and had their “psychotherapeutic” practices that were consistent with their 
culture. In our considered opinion, philosophising as Okere (2005a, p. 3) argues, “becomes a 
personal, creative interpretation of one’s culture as inspired by that culture. And the culture 
becomes all the background one brings along – environment, history, language, education, 
worldview, and etcetera”. The questions we pose and grapple with in respect of “psychology” 
and “psychotherapy” in this study, are our attempts to understand the meaning of “psychology” 
and “psychotherapy”, what is therapeutic and indeed to articulate the meaning of this reality 
called “therapy” for Africans within the Africans’ environing culture. 
 
Thesis 
 
The thesis to be posited in this study is that “psychology” and psychotherapeutic training 
programmes within the African context must be defined and practiced from the African 
viewpoint. These practices should be based on the relevant appropriation of African cultures and 
her rich heritage to facilitate the reshaping, re-acquiring and redesigning of such programmes. In 
our view, Africa, on this basis, can and must become the producer rather than the consumer of 
knowledge, truth and science based upon her own existential experiences. The African 
indigenous ways of healing arising from this foundation shall produce, among others, 
psychotherapy with a distinct African flavour. Being distinctly African, according to Boesak 
(2007, p. 22), “means that we must not be ashamed or afraid of our inborn African spirituality. 
That deep indescribable connectedness to our innermost selves and the world we live in, to the 
earth that feeds us, the rivers that rush with our deepest emotions, the winds that whisper with the 
voices beyond our imaginings, the life we share with every living and breathing thing”.  
 
From an African perspective healing embodies our spiritual connectedness to our environment 
in an inextricable way and cannot therefore be seen or performed as an isolated activity. Healing 
is a ritual, which entails inclusiveness and togetherness that links Africans’ unbreakable bonds of 
their common humanity. How non-Africans define and practice “psychotherapy” does not 
represent African healing practices as has been claimed for centuries. It is therefore conceivable 
that the distinctiveness of African indigenous ways of healing might require the substitution or 
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abandonment of the term “psychology” and “psychotherapy”. The terms “psychology” and 
“psychotherapy” are epistemologically of Western origin and therefore their meaning within the 
Western context may not necessarily reflect and capture the African understanding of the healing 
process. We further argue that this would not dispense with the necessity for intercultural 
dialogue predicated on the principle of epistemological equality. The distinctiveness of African 
culture resides, in part, on the vital role of memory with particular reference to the onto-triadic 
conception and structure of Bei-ng. The onto-triadic conception of be-ing will be discussed in 
detail in Chapter 4. 
 
In arguing the need for Africa’s self definition, Okere et al. (2005, p. 8), call for “a re-coupling 
of Africa’s dislocated and obnubilated knowledge resources and practices”. In our view, 
interrogating indigenous worldviews and the logic of deconstructing and reconstructing the 
imposed traditional mainstream Western scientific and psychotherapeutic paradigms are 
necessary conditions to re-Africanising “psychotherapy”. This process will enable indigenous 
people to reclaim their systems of knowledge and if necessary reject categories and labels 
imposed from outside. We firmly believe that these and other forms of on-going endeavours of 
decolonising knowledge, methodological inquiries, practices and the perceptions about 
indigenous knowledge systems are necessary in moving forward. Boesak (2007, p. 22) argues for 
a “distinctly African voice the determination and courage, insight and vision, self-critique and 
self-understanding, knowing our limitations and celebrating our possibilities, discerning our 
weaknesses and appreciating our strengths, recapturing and preserving our dignity”. In this sense, 
the need to name and the right to redefine concepts such as “psychotherapy” according to the 
needs and preferences of the indigenous African people themselves is highly imperative in 
advancing distinctly African “psychological” and “psychotherapy” practices and other forms of 
knowledge systems. 
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CHAPTER 2 
 
Introduction 
 
In this chapter, we will discuss methodological and social inquiry issues. Problems related to 
Western methodological conceptions that arise in view of their application to the African context 
will also be reflected upon. Such reflections are necessary because these methodological issues 
have serious implications. One such implication is that, in studying and researching 
psychotherapeutic activities and knowledge systems from Western epistemology, one has to 
conform to the scientific inquiry framework of the West. This method of knowledge inquiry is 
historically known for its claim as the superior means to understanding all forms of knowledge 
systems. The claim to superiority sustains the dogma of absoluteness as well as universality that 
cannot be left unchallenged. This claim emanates from one reality, which is based on Western 
experiences. Scientific claims to universality disregard diversity and context and standardises 
methodologies. It is for this reason, and many others to be discussed, that we need to understand 
what “science” is.  
 
Currently, when we talk about science, we are referring to the predominant Western science. 
Western science claims to be transparent and objective on its own terms and by its own 
standards. Steiner (2002, p. 1) refers to this as “a scientistic thinking”, whose influence comes 
from a technicity and scientism paradigm”. This thinking honours the scientific method and holds 
that it is universally applicable. It is deemed to be the absolute means through which knowledge 
is acquired and understood. However, the methodology that is followed in “rational science” is 
not necessarily consistent with peoples’ experiences and the historical context within which 
research is conducted. We argue that this lack of respect for other experiences or epistemologies 
leads to inconsistencies and is bound to create methodological problems. In our view, the method 
through which knowledge is produced and acquired is of critical importance. We therefore would 
like to situate knowledge within its appropriate context by distinguishing between common sense 
or general knowledge and scientific knowledge. For the purpose of this study, this distinction is 
crucial because both common sense and scientific knowledge constitute authentic realities in 
different contexts. Without this distinction, the argument for the inclusion of African knowledge 
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systems and psychotherapeutic modes in the psychology curriculum in our universities will be 
superficial, weak and tenuous.  
 
Common Sense and Scientific Knowledge 
 
Very rarely do we spontaneously make a distinction between common sense or general 
knowledge and scientific knowledge in institutionalised contexts or our psychotherapeutic 
procedures. The former is associated with the pre-scientific era and activities. Common sense is 
characterised by ordinary and incomplete explanations without conclusive relevance to the facts.  
Scientific knowledge represents rational, identifiable and reliable cognitive claims in the 
knowledge inquiry enterprise (Nagel, 1961). From the above differentiation, an impression is 
created that scientific knowledge is superior and better than common sense. Nagel (1961) and 
Hindess (1977) have extensively written on both forms of knowledge. Hindess (1977) prefers the 
term metaphysics or non science to common sense. 
 
In many social inquiry studies, knowledge is presented homogeneously, without due respect to 
the different levels of knowledge conceptualisations. Presenting knowledge in this 
undifferentiated manner creates serious conceptual and methodological problems in human 
behaviour studies. Hindess (1977, p. 177) does not however agree with this viewpoint and argues 
that “the difference between science and metaphysics is not a function of their concepts and 
relations between concepts. It is a function of how we decide to treat them”. In Hindess’ (1977) 
view, the classification of knowledge as either non science or common sense and scientific 
knowledge depends on how the interpreters of that knowledge treat it, and not the character of the 
concepts. In the above argument Hindess sensitises us to power issues when dealing with 
knowledge, that is, how those who claim to have the predetermined know-how can manipulate 
knowledge for their own benefits and motives. The process of knowledge production and 
acquisition is usually accepted or refuted on the basis of the reliability or unreliability of the 
methods followed. In other words, how scientific or unscientific the process is. One cannot 
therefore talk of knowledge production and acquisition without evaluating its scientificity. It is 
the scientificity of knowledge that differentiates common sense from scientific knowledge. 
According to Nagel (1961, pp. 2-3) “science is a label associated with how knowledge is 
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constructed and gathered. Modern science is associated with elaborate and intellectual acquisition 
of knowledge”. Implied in this argument is that scientific knowledge has some final truth to it. It 
is organised, systematic and reliable, characterised by controllable, measurable, predictable and 
repeatable processes. 
 
The purpose of systematic science is according to Nagel (1961, p. 5) “to remove the 
incompleteness which common sense suffers from … and to introduce the refinements into 
ordinary conceptions by the very process of exhibiting the systematic connections of propositions 
about matters of common sense”. According to Hindess (1977, pp. 176-177), the aim of science 
is “to get nearer to the truth and it does so by fulfilling the method of rational criticism”. Okere 
(2005a, p. 22) argues that the aim of science “includes acquaintance with, getting into the deep 
and true meaning of, having familiarity with and getting the real truth about something”. Okere’s 
understanding of the aim of science is unconditional, less restrictive and less prescriptive. His 
hermeneutic approach does not prescribe how and which conditions need to be met to get to the 
truth, but rather gives room for contextual interpretations and differences.  
 
In our analyses of the above given aims, Nagel positions science as a big-brother or watchdog, 
whose aim is to correct and to improve on the incomplete and unrefined falsehoods of common 
sense. One does not therefore get the impression that there is an honest “scientific” attempt to get 
to “know” something here, except to monitor common sense’s views, conceptualisations and 
applications. Hindess takes us closer to the idea of getting to know, but introduces rationality as a 
criterion to scientific knowledge. In this instance as well, rationality is likely to exclude other 
ways of doing things as irrational if not carefully considered within a particular context. For 
example, observing and honouring ancestors in Africa is seen as logical, rational and therapeutic 
(healing) by ordinary people. To impose rationality and proof as assessment tools of their 
knowledge system and reality is methodologically flawed. The fact that there is no rational proof 
that the ancestors hear those that observe them does not mean that ancestors do not exist. Not 
everything exists on the basis of proof for its existence. The metaphysical or common sense 
world exists and is a reality to ordinary people, with or without the existence or approval of the 
scientific knowledge world. These ordinary people’s daily activities are moreover characterised 
by the desire to know their living circumstances. Okere takes us to the etymology of the word to 
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know from which knowledge comes. Okere (2005a, p. 22) reminds us that when Aristotle wrote 
all men by nature desire to know, “he was using the term know in the general, commonsensical 
understanding of the term, common to the people of his day and culture, to people of our day and 
apparently to all human beings”. In our time, the aim of science has shifted from every human 
being desiring to know, to proving right or wrong parameters using rational means. This Western 
criterion has restricted science to what Okere (2005a, p. 22) refers to as the “building of bodies or 
systems of truth about specific regions of reality, following defined methods of inquiry”. It does 
seem that there is nothing wrong in distinguishing between various levels of knowledge. The 
problem arises when this knowledge differentiation is used to create an impression that some 
levels are better and more important than others, without sensitivity to contexts and cultural 
background. After all, at any given time, both common sense and scientific knowledge are 
applicable and usable by all human beings, depending on the need and context. 
 
From this observation, we can argue that although science does not include common sense, it 
derives its very existence from common sense. Common sense is therefore the well from which 
science derives its rationality and scientificity. Common sense and scientific knowledge are not 
necessarily mutually exclusive. Hindess (1977, p. 175) argues that “the content of scientific 
knowledge at any time is a function of intersubjective decisions based on methodological norms 
derived from metaphysical research programmes. The demarcation between science and non-
science is an effect of the prevailing metaphysics”. It is important to note that the scientificity of 
knowledge depends on “methodological norms” that are put in place and determined by the 
scientific community. Clearly, certain exclusive predetermined criteria and standards are used to 
create an in-group and an out-group or scientific community and the non scientific community. 
This scientific community is characterised by certain conditions such as the knowledge bearer’s 
training, their epistemology, the aim of the task or research and so on. The “non scientific 
community” is excluded from the scientific community membership. This exclusion of some 
knowledge systems, by its very nature disqualifies the universality claim by Western science. We 
can therefore argue that the scientific statements and conclusions are not entirely objective and 
free of dogma as science claims. Hindess (1977, p. 175) states that “the results of any test and 
therefore the content of scientific knowledge, must depend on the forms of training which prevail 
within the scientific community at the time”. Training therefore provides the basis for creating 
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and validating “acceptable” basic statements within the in-group or the scientific community. The 
training, epistemology, context and so on of for example a traditional healer, will therefore enable 
him or her to make certain basic statements, assumptions or hypotheses which are acceptable to 
their client community and cultural healing community. A Western conceived community of 
psychotherapists, depending on what is defined as psychotherapeutic, will for example determine 
acceptable assessment and treatment procedures when dealing with bereavement. These 
procedures may not necessarily be applicable or used by a traditional healer within the African 
context, whose approach may be ecological rather than diagnostic. If looked at superficially, 
there is a clear demarcation between common sense and scientific knowledge conceptually. 
Epistemologically and pragmatically, however, there are serious methodological problems 
associated with differentiating between common sense and scientific knowledge. As Nagel 
(1961) observes, the acquisition of reliable knowledge is not the function of modern science … 
and skills and competent information have been there before the advent of modern science.  
 
It follows from our critique of common sense and scientific knowledge, that the insistence on 
proof through testing and falsifiability, controllability, measurability, rationality and so on as the 
sole criteria of the scientificity and non scientificity of knowledge cannot be sustained. Our 
argument for methodologies that are consistent with and are sensitive to Africans’ 
epistemologies, context, existential experiences and cultural practices must stand. Hindess (1977, 
pp. 3-4) articulates this need for the critical evaluation of methodologies by stating that 
“methodology lays down procedures to be used either in the generation or in the testing of 
propositions by those who wish to obtain valid knowledge … It is clear that methodology’s claim 
to prescribe correct procedures to the sciences must presuppose a form of knowledge which is 
superior to that produced in the sciences”. Hindess goes on to suggest that, “if the claim of 
philosophy to a special kind of knowledge can be shown to be without foundation, if these claims 
are at best dogmatic or else incoherent, then methodology is an empty and futile pursuit and its 
prescriptions are vacuous”. Our view is that methodology should benefit and advance peoples’ 
material experiences or conditions and the growth of their pool of knowledge in a collaborative 
and sensitive manner.  
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Our argument thus far has indicated that common sense is not methodology, but it contains a 
method. Although common sense does not reflect on or possess the science of how things are 
done, it has a particular way of doing things. What is clear from our discussion, however, is that 
common sense and science are not at the same logical level The Western differentiation of 
common sense and scientific knowledge seems to equate common sense to oral traditions, that is, 
that all oral traditions are reduced to the level of common sense. We firmly dispute this 
correlation and its “rational” basis as will be seen later when we discuss oral traditions. The 
method of inquiry should be consistent with and be legitimised by people’s experiential and 
cultural realities. Our further argument for the broadening of the methodology of conventional 
science calls for the need to take indigenous knowledge systems, in particular African knowledge 
systems, seriously. We will now briefly discuss other related methodological problems in the 
social inquiry enterprise that arise when scientific knowledge is considered the only way through 
which knowledge is generated. 
 
Methodological Problems in the Social Inquiry Enterprise 
 
Our observation and experience is that social sciences have sought to explain theories that 
employ “abstract” distinctions between scientific knowledge and methodologies, remote from the 
familiar experiences of the local people concerned. These discrepancies have resulted in 
questions being raised in methodological studies. Nagel’s (1961, pp. 448-449) argument, for 
example, is that “there are no reasonably satisfactory methodological explanations and 
procedures in social inquiry discourse, and if any, they are characterised by serious disagreements 
on methodological as well as substantive questions. The propriety of designating any extant 
branch of social inquiry as a real science has been repeatedly challenged – commonly on the 
ground that, although such inquiries have contributed large quantities of frequently reliable 
information about social matters, these contributions are primarily studies of special social facts 
in certain historically human groups and supply no strict laws about social phenomena”. The field 
of social sciences cannot “objectively” offer a uniform, rigidly defined set of explanatory systems 
of inquiry. Unlike the case in the natural sciences, there is strictly no real universal 
methodological prescription of inquiry in social inquiry phenomena. Methodological processes 
and issues within the social sciences have to be understood within their unique dynamic, 
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historical, individual and cultural contexts. In this sense, there cannot be universalised laws about 
the study of human experiences, practices and existence. It is within this understanding that 
Western methodologies cannot necessarily accurately and adequately account for and represent 
indigenous ideals and experiences, and in particular African indigenous knowledge systems. The 
attempt by the West to standardise and universalise their methodologies in social sciences for 
different contexts such as psychology and psychotherapy has created inconsistencies, conflict and 
methodological problems. 
 
Most, if not all, African knowledge systems suffered and continue to be subjected to Western 
methodological criteria as justification for their scientificity and existence. The present study is a 
project in the critique of the claim to universality and superiority of the Western epistemological 
paradigm over all others. It is doing this through a specific focus upon African indigenous 
knowledge with particular reference to psychotherapy. With regard to the former leg of this 
project, we propose to focus upon Nagel’s (1961) critique of methodology in the social sciences.  
 
Controlled Inquiry 
 
Controlled inquiry is based on the assumption that in order to establish general laws that can 
serve as instruments for systematic explanations that are dependable and predictable, the process 
of inquiry should be confined to a certain process of controlled experimentation. Controlled 
experimentation refers to the notion that the world, and knowledge for that matter, is 
“describable, and explicable in mechanically predictable and rigidly governed by discoverable 
laws” (Ryle, 1949, p. 75). One of the shortcomings of controlled inquiry in the social sciences is 
that human behaviour cannot be accurately predicted as one would predict the temperature at 
which a certain metal would melt in the natural sciences. The continuing conflict in Iraq is an 
example of the unpredictability of human behaviour. The predictions, calculations, and control 
measures that were planned for the Iraqi war have been modified and challenged by the very fact 
that human behaviour cannot be accurately predicted. The “predicted” and “standardised” effects 
inaugurated by the United States of America and Britain have to date not been achieved. Human 
free will (Ryle, 1949) has probably played an important role in tampering with the said 
predictions In controlled experiments, the researcher controls variables to achieve certain 
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standardised effects. According to Nagel (1961), it is not always usually clear whether the 
observed changes are due to the researcher’s influence or the variations of the conditions under 
which the experiment takes place. Within the context of the present study, African experiences, 
cultures and their practices cannot be measured and conclusions drawn about their therapeutic 
value or meanings based on controlled Western systems of inquiry. If this is done, conflict and 
misrepresentations become the predominant features of such research. 
 
Cultural Relativity and Social Laws 
 
Cultural relativity refers to the idea that every community or cultural group will behave and 
shape its practices in accordance with their cultural background, inherent to and consistent with 
the historical social character of that community. Nagel (1961, p. 459) refers to cultural relativity 
as the “historically determined character of the social phenomena”. According to Nagel this 
means that all communities have certain forms of analogous institutions such as the family 
organisation, forms of education, and ways of maintaining law and order, that have been 
developed in response to different environments. These responses have crystallised into different 
cultural traditions. It is these cultural differences that we argue have limited and restricted 
generalisability and which are obstacles to establishing general laws in social inquiry processes. 
Accordingly, as Nagel (1961, p. 459) argues, “human social behaviour depends not only on the 
immediate occasions that call forth the behaviour but also on the culturally instituted habits and 
interpretations of events involved in the response to the occasions, the patterns of social 
behaviour will vary with the society in which the behaviour occurs and with the character of its 
institutions at a given historical period”. No social behaviour or practice should therefore be 
interpreted outside of its cultural context. This does not however preclude the desirability of 
comparison. It is for this reason that Okere (2005b, pp. 2-3) argues for a hermeneutic approach to 
social phenomena because “all that we ever understand is made possible by a prior 
understanding. We go from the known to the unknown and, prior to any new knowledge, we pre-
knew”. The “pre-knew” of a particular people is simultaneously their point of departure and their 
means or method in the search for new knowledge. Social research must take this seriously in 
order to make its claims to “abstract universality” significant, credible and reliable. For this 
reason we submit that a sensitive culturally-relative approach should be adopted when dealing 
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with indigenous knowledge social systems. The West’s generalised and control oriented social 
inquiry procedures that have been invariably applied to indigenous people’s practices cannot 
therefore unconditionally sustain their claim to be true and accurate reflections of indigenous 
cultures. 
 
Knowledge of Social Phenomena as a Social Variable 
 
The role of the knowledge possessed by either the interviewer/researcher or interviewee/ 
researched constitutes a confounding variable in the social inquiry process. The fact that the 
knowledge gatherer/researcher knows what his or her intentions are may manipulate the process, 
thereby creating methodological inconsistencies. It may also only lead to the intended results. 
Conversely, when the knowledge givers/researched know that they are being studied, their 
behaviour during and after the process is likely to vary. The results or findings and the 
investigation process will always be questionable. According to Nagel (1961, p. 466), “the 
manner in which experiments on social subject matter are conducted may introduce changes of 
unknown magnitude into the material under study, and may therefore vitiate from the outset the 
conclusions advanced on the basis of strictly experimental inquiries”. The West has for example 
reached certain empirical conclusions about African healing practices (for example, that these 
treatment methods are not scientific) using predetermined methodologies, with the full 
knowledge of what it intended to achieve. Such results cannot necessarily be conclusive due to 
prior knowledge of the investigators and their methods of inquiry. Within the social inquiry 
framework, researchers are therefore methodologically faced with the problem of their 
knowledge of social phenomena, and should therefore be aware of this dilemma. The illusion that 
this confounding variable can be controlled constitutes denial of social reality, is culturally 
indefensible and methodologically inconsistent. At best this confirms the “unwitting rigidity and 
manipulation” that always accompany social inquiry processes. 
 
The Subjective Nature of Social Subject Matter 
 
The subjectivity-objectivity argument has dominated past and present methodological 
discourses and will continue to be an area of contention in the future. The purpose of this section 
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is not to engage in the above controversy, but to indicate the methodologically problematic nature 
of the subjective nature of the social subject matter. Nagel (1961) identifies the subject matter as 
purposive human action, directed to attaining various ends or “values”. Nagel (1961, p. 474) 
argues that “motives, dispositions, intended goals and values are matters not open to sensory 
inspection, and can be neither made familiar nor identified by way of an exclusive use of 
procedures that are suitable for exploring the publicly observable subject matter of the ‘I’ (or 
natural) sciences …. Accordingly, the various ‘things’ that may need to be mentioned in 
explaining purposive actions must be construed in terms of what the human actors themselves 
believe about those things, rather than in terms of what can be discovered about the way of the 
objective methods of natural sciences”. Most of the prevailing conventional Western 
methodologies upon which categories of describing and explaining African social practices are 
based therefore represent Western subjective constructions. These constructions are clouded by 
the Western cultural historical influences that are inherent in most social inquiry processes. Due 
to the subjective nature of the social subject matter, the West cannot therefore claim to have 
objectively represented African experiences and reality completely. Appeals to objective 
evidence and knowledge in social contexts do not necessarily constitute authentic knowledge. 
Such unauthentic knowledge, based on “science”, often functions as a social control mechanism. 
This is the reason why most African healing practices are degraded and excluded from the body 
of scientific knowledge. We therefore see objective “verification” within social inquiry processes 
as an attempt to exclude, subjugate, maintain and control the status quo. Freire (2003, p. 50) 
argues that “one cannot conceive of objectivity without subjectivity. Neither can exist without the 
other, nor can they be dichotomised. The separation of objectivity from subjectivity, the denial of 
the latter when analysing reality or acting upon it, is objectivism. On the other hand, the denial of 
objectivity in analysis or action, resulting in a subjectivism which leads to solipsistic positions, 
denies action itself by denying objective reality”. According to Freire objectivity and subjectivity 
are in constant dialectical relationship. Science therefore, on the basis of its own “objective” 
methodology, cannot sustain the denial of other realities to the indigenous people.  
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The Value-oriented Bias of Social Inquiry 
 
Social inquiry processes are not free from the social value systems from which researchers 
come and are committed to. This bias does not only affect the contents of their finding but also 
their assessment of the evidence on which they base their conclusions (Nagel, 1961). The 
argument to be advanced here is that there is no such thing as “value neutrality” in social inquiry 
processes. Those who subscribe to the notion of “value-neutrality” are denying the ontological 
and epistemological phenomena of indigenous knowledge. Researchers are intrinsically 
enmeshed in what they are investigating, and also affected by their own notions of what 
constitutes a satisfactory social order. Accordingly, in any social inquiry process, the researcher’s 
own personal standards and sense of social justice come into play (Nagel, 1961). On the basis of 
this argument, we can see that Western methodological formulations and applications are biased 
towards Africans, because they are clouded by Europeans’ own standards and conceptualisations 
of what constitutes a “good” social order. It is within this context that we should question the 
Western methodological bias in respect of Africans’ cultural healing practices and experiences. 
We have demonstrated that it is methodologically impossible to claim objective, a value-free and 
unbiased position in a social science such as psychotherapy. The argument that methodology 
followed in social research formulations will inevitably be influenced by peoples’ experiences, 
their historical contexts and epistemologies, should therefore stand. We will now discuss how 
experience, historical cultural context and methodologies relate to the concept and practice of 
science. 
 
Experience, Historical Context and Methodology 
 
On the face of it, there is merit to rational inquiry as a “scientific” gathering process. 
However, on closer scrutiny, if we agree with Dewey (1958), Okere (2005a & b), Drummond 
(2006), Kuokkanen (2006), Coates, Gray and Hetherington (2006), Okere et al. (2005) and 
Hindess (1977) that knowledge comes from experience, then, the methodology by which this 
experience is translated into “scientific” knowledge becomes crucial. Different people have 
different experiences, methodologies and various conceptualisations of what “science” is to them. 
Osuagwu (1999, p. 57) argues that “the meaning, operation and purpose of method depends very 
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much on the object (its nature: material or immaterial) of the science in question. Because if the 
object is distinct, then its science will grosso modo, equally require a distinct method. Thus there 
are as many methods as there are objects of sciences: mathematical, moral, natural, physical, 
mental, spiritual, etc. History attracts our present attention”. We cannot therefore talk of a 
universal science constructed out of a foreign epistemology. This viewpoint is strongly supported 
by Okere’s (2005a, p. 21) argument that, “ it is clear that all philosophy is local and even 
individual before it can be universal; and nothing can be genuinely universally valid unless it was 
first authentically personal and inserted within a given culture and context”. A similar viewpoint 
can be found among the indigenous Maori people in New Zealand. Drummond (2006, p. 3) 
presents it in this way: “ For Maori, acquiring knowledge is not an isolated activity that takes 
place in a library or a classroom, but a learning process that takes place in a human and 
geographical context. It is cultural learning, placing the individual in a framework of spiritual 
beliefs, a practical economic structure, a geographical context and network of family and 
community structures based around named individuals ancestral and living.” These experiences 
and context-bound indigenous viewpoints on knowledge systems therefore render the idea of 
Western rationality as the only scientific criterion for knowledge production questionable. 
 
Within the context of this study, psychotherapy as a field of study, a reality and a form of 
practice needs to be situated within the African experiential discourse. The view of Ramose 
(2002, p. 1) is that, “it is still necessary to assert and to uphold the right of Africans to define the 
meaning of experience and truth in their own right. In order to achieve this, one of the 
requirements is that Africans should take the opportunity to speak for and about themselves and 
in that way construct an authentic and truly African discourse about Africa”. From the above 
arguments, methodology arises from a particular history and experience and therefore needs to be 
consistent with the epistemology and cultural experiences of the people concerned, in this 
instance, Africans. Mbeki (2006, p. 23) affirms Ramose’s view by stating that “perspectives on 
Africa must also be based on information, whether correct or otherwise, events and processes 
about Africa and in Africa”. Most of the information about Africa such as African healing 
practices is formulated, interpreted and concluded using Western perspectives. This imposition of 
Western perspectives and misappropriation is what results in various distortions about African 
history and the reality around her.  
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The above argument is often disregarded within the Western scientific paradigm. As Osuagwu 
(1999, p. 26) observed, “ African philosophy has been very much denied, rejected and neglected 
on grounds of its controverted genuine historicity, scientificity and authentic Africanity”. 
Western science has a history of excluding other realities, prescribing and defining rules for 
acceptable knowledge and practice on behalf of others. Mbeki’s (2006, p. 23) argument on the 
West’s denial of other realities is that “by denying people the cultural and the social traits of the 
‘civilised’, the powerful could denigrate a people’s history. Coupled with a continued process of 
indoctrination this could eventually also erode the self-worth and sense of humanity of ‘the 
other’”. According to Coates, Gray and Hetherington (2006, p. 382), “these Euro-American 
paradigms have contributed not only to intellectual colonisation, but also to the devaluing and 
marginalisation of indigenous and local knowledge”. One of the prime aims of the process of 
colonisation has been to distort, dominate and subjugate other forms of knowledge systems. We 
therefore agree with Mbeki that in dealing with perspectives on and of Africa, we have to ask 
certain critical questions such as, what past and present information is available on Africa? Who 
gathers and disseminates such information? Who interprets events and processes in Africa? From 
what point of view are these interpretations made? Whose views dominate the daily discourse in 
our country and the rest of the continent? If we effectively ask these questions we are likely to 
critically reflect on processes and ideas that dominate our curricula, history and social discourse. 
In this way we will be able to position ourselves (Africans) as important producers and conduits 
of knowledge. In this connection Okere (2005a, p. 20) maintains that “this has enabled the 
development of false superiority over other forms of knowledge and real power hegemony of the 
West over other peoples”. It is for this reason that the concept of diversity is somewhat 
opprobrious to Western thought and practice. It is on the basis of this narrowly limited approach 
and scope of the Western scientific paradigm that we argue for a dialogical engagement between 
the Western and the African methods of acquiring and validating knowledge. 
 
According to Freire (2003, p. 17), “dialogue does not represent a somewhat false path that 
involves the ingenuity of the other. On the contrary, dialogue characterises an epistemological 
relationship. Thus dialogue is a way of knowing…The fundamental goal of dialogue is to create a 
process of learning and knowing that invariably involves theorising about the experiences shared 
 27
in the dialogue process”. This equal engagement of knowledge systems will go a long way in 
dealing with what Okere (2005a, pp. 26-29) describes as follows: “We alone-know-it-all claims 
made in the name of the West … and bring about the acknowledgement that the degree of 
‘scientificness’ is debatable and will always be variable … that different people do have their 
own science and bodies of knowledge”. To come to this level and process of dialogical 
engagement between the West and Africa, philosophical reflections on their methodologies are 
both necessary and imperative. A question to be asked in this regard is, why philosophical 
reflections? Why philosophising in a psychology study? 
 
An attempt to understand this question must be situated in the conceptualisation of what 
philosophy is. Okere’s (2005b, pp. 2-4) argument is that “all philosophy is hermeneutic in nature, 
meaning simply that all philosophy is an effort of interpretive understanding, understanding one’s 
world, one’s environment, one’s culture or one’s reality”. If this view is admitted, we can 
therefore see that a comprehensive understanding of the concept of psychotherapy within the 
African context needs philosophising. This process will enable us to reflect on the experiences, 
cultures, history, biases, and ideals when dealing with Africans within therapeutic contexts. 
Okere (2005a, p. 21) broadly defines philosophy as “the assumption and then the questioning and 
critical interpretation of one’s culture at the level of ultimacy and finality of being. Or put in a 
different way, it is trying to find answers to the deep questions of meaning and existence posed 
by and within one’s environing culture”. Osuagwu (1999, p. 29) defines philosophy as “a 
systematic and critical enterprise of the human reason in the interpretative search and discovery 
of the primordial and essential or substantial meaning of things as they are in themselves”. It is 
within the context of these definitions that the methodological and social inquiry issues in the 
field of psychotherapy should be interrogated. 
 
The main focus of psychotherapy is to attend to diverse relational being (emotional, 
behavioural, cognitive, spiritual, interactional, ecological, cosmic, etc.), human and inanimate 
(water, minerals, mountains) experiences in a dialogical manner. This means that Africans view 
human beings as relationally engaged in a constant, respectful dialogue and interaction with their 
environment and nature. Ajei’s (2000, p. 103) conceptualisation of nature is “the wholistic realm 
of being, that includes both the physical and other forces and energies which are not ordinarily 
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susceptible to sense-experience”. This understanding of nature therefore represents the wholistic 
complexity of collaboration, connectedness and being. According to Bujo (1998, p. 209) “the 
human person and the cosmos complement each other to such an extent that they cannot exist 
without this interdependence”. From this understanding, we can see that philosophy seeks to 
critically and wholistically deal with human existence, its meaning and human knowledge 
systems in different cultural contexts. The aim of philosophising is to legitimise and include 
through dialogue, other forms of knowledge and knowing. Ramose (2002, p. 6) refers to this as 
“the curiosity to understand those who don’t think as we do…” Coates, Gray and Hetherington 
(2006, p. 389) describe it as “the search for meaning and sustainability, and acknowledging the 
need to accept and value alternative perspectives, a welcoming and an inclusive context enabling 
the celebration of diversity and the sharing of knowledge”. The above argument clearly forms 
part of the research paradigm and the methodological conceptualisations and practices of 
different people in their different contexts. A reflection on the Western science and indigenous 
cultures calls for diversified methodological approaches to knowledge systems. 
 
Western Science and the Indigenous Cultures 
 
The historical evolutionary nature of “science” emanates from the European boundaries and 
gained its power in the world through conquest. The history of “science” cannot be separated 
from the Western broader expeditions of colonisation and imperialism. Although these were 
ostensibly driven by material and political power, they also included intellectual, epistemological 
and paradigmatic colonisation. It is through this process of colonisation that the Western 
dominance was imposed. Okere et al. (2005, p. 5) point out the adverse effects of this lopsided 
relationship by stating that “African societies have since colonisation and still today been marked 
by ‘othering’ from the North. Its great civilisational traditions (in particular political, medical, 
biological, commercial and religious ones) and healing practices (our addition) have been 
inferiorised and subdued in particular during the 19th and 20th centuries’ colonial and missionary 
enterprise… Ostensibly propagated for ‘the good of the colonised peoples’, this Western 
civilisational version of knowledge was being imposed on several levels, in particular through the 
colonial and missionary schools”.  
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Western ideological supremacy translated into the colonisers deciding on what was good and 
what not for the colonised. (Biko, 2002, pp. 80-82) succinctly articulates this Western dominance 
mentality and attitude within the South African context, by arguing that “so immersed are they in 
prejudice that they do not believe that blacks can formulate their thoughts without white guidance 
and trusteeship… In all aspects of black-white relationship, now and in the past, we see a 
constant tendency by whites to depict blacks as of an inferior status. Our culture, our history and 
indeed all aspects of the black man’s life have been battered nearly out of shape in the great 
collision between the indigenous values and the Anglo-Boer culture.”  
 
It is within the above supremacy mentality that we should understand how all other areas of 
being of the indigenous people, values, and history, education systems, cultural healing practices 
and so on were devalued and relegated to the periphery. Mbeki (2006, p. 23) puts this supremacy 
mentality within the historical evolutionary context by arguing that “the European historians of 
the 19th century were consumed by the cancer of racism and the firm belief that there were no 
human beings on earth who were divinely endowed with intelligence fortitude and wisdom than 
those who populated European countries. About blacks they were absolutely sure that these were 
not only incapable of making any significant contribution to human civilisation but were in fact 
sub-human who needed the tutelage, on everything, of the matured European peoples”. It is in the 
same attitude of undermining other forms of practices and knowledge systems that the self-
imposed Western “science” should be understood. Therefore “science” as we study and 
understand it today, is a history of the European evolution of ideas as well as practices and cannot 
therefore claim to be a universal representative of all knowledge systems. Ajei (2000, p. 139) 
articulates the Western dominance by arguing that “physical science cannot arrogate to itself the 
status of ‘the only discoverer of truth in nature’ because the epistemological framework of 
physical science is just one of the many legitimate epistemological frameworks”. Western 
“science” is not necessarily consistent with the existential experiences of the indigenous peoples 
of Africa. It is therefore out of synchrony with the local cultural knowledge (Okere, et al., 2005). 
Disregarding this historical and cultural hegemony and dissonance, the West continues to claim 
and demand universal “scientific” supremacy over all knowledge systems, “under the guise of 
‘methodological’ objections” (Ramose, 2002, p. 7). It is on the basis of the indigenous people’s 
research paradigms and methodologies that we would like to engage the West by pointing out the 
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inherent problems associated with the attempt to understand knowledge from a foreign 
framework.  
 
From the epistemological, ontological and practical point of view, one cannot therefore 
undertake authentic and congruent scientific research through total, complete and exclusive 
reliance upon an alien research paradigm and methodology. If this is done, as the West has 
insisted over centuries, then tension is inevitable. These inconsistencies and lack of fit between 
the research paradigm, methodologies and peoples’ experiences are essentially due to the West’s 
imposition of its epistemological paradigm over indigenous knowledge systems. Bondy (1986) 
maintains that the aim of research is to give expression and to reflect on reality in relation to 
people’s existential circumstances. People’s historical existence and cultural practices therefore 
form an integral part of their research paradigm and methodology. One’s epistemology influences 
the research paradigm and methodology. 
 
The method by which one gathers knowledge, evaluates data and interprets the world is 
influenced by one’s epistemology. Researchers cannot therefore separate themselves from their 
epistemological paradigm. Subjectivity is an inextricable part of the researcher’s reality. Hindess 
(1977, pp. 16-17) defines positivist methodology as “a distinctive type of epistemology 
characterised by its insistence that we can know reality only on the basis of experience. 
Positivism asserts the claim of experience as the ultimate foundation of human knowledge and 
denies the possibility of meaningful discourses concerning super sensible objects … there can be 
no foundation for the ontological doctrines which underlie the rationalist demarcation between 
the sciences of nature and those of history and culture”. This is where the notion of objectivity 
comes from, the belief that research is free from socio-political, epistemological and existential 
cultural influences. Consequently, indigenous people have come to associate research with 
alienation, loss of self-identity, loss of one’s cultural being-ness and connectedness. Ramose 
(2002, p. 5). argues that “individual and collective identity is very important in the formation of 
self-knowledge, thus self-knowledge can never be complete without reference to one’s roots, to 
the past which is one’s history”. Osuagwu (1999, pp. 27-30) further states that “to understand the 
issues of historicity and the scientificity of African historical methodology, we need to employ 
deconstruction and reconstruction approaches”. He further argues that to do this properly, “our 
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investigations must take into account our historical origins/originals: contexts, times, places, 
persons, events, projects, problems, influences, doctrines, schools, literature, etcetera. We must 
get back to the origins and originals – to the remote ancient times in North Africa – to discover in 
their proper purity, identity, integrity, differences and merit which were distorted, denied, omitted 
and forgotten by later historians. Reconstruction comes into play, to co-ordinately and 
complimentarily, put things into their proper perspective. This proper reconstructive placement 
implies the creative moment of construction”. The current methodological tensions and 
inconsistencies between the Western and indigenous peoples, Africans in this case, is a justifiable 
attempt by Africans to deconstruct and reconstruct the deformed African identity. The history of 
our psychotherapeutic practices and their cultural heritage and their dynamism to a very large 
extent defines Africa’s uniqueness. On this reasoning, the study of history is both necessary and 
imperative (Ramose, 2002).  
 
The above sketched background gives rise to the need to critically evaluate how both a 
research paradigm and methodology can be unauthentically exploited. The West has used its 
“definitions” of research, paradigm and methodology to subjugate and undermine indigenous 
cultural practices. There has therefore been a conventional tendency that has created a closed and 
rigid system of knowing that only permitted the self-certifying discoveries and claim to 
absoluteness in the name of science. The essential problem inherent in this way of thinking is that 
it generalises and globalises standards, assuming that the Western paradigm should be treated as a 
universal constant. Okere (2005b, pp. 8-9) argues that “those who preach universalism thinking 
that the West has discovered the only universalistic themes of all philosophy and for all time can 
be likened to those who imagine that the whole world should join the bandwagon of globalisation 
since it is not only the inevitable future, but indeed the only true future for all”. In the light of this 
universalised and institutionalised thinking, diversity is seen as deviancy that needs to be strictly 
controlled. Anything that does not fit what Steiner (2002, p. 2) calls the “rule and law of science 
(paradigm)”. It is this identity deformation, gross injustice and historical prejudice against 
African research methodologies, by Western science that indigenous people are questioning and 
resisting. 
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Smith (1999, p. 1) reminds us that “from the vantage point of the colonised, the term research 
is inextricably linked to European imperialism and colonialism, therefore the word ‘research’ is 
one of the dirtiest words in the indigenous world vocabulary. The way in which scientific 
research is implicated in the worst excesses of colonialism remains a powerful remembered 
history for many of the world’s colonised people”. Okere (2005a, pp. 21-22) supports Smith’s 
argument, but further argues that even the words “science and Western are emotionally charged 
words invoking intense feelings of partisanship and, for some, even resentment”. Embedded in 
Smith and Okere’s observations is the extent to which research and science have been and are 
still exploited, to subjugate indigenous people.  S. Lifschitz (personal communication, March 16, 
2006) argues that scientific inquiry or research reduces experience as a form of knowledge to the 
periphery and therefore anything that does not “fit” this “scientific inquiry” is not regarded as 
science.  It is on the basis of this lack of “fit” with the predominant paradigm that we see 
indigenous knowledge systems being marginalised because they do not “fit” the universal 
Western “scientific” paradigm. Similarly, the acceptance of any research results and the 
methodology followed must “fit” with the Western paradigm; otherwise they do not constitute 
“authentic scientific knowledge”. This generalistic, scientific and rationalistic thinking does not 
differentiate people according to their historical and cultural experiences and contexts. The 
Western scientific paradigm has demonstrated that it does not have the will and interest to 
understand historical realities from indigenous peoples’ cultural frame of reference. The one 
common Western universal way of interacting with other knowledge systems is to subjugate and 
displace them through bureaucratic and rationalistic research methodologies. On the basis of the 
above argument, it is thus appropriate to conclude that Western science cannot deal with 
differences and diversity (Coates, Gray & Hetherington, 2006). Anything that goes beyond the 
comprehension of the Western conceptual framework does not seem to form any meaningful 
body of knowledge and therefore it is regarded as unscientific. In this way different, unfamiliar 
and non-compliant realities are thus reduced to no knowledge or less significant status. Despite 
this rigid arrogance by the Western methodologies and knowledge interpretation, indigenous 
people are more and more collectively reclaiming their identities by researching and practising 
their culture. Methodologies used here are consistent with the indigenous epistemologies and 
forms of social inquiries. 
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According to Bondy (1986, p. 237), people have “multiple variety of historical existential 
realities about the world” and this makes it difficult to create normative standardised definitions. 
Steiner (2002, p. 9) emphasises the importance and uniqueness of history as personal experience 
by stating that “… history is what we experience, it is not a theoretical filter through which we 
interpret experience, history is what we experience immediately. History is present to us and is 
experienced as future possibilities … it presents the dimensions of culture, research themes and 
the being of researchers and others, history is the milieu in which we live our lives, it is the 
source of our experience and what makes us meaningful”. The word history is here placed within 
a different conceptual level and framework. Whether we are referring to his-story or her-story, 
this relates to a -story, a narrative which is at the level of experience. This experience constitutes 
knowledge. But such knowledge is not “science” as understood in terms of the Western 
epistemological paradigm. To be science such knowledge must appeal to the etymology of this 
term derived from the Latin; Scire- in Latin means to know. It is knowledge, any kind of 
knowledge arising from experience. And this knowledge is referred to as reality. It is in this sense 
that reality is science.  
 
In recent years, the understanding of history as experience, knowledge, and reality has gained 
momentum and prominence especially among the indigenous people, whose history was not seen 
as authentic knowledge or science. In his interrogation of the question of science, Okere (2005a, 
p. 25) discusses science on two different levels; first level science (science as knowledge in 
general) and science as one and as many. The latter level is informed by the notion that all human 
beings by nature desire to know. Okere argues that “to claim such a prerogative exclusively for 
one people or culture or to deny it to others would be to disqualify those others from a class of 
humans. As such all human beings as a matter of fact, somehow do have some knowledge. Many 
in the sense that, since such basic knowledge is human activity par excellence, it is also 
supremely historical in a supremely pluralistic world. That is why, as in human activity, there 
must be more than one way, in fact many ways of doing it, each human group/culture structuring 
and colouring its own knowledge according to the specificities on its own environment”. This 
understanding of science departs radically from the Western rational meaning of science. At this 
level of conceptualisation, according to Okere (2005a, p. 22), “science or knowledge is a special 
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activity or mode of being of man by which man relates to reality from the perspective of the truth, 
truth here meaning getting reality as it is”. 
 
A complementary understanding to Okere’s view of science is provided by Osuagwu’s 
conceptualisation. Osuagwu (1999, p. 51) defines science as "formally a rational, systematic, 
rigorous, logical, critical, creative and objective enterprise; that aims at investigating, 
understanding and discovering reality in its veracity or falsehood”. Osuagwu (1999, p. 52) goes 
on to argue that “our foregoing position does not intend to neglect the serious caveats noted by 
African critics against erroneous Europeanism in African scholarship, … we must moderate the 
unscientific aspect of the recommendation for the total rupture with or isolation from the basic, 
common or international scientific rules of open-mindedness, partnership, complementarity, 
collaboration or community. The correct understanding of science recognises its autonomy and 
objectivity which operates supremely over particular persons, peoples, places, times cultures and 
histories”. Clearly, Osuagwu’s understanding of science honours universality and objectivity. It is 
prescriptive. Freire (2003, p. 47) succinctly describes this “Western scientific methodological” 
prescription, by arguing that “every prescription represents the imposition of one individual’s 
choice upon another, transforming the consciousness of the person prescribed to into one that 
conforms with the prescriber’s consciousness”. A prescription by its very nature creates norms, 
standards and laws which set exclusionary conditions to the one that must conform to the 
prescription. The acceptability and effectiveness of the prescription depend on the parameters laid 
down by the one who prescribes the rules. 
 
The argument that we would like to advance here is that the proposed “basics” and 
“international scientific rules” criteria must take into account indigenous peoples’ experiences. 
These “methodological standards” should be formulated through dialogical engagement, and not 
exclude the contributions of other cultures and systems of thought. According to Okere (2005a), 
there are different ways of being and of relating, therefore there are equally various ways of 
knowledge or science. This understanding of science is accommodative of different experiences 
and contexts. Western “science” is “often limited both in its subject area and approach, restricted 
to the building of bodies or systems of truth about specific regions of reality, following certain 
well defined methods of inquiry” (Okere, 2005a, pp. 22-23). The above divergent views on 
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science therefore show that “science” is prejudiced and biased when it becomes unilaterally 
prescriptive and universally applied, thereby excluding vast areas or “pools” of knowledge or 
experiences and their corresponding methods of inquiry.  Okere’s redefinition above has provided 
us with an expanded meaning of history. Our understanding of history as a systematic, old and 
ever growing creation of bodies of truths and significant dates’ recordings and analysis in 
academic settings is challenged. A new expanded conceptualisation and meaning of history as 
narratives, realities, experiences and science has therefore emerged. We would like to align 
ourselves with Okere’s latter definition. We have argued that all knowledge has forms of science 
to it, and science comes from experience, and experience constitutes history, and history is a 
source of reality. We therefore conclude that knowledge, experience, history and reality are 
constructed through different scientific means. Science in this context includes and represents 
lived experiences that manifest in both the visible and invisible worlds. 
 
We will now turn to the definitions of the concepts research, paradigm and methodology and 
briefly show how each one of them fits in the main argument advanced above. These concepts 
will then briefly be reflected upon to create the context for a critical discussion of the 
methodological problems of psychotherapy as a social inquiry field. Critical reflections on these 
concepts and how they are misused by the West to create a myth of universal “science” will be 
provided.  
 
Research, Paradigm and Methodology 
 
The conceptual relationship between research, paradigm and methodology is very complex 
and to a very large extent defines what “science” is. Yet this inextricably connected relationship 
does not receive the necessary interrogation it deserves in social inquiry and in particular, in 
psychotherapy literature. The unjustifiable Western dominance and use of the concepts research, 
paradigm and methodology in modern and post-modern scientific enterprises needs to be 
seriously explored. The basis on which Western “authentic scientific” research is proclaimed 
universal is backed up by these concepts. In our view, these concepts are indeed necessary to 
guiding the social inquiry process. The problem we have has an ethical and methodological 
dimension to it. That is, when these concepts are manipulated and used not to the benefit of all 
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humanity, but for the exclusion of other knowledge systems. Bondy (1986, p. 244) sees this 
methodological imposition as “the alienation of being, which is more serious in the dominated 
nations, among which the Hispanic American countries must be counted”. This state of affairs 
means that indigenous discourses are dominated by non-indigenous epistemologies. Osuagwu 
(1999, p. 56) argues that “scientific methods are not ready-made and self-evident. They need to 
be, at least informally, but better formally, discovered and established for comprehensive and 
effective employment”. It is this self-imposed, expansionary and inappropriate application of 
research, paradigm and methodology that we will question on both moral and “scientific” 
grounds.  
 
Research “Defined” 
 
In a philosophical paper entitled, the technicity paradigm and scientism in qualitative research 
Steiner (2002, pp. 1-2) critically contrasts research and reflection, and defines research as “a 
special way of making, acquiring and evaluating knowledge based on specialisation, efficiency of 
knowledge production and detachment of what is studied from its usual context so that 
researchers can focus on the area of special interest and be most efficient.  A rigorous, 
institutionalised pursuit of certainty through rational, objective representation of experience … 
research involves the frantic accumulation of specialist data for its own sake, as the basis for 
expertise and for the power to control the territory defined as the specialist discipline”. Steiner 
goes on to disagree with this conceptualisation by arguing that such research relies on agreed and 
controllable methods for accumulating and evaluating knowledge to permit division of labour and 
a faster aggregation of a body of knowledge valuable to the discipline.  This definition, which we 
have become used to associating with “authentic and credible” research, resembles the typical 
Western thinking about research. Steiner (2002, p. 2) refers to this research conceptualisation as 
“research-driven knowledge making in the epoch of technicity, scientism, specialisation, 
abstraction and rationalism”. The problem with this objective, globalised and standardised 
Western definition is that abstraction and rationality as defined by Western thought are assumed 
to be the universal and ultimate scientific criteria. If we adhere to this definition, we will 
inevitably exclude other ways of knowledge gathering that do not fall under these criteria. Within 
this context, tension and disagreements in terms of cultural diversity, beliefs and values develop 
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between the Western and the African ways of knowledge construction. As we have demonstrated 
with the notion of science, we would like to rather think of research as a systematic process of 
knowledge acquisition through which different people in different contexts come to know, 
represent and reflect their experiences and the world. This understanding of research does not 
provide rigidly defined rules, but allows and supports various methodological approaches and 
creates conditions for self-criticism as well as criticism from the outsider’s viewpoint. 
 
Our argument above clearly shows that research is not a detached, specialised, institutionalised 
pursuit of knowledge through certainty, narrowly defined rationality and standardised objective 
presentation of knowledge. The conditions for such research are mostly created by the economic 
and political interests of the research funders. On the contrary, research is a diverse and broad-
based human pursuit of knowledge permitting comparison and dialogue among the multiple ways 
of knowing and doing. A return to a more diverse, inclusive and context-sensitive praxis that will 
effectively situate research in its appropriate and meaningful context is therefore preferred. An 
understanding of research as a culturally dynamic process of interrogating, questioning, 
conceptualising and interpreting knowledge with the view to creating meaning about the world is 
therefore argued for. 
 
Germane to our definition of research is the proposition that the researcher is free to choose 
and pursue the topic of research. However, in practice it is the case that research is often bound to 
respond to political and business interests. For example, Lysenkoism in the former Soviet Union 
was the kind of research in pursuit of political objectives and so was the funding of the 
Humanities and the Social Sciences in the West during the Cold War. The ascent of economic 
globalisation took precedence over the Humanities and the Social Sciences and has now placed 
greater emphasis on funding science, technology and business management sciences. 
Accordingly, companies such as Monsanto would fund research that promotes business interests, 
as was the case with the brown bean episode. The close alliance between scientific and academic 
research with business interests has compromised academic freedom and downgraded the quality 
of research. It is in the light of this unfolding experience that many scientists and academics 
continue to plead for the “dis-establishment of science”. The support and realisation of this plea 
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in practice is essential to upholding academic freedom in particular and, human freedom in 
general. It is vital to the human right to give meaning to life and pursue happiness independently. 
 
Paradigm “Defined” 
 
Kuhn’s (1962) famous publication, The structure of scientific revolutions, deals extensively 
with the concept of “paradigm”. Kuhn (in Reason & Bradbury, 2001, p. 4) defines a paradigm as 
“an overarching framework which organises our whole approach to being in the world … a 
framework which organises all perceptions and thinking”. Broadly defined, a paradigm is, 
according to Ajei (2007, p. 134), “theoretical and practical background which members of a 
scientific community share”. Paradigm here represents a worldview. Worldviews are depicted in 
peoples’ ways of living, including their cultural practices, belief systems and experiences. All 
people irrespective of who they are or where they come from therefore hold particular 
worldviews. Since all people have worldviews, all people have a paradigm. This implies that 
different people have their own unique ways of viewing and dealing with the world. If paradigms 
reflect peoples’ worldviews, these reflections must be viewed in their respective cultural 
contexts. All people have their unique own ways of philosophising about their existential 
experiences. A paradigm is a systematised, organised and meaningful way of knowing, 
experiencing and explaining the world, irrespective of who is engaged in the “knowing”. Kuhn 
advances the argument that scientific inquiry always takes place within a certain conceptual 
framework, regulated by theoretical and methodological assumptions and interpretations that are 
consistent with that practice. The West cannot therefore claim to have a superior paradigm to 
those of indigenous people or claim to be the only ones who “know”. Our experience has been 
that the West has developed a tendency of presenting the Western paradigm as the universal and 
objective paradigm, and this we regard as a distortion, misunderstanding and a narrow sense of 
what a paradigm is. Reason and Bradbury (2001) expand the understanding of a paradigm to 
mean a cultural worldview, which from time to time, depending on the culture and context, shifts 
as lived experiences breed new knowledge.  
 
The above definition creates a diverse perspective, of understanding a paradigm as a flexible 
context-bound cultural framework of inquiry and questions the West’s limited rational, analytical 
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and absolute claim to all “scientific” knowledge. People’s existence in the world is understood 
through their epistemological existential inquiry processes predicated by their unique lived 
experiences. For example, most Africans’ existence is understood in the indivisible dimension of 
the visible world (Bujo, 1998). We will call this an existential ethic, which gives identity to 
people. From the above arguments, it is clear that undertaking research requires a particular 
paradigm (framework). A paradigm cannot therefore be prescribed and detached from the daily 
activities and meanings attached to these experiences, practices and beliefs of the people 
concerned. If the researcher shifts the “accent” of reality, then the result is what Hindess (1977, p. 
66) describes as “detaching oneself from one’s biographical situation within the social world, and 
entering ‘a field of pre-organised knowledge, called the corpus of his science’”. A paradigm is 
therefore an individual, community and cultural way of constructing, interpreting and 
understanding the world. This worldview is shaped by the past and present conceptual view of 
events and processes of that particular historical cultural context. 
 
Methodology “Defined” 
 
In our observation, methodology and method are in many instances used interchangeably in 
research work. These two concepts are not on the same logical level and are therefore not the 
same. Method refers to the procedure followed, and methodology is science or knowledge about 
the procedure. Methodology therefore refers to a higher order reflection of the research method in 
the production of knowledge. Osuagwu (1999, p. 56) defines scientific method as “an inevitable 
condition for the possibility of science, it is, indeed, a categorical imperative for science’s 
discovery of truth and meaning of reality. Negatively defined, method is an effective condition 
for the detection, correction and avoidance of error or falsehood”. Our argument for the rejection 
of this latter definition is that we see this definition of methodology as inflexible, limited, 
controlled as well as a mechanical conditioning. In what can be seen as a broad social sciences 
view Hindess, (1977, p. 2) conceptualises methodology as a “discipline, bordering on philosophy, 
whose function is to examine the methods which are used or which should be used to produce 
valid knowledge”. In Hindess’ conceptualisation, methodology is a field of study that entails 
philosophical reflections on the methods that are used in the production of knowledge. In a more 
operational and specific definition of methodology, Hindess (1977, p. 3) rejects any view that 
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sees methodology as “the claim to correct procedures to the sciences … the scientific knowledge 
produced and thought to be valid only if its production conforms to the prescribed procedures”. 
Methodology as a philosophical “reflection” critiques what is already “laid down”. This is 
contrary to the limited “scientific” sense where methodology lays down procedures to either 
generate or to test propositions by those who wish to obtain valid knowledge. Our argument is 
that methodologically, the process of knowledge production must be consistent with the cultural 
orientation and the material contexts of the people concerned. Within the educational context for 
example, according to Olukoshi and Zeleza (2004, p. 12), “there is a need for African universities 
and their processes of knowledge production to have their cultural orientation …which entails the 
appropriation and transformation of ‘external’ factors and influences to the ‘internal’ principles 
and priorities that define orientation, values and practices”. When a method is seen as a 
standardised prescription whose role is to complete, prove, detect, correct, avoid falsehood and 
devalues other knowledge systems, then it is devoid of reality and tension is inevitable. Hindess 
(1977, p. 66) contextualises methodic relevance by arguing that “the world of scientific theorising 
is distinguished from other provinces of meaning – in particular, from the paramount reality, the 
world of daily life” by a specific tension of the consciousness and “… a specific epoch, a specific 
form of spontaneity, a specific form of self-experience, a specific form of sociality, and a specific 
time perspective”. Hindess (1977, p. 3) accurately captures this scientific inflexibility in method 
by arguing that “scientific knowledge is thought to be valid only if its production conforms to the 
prescribed procedures; it follows that the prescriptions of methodology cannot be validated by 
scientific knowledge”.  
 
Our attempt to “define” the concepts research, paradigm and methodology has been cautious. 
This tentative approach has been informed by the awareness that these concepts cannot be rigidly 
and universally defined. Within the realm of this study, research, paradigm and methodology 
“definitions” on studies in the African context must take into account the socio-political and 
cultural worldviews of the indigenous people as epistemological points of departure. These 
“definitions” must be broadened to accommodate other forms of producing and preserving 
knowledge. Among the many varied ways in which Africans construct, gather, preserve and pass 
on knowledge is oral tradition. This takes us to a highly contested debate on whether oral 
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discourse is and can be regarded as an authentic, viable and scientific method in the scientific 
enterprise. 
 
Oral Traditions and Western Thought 
 
Properly construed and analysed, science has to be sensitive, respectful and accommodative of 
all realities, including African indigenous oral tradition. Any method of social inquiry that claims 
to be scientific must also appreciate and deal with oral tradition as an authentic, viable and 
scientific method. Oral traditions are usually defined as “illiterate” and “non-text” knowledge 
production and preservation methods. They are usually juxtaposed with “texts” which are used as 
disqualifiers for Indigenous and, in particular, African claims to authentic scientific knowledge. 
We will now expound indigenous African oral traditions and argue for their reinstatement as 
viable, intellectual and authentic scientific methods of knowledge production and dissemination 
in scientific paradigms. 
 
Oral Discourse 
 
Oral discourses refer to the unwritten philosophical and methodological traditions used for 
producing, preserving and disseminating knowledge. The fact that information or knowledge is 
here not written down does not necessarily mean that such knowledge is less significant than 
“texts”. However, as Okere (2005b, p. 12) points out, the added advantage of texts is to “help to 
identify, to consolidate, to preserve and to disseminate philosophy, but they do not make it any 
more than they make poetry”. The unwritten nature of oral discourse is regarded by Okere 
(2005b) as an inconvenience and challenge to African knowledge bearers and producers, whom 
he encourages to establish written traditions. Oluwole (1997), in her book, Philosophy and Oral 
tradition, critically discusses “texts” and oral traditions and the value and contributions each has 
in the process of knowledge production, preservation and dissemination. In support of Okere’s 
(2005b) view, Oluwole (1997) also emphasises that writing helps to document individual 
thought, provides immense opportunity for clearer explanations, detailed analysis and self-
criticism, all of which may raise the level of discussion. Oluwole (1997, p. 6) argues that “the 
acts of reflection, criticism, analysis, argument and discussion can all be carried out in a purely 
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oral form. And since the formulation of poetry, discursive prose, verse, narrative, etc. did not 
depend on the art of writing, the creation of these literary styles and structures cannot be said to 
depend on the mastery of writing”. The argument for mastery of writing as a precondition for 
knowledge to be regarded as scientific therefore does not hold. Both the written texts and oral 
discourse are forms of expression. However, according to Western thought, only that which is 
written and recorded is preferred as scientifically legitimate. Our considered submission here is 
not to prove which form of expression is “more rational”, “better”, or “more civilised” than the 
other, but to indicate their unique role and significant contributions as methods of inquiry in the 
social sciences. Oluwole (1979, p. xviii) argues that “what is important is that there are no 
universal paradigms which all forms of thought must adopt everywhere in the world, philosophy 
belongs to a social group that gives it identity in a place and time”.  
 
In the context of this study, psychology and psychotherapeutic practice in particular are 
identified, defined and agreed upon by given indigenous African groups. Rituals which involve 
the use of proverbs, epic poems, songs, dance, stories and drumming are regarded by many 
Africans as therapeutic. The definition of what is therapeutic is usually conceptualised around 
those activities. They are subsequently preserved and disseminated in that form. These rituals 
then, become the expressions of those peoples’ thoughts, emotions, social organisation, their 
cultural identities and therefore viable scientific methods of connections and dialogue. The large 
scale manner in which Expressive and Art therapies are practised by many indigenous people in 
Latin America, Africa, Scandinavian countries, New Zealand and Australia to mention but a few, 
indicate the importance and relevance of these oral traditions in contemporary societies.  
 
Oral and Written Discourses as Scientific Narratives 
 
As alluded to by Okere (2005b) in our discussion earlier on, oral discourse is often 
disqualified for its non-reputability and “unscientificity” status in most Western thought. Those 
who subscribe to the mainstream Western science “written-evidence framework” as the only 
viable scientific data, continue to persist in their denial of existence to oral dialogue as a form of 
scientific narrative. Wiredu (1980) argues that philosophising is not necessarily tied to literacy 
and text material. It has to be borne in mind that even the Bible did not originate in a text form. 
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We are told that “God” initially communicated His command to His prophets such as Moses 
orally. The written versions were the subsequent results of thoughts initially expressed orally. 
The process of learning and development which we acquire through our interaction with other 
people and our environment is not strictly and rigidly limited to written materials. If one for 
example considers the educational social dimension of riddles, proverbs, fairy tales and poems, 
then it can be argued that oral expressions embrace every sphere of learning and knowledge in 
life (Bujo, 2003). These materials and processes therefore constitute authentic knowledge or 
reality of the people involved in such narratives. Dialogue as a predominant African system of 
interaction and being is also capable of revealing, explaining and presenting reality or knowledge 
like any so-called organised scientific activity. Oluwole (1997, p. 13) reminds us that “language 
is a product of peoples’ experience. When used for educational purposes, it involves learning a 
body of guiding rules and principles, not only of grammar but of conceptual formats”. These 
conceptual formats include peoples’ ability to express different forms of experiences and/or 
abstracting thought within particular contexts.  In our view, experiences can sufficiently be 
expressed and represented through language, which in most cases takes the form of oral dialogue. 
The conventional tendency has however been to see the condition of orality as the determinant 
not just of the quality of individual thought within specific non-literate cultures of the world but 
also as a crucial element in an entire development. Oluwole (1997, p. 20) observes that “to refer 
to as an illiterate is to convey the ideas of being rural, traditional, unenlightened, uneducated, 
primitive, pre-scientific, pre-logical and subsequently liable to be a man or woman of low 
mentality”. Although Oluwole is arguing for the reinstatement and recognition of oral tradition in 
the scientific discourse, this does not mean that she does not recognise the immense contribution 
that written texts have in knowledge production. Oluwole (1997) in fact goes to great lengths to 
point out the shortcomings of oral traditions, and also their tremendous value and contribution to 
human knowledge. What she is rather arguing against is the created perception that written texts 
represent a more rational and civilised discourse than oral traditions.  
 
We have indicated that oral traditions are and can indeed enhance our scientific social inquiry 
processes. Oral discourse presents rationally coherent systems of thought that are no less than the 
conventional written texts. Oral traditions are important sites of knowledge that need to be 
approached and understood within their appropriate cultural contexts (Nabudere, 2003). 
 44
Consistent with indigenous African societies, our proposed method of data collection will take 
the form of oral narrative, in the form of interviews (Kvale, 1996). In the context of this study, 
psychotherapy arising from this form of philosophy demands methodologies that are consistent 
with indigenous knowledge systems’ epistemological paradigm.  The researcher will therefore 
dialogue with participants in their own preferred indigenous language. These dialogues will focus 
on the participants’ definitions and views of psychotherapy to reflect their experiences of this 
process of healing. Consistent with the African epistemology, these voices will then be invited to 
the dialogical space to form part of whole dialogical discourse, rather than be seen as separate 
“attachments” to this research text as is commonly the case with Western ways of conducting 
research.  
 
In Chapter 3 we will critically interrogate the definition of the terms psychology and 
psychotherapy in the context of modern and post-modern thinking respectively. This reflection 
will take us to concepts empiricism, rationalism, universality and objectivity, and how this 
thinking has influence the current dualistic predominant discourse in psychology as a discipline 
and psychotherapy as a healing process. 
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CHAPTER 3 
 
Introduction 
 
The definitions of the concepts psychology and psychotherapy are as philosophically 
debatable as the field of psychology itself. There is no one definition, nor is there one conception 
of psychology and psychotherapy that fits with and is shared by all cultural groups. Psychology 
and psychotherapy are not value-free. The definition of fields of social inquiry such as 
psychology cannot be separated from the historical and cultural influence of their origin. Any 
suggestion that psychology and psychotherapy are value-free and independent of the 
epistemology that informs their definition and practice only serves to create a distorted 
impression of these social sciences. The idea of a value-free inquiry process presupposes that the 
therapist or researcher is conducting the inquiry in an “objective” manner. “Objectivity” has been 
questioned on the basis of its tendency to render disciplines and research processes’ subjective 
nature invisible and turn their diversity into uniformity (Steiner, 2002). Vorster’s (2003, p. 74) 
claim that psychology and psychotherapy can be studied in an “objective” and empirical manner 
is an example of how researchers and practitioners tend to present knowledge and social 
phenomena as being free from the influence of the researcher or therapist and their environing 
context.  
 
Psychology and its treatment modalities as we know and practice it today, is inextricably 
linked to and influenced by the traditions of empiricism, objectivity and rationalism in the West. 
As a result, the many definitions of psychology and psychotherapy found in psychological 
literature reflect and adhere to these Western presuppositions. The problem experienced in 
psychology currently, is that these definitions and presuppositions are perceived to be universally 
applicable to all cultures. We object to this situation, because universalist approaches tend to 
simplify the diverse cultural landscape into fragmented specialised entities. These fragmented 
forms of knowing cannot claim to represent the many existing forms of “psychologies” and 
“psychotherapies” of the world. The world is a reflection of diverse cultural experiences 
inhabited by people with unique ways of dealing with life experiences, including indigenous 
knowledge systems. Understood in this sense, universalist approaches grossly misrepresent some 
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of these indigenous realities. These approaches categorise and divide reality and people into an 
artificial sameness. 
 
Contrary to this fragmented universalist view, most Africans believe that the universe consists 
of both visible and invisible beings. This conception evokes the idea of coherently linked and 
interacting systems that represent the wholeness of being. It is for this reason that we argue that 
the current psychology and psychotherapy curricula that split the totality of being into fragmented 
realities, disguised as specialities, are alien to the African idea of wholeness. Such approaches 
cannot claim legitimacy and relevance in the African context. In support of this view, Mkhize 
(2004, p. 25) argues that “traditional Western approaches to psychology are based on certain 
presuppositions about the person and the world … Western-derived psychology theories, which 
are assumed to be universal, have been imposed on non-Western populations. Indigenous 
theoretical frameworks on the other hand, have been marginalized”. This marginalisation has 
been unjustly maintained by the distorted thinking that presents psychology and psychotherapy 
conceptions as universal realities. Universality presupposes that knowledge, in this case 
psychology and psychotherapy, remain the same and are applicable to all people’s life 
experiences.  
 
In this chapter, we will challenge the claim that psychology is value-free. This argument will 
be pursued with special reference to modern and postmodern paradigmatic presuppositions.  
 
Modern Thinking, Psychology and Psychotherapy 
 
Modern thinking conceptualises the world or reality as having a “true” nature which can be 
studied and understood in a “neutral” and “objective” manner (Fourie, 1998). Such a world or 
reality is perceived and believed to be a well-structured and visible, controllable, predictable and 
measurable entity that can be comprehensibly, rationally and empirically defined in terms of 
mechanical laws. The “objectivity” referred to here is determined by experts who by virtue of 
their specialisation are supposedly able to operate from a “neutral” and “knowing” position. The 
“knowing” position that modern experts assume to be correct, reduces life experiences into 
fragmented specialisation entities. In support of this view, Lyotard (1979, p. 72), argues that “if 
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modernity has failed, it is in allowing the totality of life to be splintered into independent 
specialities which are left to the narrow competencies of the expert, while the concrete individual 
experiences ‘desublimated meaning’ and ‘destructured form’ not as a liberation but in the mode 
of that immense ennui described by Baudelaire described over a century ago”. Clearly, modern 
thinking attends and gives weight to the simplification and control of experiences through 
knowledge categorisation under the guise of specialisations.  
 
Modern conceptions of psychology and psychotherapy are also underlined by Western 
philosophical scientific presuppositions such as objectivity, universalism, rationalism, and 
empiricism, which are executed by specialist independent experts. These presuppositions are 
from the perspective of modern thinking seen as core determinants of what is seen as authentic 
psychology, psychotherapy, scientific research and knowledge in general. From the perspective 
of modern thinking, for knowledge to be scientifically legitimate, these conditions have to be met 
irrespective of its historical trajectories and epistemological paradigm. The authenticity and 
scientificity of any psychology and psychotherapy and interventions that are not deemed 
universally objective, rational and empirical are marginalised. On this basis, objectivity, 
rationality and empiricism are research prescriptions that must be adhered to by any therapist, 
researcher or observer, irrespective of cultural context and epistemology within which such 
activity is undertaken. We argue that these conformity-prone presuppositions have rendered 
modern theorisations and conceptions of psychology mechanical, limited and devoid of lived 
experiences and originality. We will now explore these presuppositions.  
 
Objectivity 
 
According to Mouton (1990, p. 40), “the central assumption in the naturalistic of objectivity is 
that research can only be valid and reliable if all subjective ‘variables’ – all presuppositions, 
preconceived notions and values – are bracketed. The scientist must approach reality with an 
open mind and allow the facts to speak for themselves. According to this notion of objective 
research, it is assumed that there is a ‘distance’ between scientist and object of research in the 
sense that no involvement between them should be allowed since such an involvement could lead 
to biased and prejudiced research. Proponents of ‘objectivity’ assume that one can only know the 
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‘true’ and ‘accurate’ nature of what an object or phenomenon is like if one ‘does not influence 
it’. The observer, according to this thinking, should not influence and, conversely not be 
influenced by what they are observing or studying. Objectivity therefore forms the fundamental 
basis of what is seen as ‘scientific research’ as understood by the modern Western thinking”. By 
the same logic, psychology from the modern perspective assumes that there is a “true” nature of 
experiences and behaviour which can be “objectively” studied. The therapist or researcher here 
claims that their formulations, assumptions and conclusions about “true knowledge” are based on 
value and interest-free “scientifically” controllable and justifiable processes of inquiry. 
 
Those who subscribe to modern thinking maintain that the processes of knowledge inquiry 
should be “objectively” constructed for it to be considered as “scientifically” and authentically 
viable research, experience or knowledge. The concept of “objectivity” has become a must-be-
present condition that characterises most psychotherapeutic engagements and research in the field 
of psychology. What those who subscribe to “objectivity” have difficulty in acknowledging is 
that social sciences, are about understanding diversity and meaning-making processes in respect 
of concrete individual experiences, values, ethics and nature of the universe, culture and people’s 
lived experiences. These experiences define people’s identities and are deeply rooted in their 
histories and cultures and cannot therefore claim to be value-free. 
 
From the psychotherapeutic viewpoint, the prime aim of “objectivity” is to generate efficient 
researcher value and interest-free generalisable knowledge by limiting or eliminating the 
influence of the therapist/observer from the therapeutic space. In our view and experience, no one 
can claim to come to the therapeutic domain without carrying a cloud of their epistemological 
and ontological background to such a space. The therapist cannot be separated from the 
methodology and the research process, because all these are influenced by the epistemological 
paradigm of the therapist. As we have argued in Chapter 1, no one can claim to have no 
epistemology. Any attempt to separate the researcher or psychotherapist from the research or 
therapeutic process and its methodology constitutes a very serious epistemological inconsistency. 
Despite this, some practitioners, such as Vorster (2003, p. 120), argue that “objectivity’ is a pre-
requisite to what he calls “scientific research” and “clinical observation”. In Vorster’s reasoning, 
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without “objective observation”, there cannot be any credible, “scientific” and effective 
psychotherapeutic intervention. 
 
Modernity further assumes that the (therapist) observer and the (client) observed are two 
ontologically distinct and independent entities. This distinction is in sharp contrast to the African 
conception of reality. To further support this distinction, Vorster (2003) argues that the therapist, 
by virtue of being “objective” and “trained”, operates at a much higher logical level than the 
client, who is being studied or helped, at a “lower logical position’. Vorster believes that when 
there is clear distinction, “lack of influence” or distance between the therapist and the client, then 
this is a necessary and sufficient condition for “true” knowledge to be discovered about the 
client’s situation. This then, clearly demonstrates that the “objective” position that the therapist or 
observer takes invariably dictates how knowledge or people’s experiences are dealt with in 
modern therapeutic conceptions. Accordingly, the therapeutic system consists of the knowledge 
bearer, the therapist and the “psychologically” troubled client, couple, family or community 
whose well-being depends on the “objectively”, “trained” and skillful intervention of the “value-
free” therapist. 
 
In our view, the limitation of using “objectivity” as the only standard way to define or analyse 
the therapeutic relationship or any other experience, is that it reduces the complexity, meaning 
and the concrete relational dimension of such an experience to mere controllable and objectifiable 
physical constructs. This simplistic, fragmented and limited view tends to undermine the diverse 
and subjective nature of experience or reality between people, the environment and their 
cosmology. People’s lived experiences cannot necessarily be subjected to, and be understood 
only in terms of “objectivity”. Objectivity is therefore some form of self-justifying rationalism, 
which claims that the separation between the object of study and the expert in the field concerned 
emerges from the “knowing” position.  
 
Rationalism 
 
Hindess (1977, p. 8) defines rationalist thinking as “an epistemology that conceives of the 
world as a rational order in the sense that its parts and the relations between them conform to 
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concepts and the relations between them, the concepts giving the essence of the real”. 
Rationalism stems from the notion that there must be some explainable reason to reality, 
knowledge or experience. For knowledge to be seen as authentic and scientific, there must be a 
logical demonstration on the part of the knower or producer that they “know” something and that 
they are in control because they can give the only “real” explanation of the experience or 
knowledge. Teffo and Roux (2002, p. 162) succinctly argue that “rationality has been seen as a 
universal inherent ability of mankind to determine the truth … rationality, therefore, is seen as the 
only avenue towards reliable knowledge, and also as being certain of success in yielding correct, 
final answers if its methods are promptly followed”. Proponents of rationality construe it as an 
accurate measure through which the “logical” method of investigation or intervention will 
determine the true nature of things. Rationality therefore creates a sense of control and reliability 
of knowledge. In this way, an impression that reality or the true nature of things is known is 
created through knowledge categorisation in the form of specialisations. This then serves as proof 
for the existence of such “reality”, based on the notion that for “something” or reality to exist, 
there must be reason for its existence. “Reality”, in terms of this thinking, must be apprehensible 
and be subjected to the manipulation of the specific “objective” predetermined Western control or 
treatment procedures. 
 
From the modern scientific point of view, a rational decision implies that there must be an 
evaluation of the relevant evidence, experience or knowledge that must be arrived at using 
established rules or laws. According to Meyerson and Banfield (1955, p. 314), a rational decision 
is arrived at in the following manner: 
 
1. the decision-maker considers all the alternatives (courses of action) open to him, that is, he 
(she) considers what courses of action are possible within the conditions of the situation and 
in the light of the ends he seeks to attain; 
2. he (she) identifies and evaluates all of the consequences of which would follow from the 
adoption of each alternative; that is, he (she) predicts how the total situation would be 
changed by each course of action adopted, and 
3. he (she) selects that alternative the probable consequences of which would be preferable in 
terms of his most valued ends. 
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Clearly, the above is based on the reductionist assumption that the world or reality is a 
discoverable entity which when studied under certain “objectively” established conditions and 
laws, can be understood in a predictable and universalisabled manner. Most indigenous people, 
African people included, for example, believe that reality is not limited to linear reasoning (Grills 
& Ajei, 2002). Rather, reality is composed of visible and invisible beings and these are complex 
systems that are not necessarily accessible only through rational laws and rules. 
 
Our view is that laws and rules entail a measure of judgment that determines the rational 
model or thinking people subscribe to. In this sense rationality is limited to a particular social 
interest group and is therefore in our view problematic if applied universally. The social interest 
group creates what Harding (1997, p. 46) refers to as “the internalist epistemology, the claim that 
events of nature do not happen at random but follow an unvarying pattern, which can be 
discovered by applying the laws that govern these regularities in order to successfully predict 
regularities in nature and social phenomenon”. By implication, this social interest group or the in-
group has the power to determine the rules and laws according to which something is to be 
judged as rational or irrational. Applying such rational standards is informed by the firm belief 
that being able to provide logical rational explanation to phenomena will enable the expert to 
predict subsequent similar processes in other contexts. The problem of applying rules universally 
is according to Van Niekerk (1990, p. 185) that “our ability to act as rational agents is limited by 
our expertise… Rational decision-making is a socially mediated rather than a rule-guided 
process. For a belief based on judgment to be a rational one, it must be submitted to the 
community of those who share the relevant expertise for evaluation against their own judgment”. 
The implication of this view is that, as rational agents, therapists or people in general cannot 
claim that their rationality is all-inclusive of human experience. Rather, rationality represents just 
one way of conceiving reality by one section of the human race. 
 
The argument that presents rationality as a universally acceptable rule to all experiences 
without sensitivity to diversity and the rules that govern that system is flawed. What is perceived 
as rational by one community may not be perceived as such by the other community. In this 
regard, Steiner (2002, p. 6) argues that “each person has the ontological potential to experience 
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the world from a unique perspective”. The behaviour of a rugby fan that runs in the field of play 
naked out of excitement or dissatisfaction may be seen as a rational expression of feelings within 
the rugby-loving community. The same behaviour may be seen as insanity or irrational by 
another community. The fact that something is perceived as “irrational” does not imply that it 
does not exist. Therefore certain realities exist and are meaningful to specific contexts 
irrespective of whether they are deemed rational or irrational. Our view is that such behaviour 
still possesses significant meaning for certain people in particular contexts. 
 
Viewed within the realm of the above sketched context, the rationalist paradigm has a 
tendency to deny the meaning and existence of phenomena, experience or knowledge that do not 
conform to the approved “rationalist” vision and prescriptions of the legitimisation process. On 
this point, Ajei (2007, p. 112) is of the view that “scientific processes claim to posses inherent 
rationality, unique logic of justification, universal language and ‘objective-achieving method’”. 
Experiences and knowledge systems that do not conform or cannot be explained in terms of these 
predetermined rational prescriptions are marginalised. When experience is seen as rational, this 
gives an impression of being in control. Understood in this sense, rationality represents a false 
impression of control and is an internal-legitimisation process. The fixation with creating a sense 
of control and the need to explain and “know” everything has resulted in either the denial of 
certain experiences or simplification and “rational” explanation of every experience (even if it is 
not possible, such as in the case of witchcraft) because of “fear of not knowing”. 
 
Viewed in this context, an exclusive claim to rational status is insensitive to cultural diversity, 
ontology, history and context. It reduces lived experiences and their meanings into simple 
controllable constructs devoid of cultural influence. Culture provides an important lens through 
which an understanding of human psychological and social functioning can be attained (Grills & 
Ajei, 2002). On this basis experience will differ from culture to culture, and each culture will 
have its own way of knowing. In support of this view, Grills and Ajei (2002, p. 76) argue that 
“reality does not limit itself to the five senses and rational logic as the only means for securing 
information and understanding. Knowing is not limited to linear reasoning. Knowing is not 
bound by space, time, the senses, cognition and tangible verification or control of that which is 
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known.” Despite this understanding, modern perspectives still continue to construe rationality as 
a normative explanatory prescription to almost every situation, knowledge or experience. 
 
Psychology subscribes to modern science and therefore regards rationality as a crucial 
presupposition in the science discourse. It is partially for this reason that psychology and 
psychotherapy have come to be associated with an elitist, educated middle class (Wilson et al. 
1999), with little relevance to people’s material and lived conditions. We therefore support 
Baerveldt’s (2007, pp. 105-106) argument that, “required is a psychology that is indeed 
intrinsically social… social and cultural realitiesm – like ‘motherhood’, or ‘honour’- cannot be 
detached from people’s personal beliefs in and commitment to those entities”. These arguments 
therefore call for the revision and redefinition of psychology and psychotherapy, to include 
experiences that transcend modern and postmodern conceptualisations. 
 
The rational approach equates knowledge with science and disregards the social dimension of 
experience and being. Knowledge is a reflection of society’s narratives in all its forms and 
manifestations. In this regard, any performance of cultural rituals, art expressions and ancestral 
connections represent the social narratives and identity of that community. An inclusive 
psychology should therefore acknowledge, respect and accommodate all the different social 
narratives. The continuous presentation of rationality by modernity as a universal normative 
prescription (determinism and application of criteria of efficacy) is therefore indefensible and 
unsustainable. 
 
Empiricism 
 
Empiricism is another positivist scientific presupposition. Empiricism holds that for 
knowledge to be regarded as scientific, its existence has to be justifiable and provable in rational 
and experimental ways. In methodological terms, “the emphasis of empiricism is on concrete, 
practical, tangible and observable phenomena” (Muller, 1990, p. 511). In line with objectivity, 
empiricists claim that there is a “true” nature of concrete knowledge which when exposed to 
certain controlled conditions, can be empirically explained and proven in systematically 
“rational” ways. Such empirical explanations must follow “true” universal statements and laws of 
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nature in order to create “empirical” conditions through rational evidence. Hindess (1977, p. 167) 
posits that “it is possible to derive predictions as to what may be observed in particular regions of 
space and time”. In our view, this argument is problematic when dealing with human experience. 
Human experience is not only limited to the physical or human empiricism based on 
presuppositions or concepts which are deemed essential by scientific laws. The basis of our 
argument here is that, if knowledge is based on experience (Okere, 2005a, Dewey, 1958 & 
Hindess, 1977), then there cannot be any rational explanation that one action leads to the other in 
a linear causality. On the basis of the unpredictability and freedom of choice (Hindes, 1977 & 
Ryle, 1949) inherent in human behaviour, then other forms of knowledge production and 
explanation are possible, which cannot necessarily be the object of empiricism. In support of this 
view, Lyotard (1979, p. 7) argues that “scientific knowledge does not represent the totality of 
knowledge; it has always existed in addition to, and in competition and conflict with, another 
kind of knowledge”. Lyotard sensitises us to the fact that science is not the only way of knowing, 
but rather, just one way of the many different ways of knowing embodied in people’s 
experiences. If we move from the view that knowledge comes from experience and other 
invisible ways of being, then scientific knowledge cannot be the only standard through which all 
forms of knowledge are discovered and known. By the same logic, modern conceptions of 
psychology and psychotherapy as “tributaries” of science, cannot claim to represent all people’s 
ways of doing things and understanding human behaviour. On this basis, legitimisation of the 
existence of psychology and psychotherapy cannot only be defined and described through 
empiricism. There are other existing forms of “psychologies” and “psychotherapies” in existence 
beyond the bounds of modern thinking. 
 
In African traditional thought, for example, human relationships have several levels of 
connections that transcend the “tangible”, “observable” and empirical level. In our view, the 
connectedness of these elements or subsystems is not only limited to their physicality, but 
extends to other levels of relatedness. In this traditional thinking, the “therapeutic” system 
physically includes all those people who are involved, related or influenced by the client’s 
problems. Each of these systems is seen as influencing one another, and they are inter-dependent 
and co-dependent. Contrary to this perspective, therapeutic influence within modern thinking and 
more specifically modern psychotherapeutic conceptions are measured in terms of observations 
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that are “tangible”, “predictable”, and “accessible” in particular conditions. Here empiricism 
emphasises authentically observable, “provable” means of establishing the “reliability” and 
“validity” of statements, and knowledge justification in predetermined structures as judged by 
experts. Slattery and Daigle (1994, p. 459) argue that “…such structures promote order, harmony, 
homogeneous sociopolitical structures, and shared Western values in society. The irony, as we 
have seen, is that what it actually produced, are individuals who have lost the ability to approach 
experiences in life with a sense of context”. Within the social science context, and more 
specifically within psychology, empiricism creates conditions for people or behaviour to be 
mechanically controlled, predictable and therefore estranged from their life experiences and 
ecology. 
 
The presuppositions and modern scientific concepts presented above clearly demonstrate that 
modernity’s conceptions of psychology and psychotherapy are very limited and thus exclude 
other knowledge conceptions and practices. Consequently, an alternative voice, under the guise 
of postmodernism, came into being as a result of the growing dissatisfaction with modern 
thinking, to address the incompleteness and inadequacies of modernity. We now turn our 
attention to postmodern conceptions of psychology and psychotherapy. 
 
Postmodern Thinking, Psychology and Psychotherapy 
 
Lyotard (1979, pp. xxiv-xxv) defines postmodernism as “incredulity toward metanarratives… 
postmodern knowledge is not simply a tool of the authorities, it refines our sensitivity to 
differences and reinforces our ability to tolerate the incommensurable. Its principle is not the 
expert’s homology, but the inventor’s paralogy”. In the context of this study, Lyotard’s definition 
of postmodern directly challenges the current experimentation-based Western scientific 
discourses to explore the living historical situation in relation to people’s existential experiences. 
The challenge for psychology and psychotherapy is to also respond and address themselves to 
these experiences, rather than representing prescriptive, evaluative and performative conventions 
which legitimise unitary experimentation processes. The current conventions of psychology and 
psychotherapy are premised on the firm belief that social systems’ interactional patterns and 
narratives are “knowable”, “predictable” and “treatable”. In this sense, psychology and 
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psychotherapy seen in the context of philosophy, have reduced Lyotard’s understanding of 
complex social systems’ “sensitivity to differences and tolerance of the incommensurable”, to 
mere mechanical behavioural constructs, measurable in terms of performance credits. This 
approach has reduced the field of psychology into solution-and-problem-focused practices, 
instead of meaning-making systems. The advent of postmodernism has been mediated by a keen 
interest in addressing these limitations in social systems. 
 
It must be indicated from the outset that postmodern thinking, just like modern thinking, does 
not embody a homogenous group of thinkers. The postmodern epistemology comprises a range of 
thinkers whose conceptualisation and view of reality or therapy differ considerably. As a matter 
of fact, there are also vast differences even among postmodern scholars on which types of 
thinking, descriptions or psychology falls under the postmodern epistemological paradigm. For 
example, Becvar and Becvar (2006), classify cybernetics of cybernetics, contructionism, 
narrative therapy, and constructivism, deconstruction within the post modern thinking paradigm. 
Fourie (1998) sees constructivism as being central to second-order cybernetics, which includes a 
whole range of thinking such as ecosystemic thinking. Vorster (2003) classifies radical 
constructivism, social constructionism and narrative therapy as some of the postmodern 
paradigms. The argument pertaining to which theories form the postmodern movement does not 
form part of our discussion and we will not therefore pursue it.  
 
Although postmodern thinking is perceived as a more culture-sensitive and inclusive way of 
thinking, it cannot, by any generalisation, provide legitimisation and argumentation for the claim 
to understand and represent all forms of knowing. Our immediate task here is to advance the 
argument that all these postmodern categorisations, together with modern conceptions, fall within 
the same historical-cultural context. This cultural context exerts an inescapable influence on the 
conceptualisation and practice of psychology and psychotherapy. Therefore even if postmodern 
conceptualisations of psychotherapy reject objectivity, and are on different levels of construction 
and abstraction, their view of a person is for example conceived out of the individualistic 
epistemological paradigm. Conversely, how a person is understood and treated will be 
determined by the very same scientific and individualistic paradigm’s conceptions of a person 
and reality. 
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Psychotherapists cannot therefore see the world or reality in any other way except through 
their framework. Framework in this instance may be their ways of thinking, doing, cultural belief 
systems and theoretical paradigms. Fourie (1998, p. 11) supports this view by stating that, 
“whenever one thinks, one makes assumptions. It is not possible to think in a neutral way without 
being directed by the ways we had learned to think”. Postmodern psychology and psychotherapy 
cannot deny that their presuppositions and treatment modes are deeply rooted in, and influenced 
by, Western epistemology. On this basis, any form of psychology, psychotherapy or theory that 
claims to be non-biased is at the same time denying its cultural context and identity. 
Understanding this inherent social dynamic of systems, postmodernists reject the modernist claim 
to “objectivity”, “universalism”, “rationalism” and “empiricism”. In postmodern terms, social 
systems are seen as being in continuous dialogical engagement with other related systems and as 
meaning-creating contexts rather than as problem-ridden and treatment-prone systems. It is for 
this reason that modern thinking became increasingly rejected, not only by postmodern thinkers, 
but more recently by Africans as it is seen to be motivated by the colonial imperative of 
dominance, a reflection of Western intolerance to differences and cultural insensitivity to other 
people’s cultural experiences. 
 
To their credit, postmodern thinkers perceive and acknowledge differences not as a threat, but 
as other meta-narrative voices or alternative realities, whose presence provide new meaning and 
knowledge diversification. In social systems, the view that categorises knowledge in terms of 
superior/ inferior, good/ bad or valuable/less valuable ranking is bound to be challenged on the 
basis that all knowledge has meaning and a contribution to make. People always bring their own 
unique cultural background in the process of inquiry, therapy and interpretation of others or their 
experiences. Becvar and Becvar (2006), Fourie (1998), Foster and Froman (2002), Goldenberg 
and Goldenberg (2004), Sigogo and Modipa (2004) and Drummond (2006) also support the 
impossibility of “objective”, “neutral” thinking. 
 
We would like further to argue that this inclusive and sensitive thinking does not change when 
one thinks in or “shifts” to the so-called “scientific” mode of thinking. We take our thinking into 
the “scientific” domain. It is in terms of this reasoning that we argue that both modern and 
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postmodern psychology and psychotherapy are subsidiaries of science, and cannot therefore 
claim to be free from their cultural influence. Many scholars, such as those mentioned above, 
have argued against the notion of “objectivity”, in favour of a culture-sensitive psychology. Our 
view is that the idea of cultural sensitivity is in most cases approached very superficially. In the 
vast citable literature and research on traditional Western psychology’s views on cultural 
sensitivity, it is assumed that clinical and counseling skills acquired during training are sufficient 
conditions for one to function adequately and effectively in diverse contexts. As Parham (2002) 
accurately observed, our new-found sensitivity to more culturally sensitive counseling methods 
should challenge this unsustainable claim. 
 
From the perspective of postmodern thinking, reality is not a “pre-determined” constant to be 
“discovered”. Both the therapist and the client contribute towards the co-creation of “reality”. 
Therefore the client and the therapist influence each other in a mutual manner, as no one is in 
control (Becvar & Becvar, 2006; Fourie, 1998; Goldenberg & Goldenberg, 2004). While modern 
therapists believe in changing the behaviour of the patient using pre-determined acquired skills 
and controlled measures, in what they term “objective” interventions, postmodern thinkers reject 
the notion of “control” and “objectivity”, empiricism and rationalism. The claim here is that we 
will never “know or discover” the true nature of things; what we “know” is in fact a reflection of 
our “subjective” perceptual construction of “reality”. 
 
A notable difference here is a shift from the emphasis on the (modern) client system where the 
therapist “knows” the “true” reality and how to “fix” it, to the (post modern) therapeutic system 
where both the therapist and the client “co-construct” “reality” and “co-evolve” (Becvar & 
Becvar, 2006; Fourie, 1998). Therapy takes place in a therapeutic system consisting of the 
therapist, the client and the context. The client-therapist-context system is therefore believed to 
be central to the therapeutic process. Contrary to this modern and postmodern conception of 
psychotherapy, we would like to argue that whether the therapist is “objective” or “subjective”, 
“in control” or “equal with the client”, whether “reality” is “discovered” or “co-created”, the 
emphasis remains rooted in common, shared Western values. It is for this reason that we argue 
that both modern and postmodern thinking put emphasis on client-therapist-context variables as 
necessary conditions for change in behaviour or alternative meaning. The client-therapist-context 
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interaction and engagement is bound and made possible through the language that is adopted in 
that context. 
 
The Language “Game” in Psychology and Psychotherapy 
 
There are different levels and ways in which the concept language is conceptualised. To a 
positivist, language is a medium through which information is conveyed from one person to the 
other in a relationship, using different forms of expressions. To an artist, language is an 
expression of the state of being and of one’s reality in a particular context. In general terms, 
language represents an expression of behaviour within an interactional context. Language has a 
communicative value in all contexts at all relevant times. In this sense all behaviour is 
communication. Watzlawick, Bavelas and Jackson (1967, pp. 48-49) argue that “one cannot not 
behave. Now if it is accepted that all behaviour in an interactional situation has message value, 
that is, communication, it follows that no matter how one may try, one cannot not communicate”. 
There are different ways of language expressions such as verbal representations, non-verbal 
expressions, artwork such as music, sculpting and paintings. Simply put, language is an 
expression of people’s ontology, experiences and their environing culture. It is a connecting 
device in interpersonal relationships. It therefore follows that every approach and context will 
have its terminology or linguistic expressions that are consistent with and acceptable to that 
context. The language used in any context determines the “rules” by which the communication 
“game” has to be conducted. In psychology and psychotherapy as well, language appropriate to 
the cultural context has to be adopted for meaningful communication. Therefore using language 
and concepts inappropriately in any context will create misunderstanding and misrepresentations 
resulting in confusion. 
 
Modern and postmodern thinking are ontologically and epistemologically conceived from the 
same historical-cultural point of view. The philosophical difference between modern and 
postmodern thinking within the therapeutic context is their linguistic discourse. Modern and 
postmodern thinkers’ “language” is different on psychotherapeutic processes, techniques and 
position of the therapist, depending on their training, theoretical and cultural context. Our view is 
that modern and postmodern language prescriptions are construed from and, influenced by 
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Western understanding of reality and human beings. The use of language that is not consistent 
with and does not form the language tradition of a particular context tends to create 
miscommunication, confusion and logical inconsistencies. Language is very important in creating 
meaningful connections between clients and their therapists. Here are some of the examples of 
the differences in terms of language expressions of modern and postmodern thinking: 
 
 Modern language 
• Changing behaviour 
• ‘objectivity’ is possible 
• Patient 
• Symptom 
• New/changed behavior 
• Client system 
• Therapist agent of change 
• Emphasis on therapeutic system 
Postmodern language 
Perturbing the system 
‘subjectivity’ is inevitable 
Client system 
Meaning making behavior 
Alternative meaning/reality 
Therapeutic system 
Therapist is co-facilitator/co-creator 
Context creates meaning 
 
 
Consistent with the thinking from which one operates, the appropriate language is used. Such 
use of language does not however depart from the cultural lenses through which the therapist sees 
the world. Our language is a reflection of our thinking and cultural background. The way in 
which we language is therefore not only a linguistic argument, but also an ontological and a 
philosophical issue. 
 
Concluding Remarks 
 
This chapter set out to discuss modern and postmodern conceptions of psychology and 
psychotherapy. We also interrogated some of the modern scientific presuppositions and the 
postmodern thinkers’ claims of positioning themselves as alternative shifts from traditional 
psychology and psychotherapy conceptions. Clearly, traditional modern scientific 
presuppositions such as objectivity, rationalism, empiricism and universalism have left the 
psychology fraternity firmly stuck in the Cartesian and value-free illusion thinking. This has been 
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legitimised by the firm belief in the existence of a universal representative experience, to the 
exclusion of other “non-universal” experiences and realities. All this is happening despite the 
accessibility and diverse cultural human knowledge landscape across the world. Our view in this 
regard is that research in psychology and psychotherapy has adopted conformist approaches that 
created conditions for uncritical and hasily generalised engagements. No doubt, the postmodern 
paradigm has created interesting shifts, alternative narratives and possibilities of understanding 
experiences and behaviour ecologically. In this sense, there is a lot to learn from both these 
paradigms. 
 
Even though the postmodern perspective claims to have drastically shifted from modern 
thinking by adopting accommodative and non judgmental language, it has not succeeded in 
breaking “free” from the same cultural experiences that continue to define modern thinking 
conceptions and legitimisation prescriptions. The superficial “adaptation” strategy adopted by the 
postmodern paradigm under the guise of subjectivity does not help people from this perspective 
to comprehend the cultural dynamics required to construct culturally sensitive psychology and 
psychotherapy programmes. Both the modern and postmodern epistemological paradigms will 
continue to make significant contributions in the human sciences. Our argument is that these 
paradigms, however linguistically disguised they may be, have not, and cannot, devise 
appropriate psychology and psychotherapy treatment modalities that are sensitive to the African 
experience. On this basis, we argue that indigenous people must define what is to them 
“psychology” and “psychotherapy”, using their conventions and language expressions that 
accurately capture their healing practices, epistemology and ontology. 
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CHAPTER 4 
 
Introduction 
 
In this chapter we will present and critically examine the etymology of the term “psyche”. The 
APA Dictionary of Psychology (2006, p. 747) refers to the psyche as “the mind in its totality as 
distinguished from the physical organism. The term also refers to the soul or the very essence of 
life as derived from Greek mythology, in which ‘psyche’ is a personification of the soul in the 
form of a beautiful girl who, having lost her divine lover, Eros, is eventually reunited with him 
and made immortal”. If the “psyche” is about “the very essence of life”, then it is crucial to also 
recognise the specific social network structures and lived experiences of people in different 
cultural contexts. Therefore any definition and understanding of the concept psyche should be 
located within these socio-cultural organisational systems. In our view, concepts and terms 
represent linguistic expressions of people’s lived experiences and their reasoning as embodied in 
these cultural network systems. The variation in meaning of “psyche” has created interesting 
arguments for some scholars and researchers regarding its use and applicability in different 
contexts. 
 
The term “psyche” will be analysed and interrogated in order to create the context in which 
our argument in this chapter for a culture-sensitive “psychology” can be based. To deepen our 
understanding of the “psyche” or “soul”, we have to take into account its etymology. Also, we 
will clarify key critical concepts, that is, etymology, psyche and moya. This will assist us in 
appropriately situating and understanding the term “psychology” and its practice in general and, 
in particular in the African context. 
 
In most literature this term is superficially analysed or only presented from the superimposed 
Western dualistic conception of the human being. This understands the person as only consisting 
of “body” and “soul”. The implication of this superficial and dualistic analysis is the gross 
misunderstanding of the concept “psychology” when it is considered and practiced in contexts 
different from those of the West. This is partly due to the fact that the “informal” methods which 
guided indigenous people and in particular Africans’ practice of “psychology”, have not been 
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recognised as being equally legitimate and “scientific”. It is on this basis that we would like to 
investigate firstly, from the etymological point of view, if indeed “psychology”, as understood by 
the West, contains the same meaning and understanding for Africans. If we follow the view that 
the “psyche” is more than the physical organism, is immortal and is the very essence of life, then 
“psychology”, which as we will see is derived from the concept “psyche”, cannot be limited to 
the study of mind and people’s pathological behaviour as has been claimed in the vast 
psychology literature that exists. Secondly, we will further argue that “psychology”, like any field 
of study and practice, grows out of a people’s existential experiences and reality. In African 
traditional thought, “psychology” broadly represents the visible cultural be-ing and practices in 
the community of the living, the living dead and the yet-to-be-born in the onto-triadic sense of 
existence (Ramose, 1999, p. 51). Within this cultural-philosophic framework, the idea of a 
supreme being emerges. It is an interesting and problematical idea. As a problem it poses the 
question whether or not metaphysics can arise from a unitary ontology.  
 
Clarification of Concepts 
 
According to the Dictionary of Key Words in Psychology (1986, p. 180), the oldest definition 
of psychology is that “it is the study of the soul”. This definition immediately and already departs 
significantly from the everyday understanding of “psychology”. The tendency of the West to 
solipsistic claim to certain concepts while on the other hand denying other nations the right to 
such concepts is not uncommon. Ramose’s (1999, pp. 15-17) critique of La Peyrere’s thesis that 
“God” who created Africans, Amerindians and the Australasians was not the same “God” who 
created descendants of Adam and Eve is an illustration of spiritual racism embedded in certain 
concepts. Ramose goes on to argue that “… accordingly, if these other creatures had any soul at 
all it certainly could not be the same as that of descendants of Adam and Eve. This thesis 
suggested not only that these other creatures were most probably without a soul but if they were 
at all ensouled then theirs was certainly not a rational soul” (p. 15). If we, however, go by the 
definition of psychology above, then all people have “psychology” because all human beings 
must be presumed to have a “soul”, and not as La Peyrere implied. Different cultures 
conceptualise and understand the “soul” from their own epistemological paradigm. As such the 
understanding and practice of their knowledge of the “soul” cannot be generalised to other 
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cultures without creating serious epistemological tensions. On this basis, we will here argue that 
the Western dualistic view of a human being, which the Encyclopaedia of Psychology (1994. p. 
386) maintains “was revived by the renewed interest in individual personality”, leads to gross 
misrepresentations of indigenous people’s cultures and their “psychology”. In addition, if the 
Western conception of “psychology” remains predominant under the guise of universality, then 
this leads to the suppression of other realities such as those of indigenous people, in particular 
Africans. Under these conditions, there cannot be any meaningful and mutually beneficial 
dialogical engagement between different knowledge systems. It is on this premise that we argue 
for a wholistic definition of “psychology” that recognises and includes the African conception of 
a human being. 
 
Terminology and Paradigm Construction 
 
Etymologically, marrying the Western and the African understanding of the “soul” is not 
compatible. These are two distinct cultural experiences and languages that are conceived out of 
different epistemological paradigms, histories and cultural experiences. The terminology used in 
each perspective should therefore be consistent with the epistemological paradigm and etymology 
of the term in question. The argument for the use of the African terminology means that, where 
Western terms such as the “psyche” do not accurately capture the actual existential experiences 
of Africans, African terms should be used instead. We may go as far as arguing for the outright 
use of appropriate African terms, without first considering the translated version. The argument 
that there are no appropriate psychological terms in African languages is philosophically 
undermining the very existence of an African. Simply stated, this argument questions Africans’ 
ability to conceptualise and give expression to their experiences and their world. This thinking 
serves to maintain the superimposed colonial dominance (Wiredu, 2002, p. 33). Such dominance 
in our view precludes the possibility of any dialogical engagement between different cultures. 
The insistence on translating Western words or concepts to their “equivalent” African terms is a 
further universalisation of the “psychologies” of different cultures, to fit the criterion determined 
by the West. If we start from the premise that all people have their unique epistemology and 
cultural ways of be-ing, then there cannot be insufficient terminology for the self-definition and 
self-expression of a people. All people, and this includes Africans, have their linguistic self-
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expressions that are consistent with their epistemology. Our argument for using African terms 
finds support in Bujo (2003, p. 14), who contends that this argument “intends to demonstrate 
clearly the autonomy of the worldview of the African thought, which cannot simply be subsumed 
under other modes of thought, but demands to be taken seriously as a dialogue partner”. 
Accordingly, the study and explanation of the “psyche” should be situated within the appropriate 
African context, using relevant African words or terms to match the philosophy and 
understanding. In this regard, reference will be made to some African languages in respect of 
these terms. In this way, the authentic use and application of these terms in scientific discourses 
will be established. We now turn to the definition of the term etymology. 
 
Etymology “Defined” 
 
The Concise Oxford English Dictionary (1982, p. 331) defines etymology as “an account of or 
facts relating to the formation of a word and development of its meaning”. Etymology can 
therefore be seen as a linguistic science. According to Malkiel (1993, pp. 1-2), etymology 
embodied the “core meaning of a word that could be imagined as something wholly independent 
of the passage of time and endowed with magic or mystic overtones. With the gradual move of 
linguistic curiosity in the direction of time-dominant disciplines, principally history, a word’s 
etymology began to be tantamount to ‘previous meaning’, or ‘earlier actually attested meaning’ 
or else ‘earlier reconstructable meaning’ without the concomitant pretence that modern 
scholarship is invariably in a position to piece together primeval meanings, or, for that matter, 
pristine forms”. 
 
From the point of view of linguistics, the “meaning” of words and what they represent 
necessitates their placement within their appropriate social context. It is however of critical 
importance to note that meaning can be created from and, represented by a variety of sources 
such as words and symbols. Different symbols and words have entirely different meanings to 
different people in various epistemologies and cultural contexts. Cultural contexts can therefore 
be construed as key to our understanding of the meaning of certain practices, belief systems and 
behaviour. Foster and Froman (2002, p. 529) in this respect argue that, “the most profound effect 
of culture lies in its foundation in the fabric of our thinking. Culture is not only the creative, 
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aesthetic product of the minds of people – the art, music and literature of civilisations – these are 
merely the peel of a much fleshier fruit. Culture is also the cause of how those minds think”. Of 
critical importance however, is the fact that attempts to understand such different meanings help 
to create contexts for understanding such differences and, to attach the appropriate meanings 
consistent with the epistemologies concerned. The etymology of words or symbols should 
therefore be seen in relation to their epistemological realm. Viewed in this context, hermeneutics 
helps to create sensitivity and respect for certain symbols, words or terms and, correlatively to 
people’s cultural practices and the meanings they attach to words, symbols and rituals. 
 
Etymology in Context 
 
According to Malkiel (1993, pp. 1-2) etymology was peculiar to “Medieval Europe and is 
associated with the mystic approach of that time, involved in it was the widespread belief in 
symbolism and the practice of parables … the appeal to etymology in a magic context may well 
have started with proper names and be as old as its roots in prehistory”. Malkiel’s conception of 
the word etymology should be understood within the cultural context from which he comes and 
operates, that is, the Western paradigm. It is within the Western bounds that he conceptualises 
etymology, hence his claim that etymology is one of the Western inventions. Our observation 
here gains support from the Encyclopaedia of Psychology (1982, volume 3, p. 165) “no human 
being can divorce his or her own personality from the topic investigated. Each investigator’s 
interests, prejudices, cultural background, qualifications, and abilities are interwoven with the 
topics chosen for investigation”. It is therefore logical to argue that etymologically, the concept 
“psyche” carries certain Western historical and cultural characteristics and cannot therefore 
loosely be translated to African languages without altering its meaning. 
 
The West has, through systematic subjugation, marginalisation and suppression of other 
realities, created the false impression that etymologically, the “psyche” and “psychology” are its 
inventions. Mkhize (2004, p. 38) argues against this misrepresentation of reality by stating that 
“all psychologies are somehow connected to underlying metaphysical ontologies which … order 
things in specific ways with regard to what is ‘good’ and ‘bad’, ‘right’ or ‘wrong’ about 
conditions of life”. We therefore do agree with Mkhize that all “psychologies” have their specific 
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ontological realities. In our view, the life conditions referred to by Mkhize can be represented by 
cultural activities such as symbols, art works, drumming, sculpting and rituals which are 
epistemologically linked to their existential experiences. These representations are a reflection of 
a people’s culture. Our interest in this study and in particular this chapter, is to examine the 
etymology as well as the hermeneutics of the “psyche” and, by extension “psychology”. Also, we 
will question the justification for using it in the African therapeutic context.  
 
From the above exposition, it is evident that there is an inseparable relationship between 
etymology and hermeneutics. One cannot discuss the etymology of the “psyche” without 
situating it within its appropriate cultural context. The “psyche” assumes different shades of 
meaning in various cultural contexts.  
 
Epistemology and African Epistemologies 
 
In this study we will advance the argument that supports the understanding of concepts and 
terms from our African epistemological paradigm. Over the years, the tendency of translating 
Western concepts to suit the African situation and experiences developed into a standard culture. 
Examples in this regard include the translation of the term “soul/spirit” into the assumed-
equivalent African term moya. Given the various meanings attributed to the term moya, as 
discussed by Ramose (1999) and Skhakhane (1988), this concept cannot just arbitrarily and 
“blanketly” be translated to “soul/spirit”. Such “blanket” translation creates ambiguity because 
the term “soul/spirit” does not necessarily mean moya, nor does it capture the essence of the 
experience embodied in moya, as understood by African indigenous people. The concept 
“soul/spirit” has its etymology and it is culture specific. It is not an original African vernacular. It 
may therefore not be implanted into the African cultural context without due regard for African 
terminology. The use or translation of alien concepts in the African context essentially represents 
the introduction of a foreign culture to Africa’s experience. On this reasoning, it is critical to 
question the relevance and applicability of the concepts in the African context. The basis on 
which such random translatability is rooted is highly questionable and contestable (Kruger, 
Lifschitz & Baloyi, 2007). Similarly, use of the term “psyche” in the African context, or an 
attempt to translate “psyche” and “psychology” to African languages is another problematic area. 
 68
These translation tendencies can no longer be left unchallenged. Under these circumstances, 
establishing the etymology of the psyche becomes crucial, especially when considering its 
probable problematic implications within the African context. The current use of the term 
“psyche” in African “psychology” and in clinical applications does not take the philosophical, 
epistemological and cultural experiences of Africans into consideration. This has resulted in the 
meaning of “psyche” being confused, diffused and at times completely misplaced and irrelevant 
when it is applied to contexts other than those of the West.  
 
Etymology of the Term Psyche and its “Definition” 
 
The interchangeable use of the concepts “soul” and “spirit” in the literature as observed in 
Setiloane (1975, p. 64) is mostly confusing and needs clarification. The focus of this chapter is on 
the “psyche”. Due to the current study’s “psychological” slant, a discussion of both the “soul” 
and “spirit” is unavoidable and imperative. Such a reflection will indicate whether or not there is 
any justification for the interchangeable normative use of these terms. The Encyclopaedia of 
Psychology (1994, p. 386), identifies “the social importance of psychology with the eighteen 
century traces the history of psychology as a science to the nineteenth century, although its 
etymological roots are Greek, psyche (‘soul’) + logos (‘word’) = psychology… Instead, people 
wrote about a ‘science of human nature’ or ‘mental’ or ‘moral’ science”. 
 
According to The New Westminster Dictionary of the Bible (1976, p. 901), the Hebrew word 
“nephesh refers to the living soul, and is applied to animals in a collective sense, and also to man 
as a living being. The soul is not a separate entity apart from the body, but forms a unity with it 
and animates the flesh”. Implicit in this inseparability of the soul-body relationship is that we 
cannot talk of being alive without the existence of the two indivisibly. This argument finds 
support in The New Westminster Dictionary of the Bible, which states that “the Hebrew word 
ruah, in Greek pneuma has an original meaning ‘breath’, ‘wind’ or ‘blow’, which contains the 
semantic meaning spirit, ‘blow’ or ‘breath’ derived from the Latin word spiritus. The soul 
(nephesh) is an essential characteristic of a human being’s existence and gives life to the body. 
Without the soul, it will be inconceivable to conceptualise the be-ing or existence of a human 
 69
being. Life and being are embodied in the soul. It is for this reason that the soul’s animating 
power dissipates when the body dies because they are one”. 
 
According to The New Encyclopaedia Britannica (1978, volume 15, p. 152), “the Hebrew 
term for ‘soul’ (nefesh, that which breathes), was used by Moses (c.13th century B.C), signifying 
‘animated being’, a man’s life in which the spirit manifests itself and applicable equally to 
nonhuman beings. The Hebrews used the term to apply to the entire personality but reserved the 
concept ruah (‘spirit’) to denote a principle of life, ‘mind’, and occasionally ‘heart’. Nefesh was 
often used as if it were the seat of appetite, emotion, and passion and, conjoined with ‘heart’, was 
held to encompass intellect, will, and feeling. New Testament usage of psyche ‘soul’ was 
comparable to nefesh”. Since nefesh refers to that which “breathes”, “wind” or “blows”, the 
psyche (soul) therefore also entails the principle of life in its totality (visible and invisible). 
Therefore, the visible “heart” and the invisible, “mind” for example, constitute the soul or psyche. 
The visible or physical form through which the soul or psyche manifests itself does not denote 
dualistic existence, but rather a single existence in different faces. In its face as the body, the 
psyche is observable. Observability renders the body susceptible to empirical inquiry. The 
“death” of the physical body does not mean the “death” of the soul itself. Because of its 
qualitative difference from the physicality of the body, the soul or psyche cannot cease to exist at 
the “death” of the physical being.  
 
According to The New Encyclopaedia Britannica (1978, volume 15), “New Testament usage 
of psyche (‘soul’) was comparable to nefesh. Jesus’ complete dualistic demarcation between flesh 
and spirit was quite evident, and St. Paul (died A.D 64) exceeded the dualism of Jesus to invent a 
triune man, regarding ‘spirit’ (pneuma) in Greek, as a divinely inspired life principle, ‘soul’ 
(psyche) as man’s life in which ‘spirit’ manifest itself, and body (soma) as the physical 
mechanism animated by ‘soul’”. It must be noted that although there is Hebrew spelling 
difference between The New Encyclopaedia Britannica nephesh, and The New Westminster 
Dictionary nefesh, this difference does not change the substance and meaning of the term. 
 
Clearly, the Christian fragmented conception of being played a significant role in dividing the 
soul into dual ontologies. The belief that when human beings die, their spirit or soul leaves the 
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body and migrates to a different ontology where it exists independently of the body is further 
proof of the fragmentation of body and soul. An example in this regard is observed in The 
Encyclopaedia of Philosophy (1967, volume 5 p. 512), which identifies psyche on two different 
levels, “the first means life, and then the departed life or ghost. On the first level, the psyche 
refers to the mind and is seen as man’s rational and immortal life, which possesses reason, 
emotions, and will”. On the basis of the above, we further observe the division of the psyche into 
two different levels, the living, breathing, feeling and the mind, reasoning level. The psyche 
divides reality into spirit and the body (soma). As the former, the psyche represents the mind, 
“man’s” rational and immortal life, but this level is invisible. The body is physical and 
observable through the conduct of human beings. This is the visible level of the psyche. Here the 
psyche is together with the “soul” forming a duality. However, it is important to note that the 
duality does not necessarily presuppose sameness between body and “soul”.  
 
By appearing in the body as its animator, the “soul” becomes embodied. It subsides as having 
a body and is thus embodied. As such it is given both the observable and unobservable forms of 
existence. The heart and personality are visible while the mind is invisible. This fragmented 
thinking conforms to the ancient Greek tradition (for example, Plato) of conceptualising reality in 
terms of the visible (physical) and the invisible (metaphysical). In Harding’s (1986, p. 363) 
observation, “in the Euro-American world view, there is a separation between the self and the 
nonself (phenomenal world). Through this process of separation, the phenomenal world becomes 
an Object, an ‘it’”. Moses used the term soul within the Biblical context to denote life giving 
spirit, the animated being. According to Hauck (1999, pp. 87-88), “both the Bible and the Koran 
equate this spirit with the Wind. In fact, in Hebrew, Arabic and Greek, the word for wind means 
both ‘breath’ and ‘spirit’. Thus the Wind carries the cosmic breath of God, the greatest spirit who 
at the beginning of the world ‘moved upon the face of the waters, bringing order to the watery 
world and life of Adam’”. Also, in the above sense, the wind is equated to air and is regarded as a 
life-giving force – the spirit – and is thus given Godly status (Good News Bible, 1977, John 3:8).  
 
In some Old Testament books of the Bible, reference is also made to the spirit or soul as the 
Holy Ghost in several instances, to refer to God or Christ’s spirit, which breathes or blows life. 
The term holy ghost in reference to God has gradually been replaced with the Holy Spirit. Our 
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view in respect of this subterfuge is that the writers or editors of the Bible considered it 
“inappropriate” to call Christ or God a ghost, translated as sepoko in Sesotho. If the term ghost or 
sepoko were to be retained, then God would be at the same level of existence as his creatures. 
This situation would be undesirable. We can further argue that God is here presented as residing 
in a different ontology, aloof and at a different level to His creatures (Wiredu, 1980 & 2002).  
 
The term sepoko is used in reference to the “person” or “soul” which during its “breathing” 
physical life, is believed to have done evil things on earth and, subsequently being refused entry 
to “heaven”. In this sense sepoko is conceptualised as an evil spirit or soul, translated as moya o o 
mobe in Sesotho. The soul does not cease to exist or influence the physical environment even 
after the actual physical death of the human be-ing. 
 
The question that arises in this regard is: Do Africans, for example, conceptualise and 
understand the “soul”/“spirit” to exist in both the physical and metaphysical ontologies? A 
further pressing and critical question in this line of reasoning is: Do concepts such as soul/spirit, 
psyche and psychology constitute applicable terminology in the African epistemology context?  
 
African Conception of the “Soul” 
 
African traditional thought does not conceptualise the “soul”/“spirit” (if we loosely translate 
it to moya), as an isolated entity belonging to invisible, non-responsive and non-living beings. 
The spirit or spirituality presupposes an interactive characteristic and a communicative value in a 
wholistic way. This means that life experiences are not viewed as separate from each other, 
outside of their encompassing context. Mkhize (2004, p. 44) refers to this principle of cosmic 
unity as “knowledge through participation… one does not know by standing and observing at a 
distance. To know is to participate in the dynamic process involving interaction between parts 
and the whole”. Viewed from this understanding, the “spirit” is not seen as a static and discrete 
concept. It is the deceased that is believed to be living in the ontology of the invisible intangible 
beings. This living deceased is conceived as being in a dynamically engaging, evolving state of 
existence and influence in the world of the animated beings. Implicit here is the view that the 
“spirit” or “soul” can be experienced and lived. 
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In Sesotho, mewa ya badimo, the spirits of the living-dead, in the African sense, for example, 
are invisible but exert immense influence on many African cultural daily activities. The challenge 
psychology and many disciplines which were previously colonised face is the language and 
concepts used in the African context. There has been little or no interest in adopting 
“psychological” indigenous languages and concepts that reflect and represent indigenous 
epistemological paradigms. This has inevitably caused serious translation difficulties, such as the 
assumption that Western concepts could adequately represent African expressions and lived 
experiences. The Afrikaans term for soul is gees or siel (translated as spirit or soul) Tweetalige 
Woordeboek/Bilingual Dictionary, (1984). We can see that based on this direct Afrikaans 
translation, the term soul is subsumed in the term spirit. It is this direct translation of terms from 
one Western language to the African languages that we are questioning.  
 
Psychology and the Problem of Translation 
 
There is a growing tendency in the “psychology” literature to adopt concepts or words as used 
in one epistemology and to translate them to the other. The very use of the term “psychology” in 
many African communities and universities poses a serious problem. The term “psychology” is 
foreign to Africans because it is conceived out of a foreign epistemology and ontology. We rarely 
see an attempt in the literature to use the appropriate concept that accurately captures the African 
understanding and experience of what “psychology” is to them. The unconvincing argument 
advanced in such adoption of foreign concepts is that there are no terms in African languages 
equivalent to these Western concepts. Subsequently, Western concepts are then adopted and used 
as authentically representative of African understanding and meaning of “psychology”. This 
situation results in Western terms being imposed on indigenous conceptions of “psychological” 
constructs and meanings. This tendency compromises and denies indigenous languages equally 
recognisable space to define, explain and represent African experiences and realities using their 
own linguistic expressions. In most cases, it is assumed that English, Greek, Hebrew, Latin or 
any other Western languages that are used in “psychology”, are readily used or translatable to 
African languages. This assumption is etymologically and epistemologically flawed. Gbadegesin 
(2002, p. 175) suggests a practical way to deal with the confusion caused by translations in this 
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way: “one way to avoid or, at least, minimise confusion is not to start with English equivalents of 
these terms, but rather to describe their usages …”. It must be borne in mind that the current 
imposed “psychology” as it is taught and practiced in the universities in Africa and clinical 
training programmes, does not use indigenous words to explain itself. This situation calls for 
serious reflection and interrogation on the relevance and usefulness of these training programmes 
to the African students and their cultures.  
 
The Relationship between the Spirit and the Psyche 
 
Superficially conceived, it is taken for granted that the concepts spirit and the psyche are 
synonyms. However, a critical analysis of these terms indicates that there are some complex 
nuances in their conceptualisation, meaning and application. There is little problematisation in 
the psychology literature of the meaning and linguistic nuances embedded in these two concepts. 
This interchangeable superficial approach that is often seen in the use and application of the 
concept spirit and the psyche is in our view unjustifiable and cannot be sustained. 
 
Since the focus of this study is on philosophical psychology, it is crucial to deal more 
specifically with the psyche, as it relates to “psychology”. The question relevant to this study in 
general and this chapter in particular is: How does the spirit relate to the psyche? This question is 
pertinent and can only be answered if we understand what the psyche means. The immediate 
challenge that we are faced with here is to establish whether the concepts psyche and spirit are 
different or reflect and represent similar meanings conceptually. The problematisation of the 
spirit/soul is well documented in fields such as religion, spirituality and politics and, has been the 
subject of controversy and argument by Plato and Aristotle, for example.  
 
What seems to be lacking in psychology discourse is sufficient problematisation of the 
interchangeable use of the terms psyche and soul/spirit. It is taken for granted in some 
psychology, theology and philosophy literature that the psyche equals the spirit/soul. What is the 
basis for using the term psyche in psychology and not spirit or soul? Whichever way the psyche 
is defined, can it be empirically studied? This question has to situate the psyche in the sphere of 
the already defined context, that is, that psychology as we know and practice it can be empirically 
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studied. The empirical approach that is often adopted when studying the psyche is highly 
problematic because the psyche, which is mostly conceptualised as the mind, is not observable. It 
is the brain that is physically observable and it can be empirically studied. However, there seems 
to be confusion in the conceptualisation of the mind and the brain. At the level of physiology, 
which among the other areas also studies the brain, the psyche as the behaviour of the brain is 
observable. At the level of the psyche being described as the mind, then the psyche is invisible 
and unobservable. Psychology is generally defined as “the study of or applied science of ‘mind’ 
and behaviour, without invoking a supernatural soul” Encyclopaedia of Psychology (1994, 
volume 6, p. 386). This broad definition situates psyche in the visible, empirical domain. Even 
within the Western conceptualisation, the question of whether the psyche can be empirically 
studied or not, creates very serious ambiguities. If the psyche or mind is not accessible to 
empirical observation and studies, then how do we empirically study “psychology”? The psyche 
and “psychology” as construed by the West are at variance with the African cultural 
understanding of be-ing and is therefore a misfit in the African context. The psyche or mind is not 
observable physically. It is a “dispositional concept, manifesting itself through concrete 
behaviour” (Ryle, 1949, pp. 117-118). In the same logic, the psyche from which psychology is 
derived, by virtue of its unobservable nature, falls in the invisible ontology. In terms of this 
reasoning, we may go as far as arguing that at this level of conceptualisation, “psychology” 
belongs to the metaphysical world and there cannot be any logical claim for its empiricism. The 
interchangeable use of the spirit and the psyche and its empirical and “scientific” claim that is so 
often observed in the literature then becomes a debatable issue. On the other hand, the 
contradiction that needs to be exposed here is that if the West’s claim that the psyche or spirit 
exists in the invisible “Godly” ontology, and then we can insist on the “scientific” empirical 
proof of God’s existence. But “God”, as (Gilson, 1941, p. 141) argued plausibly, “is not a 
scientific probability but a metaphysical necessity”. The conclusion to be drawn here is that the 
claim that situates the psyche in metaphysics, excludes the possibility of psychology being a field 
that belongs to the social sciences’ domain. Psychology as an empirical science proceeds from 
the premise that the psyche, like the soul/spirit, embodies lived experience and belongs to the 
visible ontology. On this basis, we can see why the spirit and the psyche are mostly used 
interchangeably. 
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Does death necessarily imply a separate ontological existence, or does it imply physical 
existence and experience on a different conceptual domain? These questions cannot, according to 
Ramose (1999, p. 68), be fully answered without reference to, and an understanding of some 
African languages with regard to the concept of death and spirit. In this regard he sees the 
function of language here as intended to demonstrate 1) “that linguistic expressions about death 
carry a definite meaning underpinned by specific metaphysical presuppositions and that these 
latter pertain to a particular world-view, and 2) African linguistic expressions in this context are 
not readily translatable into non-African languages without a significant loss of some of the 
essential meaning of the word or expression used”. On the basis of this argument, it is clear that 
we cannot uncritically resort to the use of alien concepts and expressions to represent the African 
worldview. Furthermore, we cannot continue to fragment reality into metaphysical and physical 
ontologies because such a split is inconsistent with the traditional African epistemological 
paradigm. According to our view, both death and “spirit” is inseparable reflections and 
representations of people’s visible ontological conceptions of reality and existence. Death and 
“spirit” are therefore inseparably linked. Therefore the “spirit” or “soul” is, from the perspective 
of traditional African thinking, present and real in both the living and the dead person. They are 
not abstracts that are only available in the metaphysical world after death. From the African 
perspective, “spirit” and “psyche” are lived experienced existential realities. It is on this basis 
that we also speak of African spirituality. Spirituality in African traditional thought is not thought 
of as a separate entity. The psyche/spirit(uality) is a member of a community of life forces that 
constitutes the wholeness of the cosmic unity.  
 
Several African scholars such as Mkhize (2004), Teffo and Roux (2002), Sogolo (2002), 
Wiredu, (2002) and Gbadegesin (2002) uphold and defend the wholistic cosmic unity of 
existence. Spirituality, in terms of traditional African thought, forms an integral part of this 
cosmic ontological unity. Loosely translated, spirit or soul means umoya in Zulu or moya in 
Sesotho. It will be misleading and insufficient to assume that spirit or soul succinctly captures the 
meaning of moya as understood by traditional African thought. It is for this reason that the psyche 
or spirit in the Western sense cannot simply be translated to moya. We now discuss the different 
meanings and shades of the concept moya from the perspective of traditional African thinking. 
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Conceptions of Moya in Traditional African Thought 
 
Moya in African traditional thought is ontologically experienced and expressed through 
different conditions, situations and behaviours. These conditions, situations and behaviours are 
not removed or independent from the visible world in which people live. Instead, they are an 
integral part of the context in which they occur. The experiences are not alien to African 
traditional thought, but constitute the world of their lived experiences. The unknown and 
untestable notion of reality, in this case moya, that is assumed to be in the metaphysical world, 
alienates people from their context and results in fragmented thinking and a distorted worldview. 
African traditional thought does not fragment moya into dualistic realities. Dualism is contrary to 
the African understanding of be-ing, which sees the world as a continuous interactive network of 
the living, the living dead, the still-to-be-born and the cosmic world. Be-ing in our view 
represents the coherent and unbroken network of interactions and relatedness between these 
different subsystems. Moya is also present and experienced in these different levels of 
connections. The different ways in which moya can be experienced and expressed are discussed 
with specific reference to Ramose’s and Skhakhane’s conceptions later in the chapter. 
 
Our discussion of moya as an inextricable part of the cosmic unity above does not necessarily 
dispute and deny the diverse conceptions of moya even among indigenous African scholars 
themselves. Setiloane (1975) and Bujo (1998, 2003) can be cited as examples in this regard. 
There are those people who hold that moya cannot be observed and therefore belongs to the 
metaphysical sphere. On the other hand there are those who hold the view that moya ceases to 
exist at death. For example, Wiredu (2002, p. 32) argues that “whether by way of inconsistency 
or doctrinal fecundity … there is, a diversity of thought on the problem. This discussion, then, 
demonstrates a vitality of philosophical thought in an African traditional society that the 
generality of colonial studies of African thought, intending to give an impression of monolithic 
unanimity, has tended to obscure”. These misconceptions are in our opinion, firstly an indication 
of the differences in how reality is constructed. Secondly, it shows the extent to which some 
Africans have copied and translated Western paradigmic linguistic versions and attempted to 
assimilate them into the African worldview. The latter has resulted in some confusion arising 
from the argument among some Africans about the existence or non existence of the 
 77
metaphysical world. Wiredu (2002, p. 24) refers to this tendency to adapt and copy the Western 
thought formations as the “quintessence of conceptual colonisation”. 
 
Moya’s existence only in the observable ontology does not necessarily mean that Africans do 
not differentiate between dead matter and living things. Even human beings die and depart from 
the material world, but after death they are not objectified, that is, they are not regarded as non 
living, non participatory and non feeling objects. The living dead’s moya remains connected and 
influential in the lives of the living and their environment. The living dead are instead still 
communicated and related to as being part of the ontology of the living. The identity of 
personhood (being human) stays with them long after their burial. It is for this reason that the 
living continues to inform and involve the living-dead of all the activities affecting them, their 
plans, sorrows and achievements in the form of rituals as means to maintain the connection with 
them. Africans are therefore against the objectification of dead people on the basis of their 
physical death.  
 
Another interesting dimension about the relationship between the living and the living dead is 
the respect that characterises this relationship. When going for some visitation ritual to the 
cemetery the Tswanas or Sothos usually say, re ya go tlhola/go bua le rre, mme, mmemogolo, 
rremogolo, we are going to visit our father, mother, grandmother or grandfather, whoever the 
person may be. There is never reference to re ya go tlhola moya wa ga rre. Hi ya ku kambeni 
tatani, in Shangaan, we are visiting our father, and not the “spirit” or moya of our father. A dead 
person is not referred to as se se tlhokafetseng, (it) that which died, but, yo o tlhokofetseng, the 
person that died. There is no expression such as ke ya go bua le moya wa ga mme, rre or moya 
wa ga monnamogolo, I am going to talk to the “spirit” of my mother, father or grandfather, 
whoever the deceased is. In African traditional thought moya continues to be inseparably 
associated with the dead body at all relevant times and context, and this becomes an inherent 
characteristic of “life” to the deceased. They still possess “life” and control over earthly processes 
even in their “dead” state. It is for this reason that they are referred to as the living dead. 
 
In African traditional thought, it is uncommon and unheard of to talk to moya “spirit”, in 
isolation from the person who is intrinsically subsumed in moya. The dead are not talked about in 
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an objectified manner. They remain personified even in their dead state. Ramose (1999, p. 68) 
argues that “this attribution of life to the deceased person is recognition of the belief that 
personhood is much more and larger than the physical body is expressed in African traditional 
thought as the living-dead. But such ascription of life to the deceased obviously does not mean 
that the person is alive in the same way as it was before death. So it is that life, however 
conceived, is believed to be present on this (the ontology of the visible beings) as well as on the 
other side (the ontology of the invisible beings) of death according to African traditional 
thought”. It is very important to note the both/and convergence embodied in Ramose’s argument. 
He does not present one ontology over the other, nor does he present them as either the one or the 
other. The two ontologies are not contradictory to each other, instead, they are complementary. 
There is no implication for the existence of either in the visible or invisible ontology, but rather, 
a coexistence of the two as a wholeness. The saying lefatshe la ba ba ithobaletseng or tiku ra 
lava va nga etlela, the world of the deceased in Sesotho/Sepedi and Xitsonga respectively does 
not refer to two different worlds ontologically, but to the interconnected way in which the living 
and the dead co-exist on the same ontological plane. Bujo (1998, 2003) supports this view by 
stating that the visible and invisible worlds imply each other. Ajei (2007, p. 116) succinctly 
argues for this inseparable conception of ontology from the metaphysical foundations of a 
modern natural science point of view by stating that “if science is culture-dependent, then 
metaphysics and cultural values are necessarily prior and foundational to its knowledge claim. 
This must be the case since ontology and epistemology are intimately and inextricably linked by 
mutual implication … If ontology is the theory of being, and epistemology a theory of the 
justification of knowledge, then each must imply the other because claiming that that something 
exists rationally implies the question: ‘how do you know?’; and claiming to know that x implies 
admitting the existence of x”. This complementarity is a clear demonstration that Africans do not 
conceptualise reality in dichotomous Cartesian terms. Wiredu, (2002, p. 24) in his discussion of 
the Akan cosmology argues that “… no such categories will be fitted into the conceptual 
framework of the Akan thought. Again, that Africans are constantly said to believe in spiritual 
entities in the immaterial sense can be put down to conceptual imposition in the colonising 
accounts of African thought in colonial times and their post-colonial aftermath”. Most African 
traditional communities share the Akan view of the integrated both/and conceptions of the 
cosmology, which moya forms part of. 
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African Cosmology and Both/And Thinking 
 
At this point it is crucial to interrogate the meaning and significance of Bujo’s statement that 
“the visible and the invisible worlds imply each other”, in view of the mind-body and physical 
and metaphysical dichotomy. To attend to this statement we would like to align ourselves with 
Bujo’s (2003, p. 19) argument that Africans do not think in “either/or”, but rather in “both /and” 
categories. This view is further sustained by Mkhize’s (2004) argument that indigenous societies, 
for the most part, do not view the world in a mechanical cause-effect manner. Instead, they tend 
to subscribe to a wholistic view of the world in which each system influences and is mutually 
influenced by the other life forces. In African traditional thought, the living, the living-dead, the 
yet-to-be-born, “God” and the context constitute the African cosmic unity. These communities 
are conceptualised as interconnected, interdependent and in constant coherent interaction with 
one another. None is better than or superior to the other. However, this community of systems is 
organised hierarchically to denote the dynamic of respect and harmony. Mkhize (2004, p. 51) 
argues that “these elements are capable of influencing and being influenced by others … and that 
this dynamism means that reality can be understood by studying the system as a whole, rather 
than isolated parts”. Implicit in this argument is that approaching African cosmology from the 
either/or fragmented perspective will not provide a comprehensive and integrated understanding 
of such reality. The both/and thinking goes beyond the diversity of the individual forms of the 
world. It is inclusive, evolving and recognises the value, contribution and complementarity 
embodied in interacting systems. It is for this reason that in African thought, moya (spirit) is seen 
in a complementary relation to the body, matter and context.  
 
On the contrary, the West, which adheres to Descartes’ notion of dualism, is most likely to 
position “moya” (spirit) against the body (mmele). It has also imposed a putative hierarchy, 
making the soul superior to the body. The self is in Cartesian thinking the centre around which 
everything revolves and depends. Therefore the self is superior to anything else. The “I” endowed 
with reason, is seen as fundamentally key to understanding the world. The person’s existence is 
upon their reasoning capacity, “I think, therefore I am”. Rationality here becomes the condition 
by which reality is conceived and determined. As Teffo and Roux (2002, p. 162) observed, 
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“rationality has been seen as a universal inherent ability of humankind to determine the truth”. 
According to this theory, rationality is based upon logical deductions and strict rules of evidence; 
the distorting tendencies of affect must be avoided at all costs. This provides a method of 
investigation in which correct answers are thought to be rationally determined, that is, true. 
Rationality, therefore, is seen as the only avenue towards reliable knowledge, and also as being 
certain of success in yielding correct, final answers if its methods are promptly followed”.  
 
The conception of the self that is determined by rationality is in opposition to the African 
conception of the self, which is and can only be understood in relation to the other members of 
the all-embracing cosmology. Even within the African traditional community thinking, the 
question of whether there is African metaphysics or not continues to be vigorously interrogated. 
This is so because “African metaphysics” as a monolithic universe is philosophically 
problematic. Also, the “metaphysical” conceptions in the African context are as varied as the 
different conceptions of reality among different socio-cultural groups. We are therefore mindful 
of the fact that Africa does not consist of undifferentiated homogeneous groups (Ramose, 1999; 
Teffo & Roux, 2002; Wiredu, 1980). 
 
Our argument, however, is that the concept of metaphysics as understood by the West is 
inconsistent with the African conception of the “metaphysical” world. This is so because as Teffo 
and Roux (2002, p. 165) argue, “metaphysical discourse in Africa must be based on the African 
perceptions of reality as determined by a history, geographical circumstances, and such cultural 
phenomena as religion, thought systems and linguistic conventions entrenched in the Africa 
world-view”. In terms of this reasoning, we therefore posit that African “metaphysics” cannot 
simply be reduced to and understood in terms of dualistic natural and occult abstractions. African 
“metaphysics” is conceptualised in wholeness terms in which there is coherent interaction of 
forces of the different systems, such as “God”, the living-dead, the living, the yet-to-be-born and 
the material things. This general African “metaphysical” conception indicates that Africans 
conceptualise reality based on the lived experiential interaction.  
 
The adoption of the use of the term “metaphysics” in African discourse is a further example of 
some Africans trying to explain the African cosmology using Western conventions of thinking 
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and concepts. We are therefore reminded of Okere’s (2005a) argument that all cultures have 
developed their forms of knowledge, and that every form of knowledge must be situated or 
generated within that culture. In the same logic, concepts or the terminology used in any culture 
should be bounded and informed by lived experiences, presuppositions and the environing 
cultural linguistic conventions. The adoption and interpretation of the concept “metaphysics” 
using Western frameworks and conventions to understand Africa’s indigenous knowledge 
systems will result in miscommunication and simplification of vastly complex African ontology 
and epistemology.  
 
Most scholars who try to articulate the African ontology have intentionally or unintentionally 
applied Western concepts to represent the African worldview. This has led to what Wiredu (2002, 
p. 26), sees as not only superficiality, but “… an illustration of one of the things that the 
uncritical assimilation of African categories to Western ones has done to an African self-image”. 
To talk of physical and metaphysical systems in traditional African thought is grossly misleading. 
Furthermore, the “arbitrary” use of terms from one epistemology to the other without critically 
evaluating their etymology and the cultural context within which they are used leads to gross 
misrepresentation such as in the case of spirit in the African languages. Kruger et al. (2007, p. 
327) argue against this random and arbitrary tendency of translating words and concepts from 
one worldview to the other; “when comparing the worldviews of different cultural groups, the 
meanings of some words and concepts are ‘untranslatable’, as they are grounded in different 
understanding of the physical, psychological and spiritual worlds. They are immersed in different 
semantic fields that metaphorically call different worlds into being”. African thought sees both 
moya and the body in wholeness terms.  
 
It follows then that there is reason and place for the adoption and use of indigenous African 
concepts in the discourse of psychology. Even this latter term should be expressed in indigenous 
vernaculars or be expanded in meaning through indigenous African vernaculars. Without this, 
“science” will violate its self-imposed norm of representativity (objectivity) and thus become 
unscientific.  
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Is the Psyche a Universal “Scientific” Concept? 
 
The “science” question was raised and dealt with in detail in Chapter 1. We will in this section 
limit our discussion to the psyche and its relationship and susceptibility to “scientific” study. We 
will also question if the psyche is a universal “scientific” concept that is applicable to different 
cultural contexts. On this basis, the crucial questions to be asked are: Can the psyche be studied 
“scientifically”? By what conception of “science” is the psyche susceptible to “scientific” study? 
From the Western paradigm, the logical way to deal with this question is to adopt the empirical 
approach. Empirical in this context implies fragmenting the psyche into observable, measurable 
smaller activities. On the first question, our argument is that the psyche can, from the perspective 
of the Western paradigm, be “scientifically” studied in the observable sense of analysing 
behaviour. In this way the metaphysical dimension is reduced to the level and domain of the 
empirical. The argument to be advanced here is that the body that occupies space in Europe is 
different in experience to that which occupies space in Africa. What Europe calls the psyche may 
not necessarily be adequately translatable to an African term (Ajei, 2007; Dewey, 1958; Okere, 
2005; Wiredu, 1980). The African equivalent term for “psyche” should be deeply and 
inextricably representative of the everyday experiences of the African life. The concept moya, 
experientially and conceptually represents the African ontology and lived experiences. Clearly, 
the adoption and use of indigenous African vernaculars is congruent with the African 
epistemological paradigm. The dominant paradigm of psychotherapy does not respond to this 
requirement. We therefore submit that the psyche as currently understood within the psychology 
and psychotherapy context, is both epistemologically and ontologically a Western imposition.  
 
Cartesianism and the Psyche 
 
Reductionism is traceable to the positivist-empirical scientific tradition of Rene Descartes, 
Isaac Newton and Francis Bacon, to mention but a few of the pioneers of this thinking. 
According to Ajei (2007, p. 113), “the insistence on a unique rationality and logic of justification 
for the explanatory framework of modern Western science is a relic of its origins and initial 
preoccupations”. What is clear though, is that the proponents of rationality have proclaimed it as 
the only method of knowledge production. In this sense, rationality has claimed objectivity and 
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by implication, universal validity status. Becvar and Becvar (2006, p. 4), describe reductionism 
as “reducing the sequences of reality, which are out there, into their smallest possible components 
… to uncover the laws according to which the world operates ... the discovery of which will 
reveal some absolute truths about reality”. Reductionism is a way of thinking that involves the 
breaking of a complex world or reality into smaller, more manageable pieces within controlled 
contexts. 
 
Cartesian thinking has claimed successes and exerted influence over many fields of studies 
and research such as philosophy, natural sciences and mathematics. The dualistic study of the 
psyche by the West in a rational, controlled and measurable manner indicates the perceived 
effectiveness and successes of Cartesian thinking. The fundamental thinking of Cartesianism is 
succinctly articulated by Foster and Froman (2002, p. 529) who argue that “Cartesian thinking 
creates separateness in one’s personhood and the self relative to others”. Capra (1983, p. 42) in 
this regard notes that: “Since the seventeenth century physics has been the example of an ‘exact’ 
science, and has served as the model for all other sciences”. It is for this reason that Shearman 
(1994, p. 2) argues that “because our thinking is in itself Cartesian and therefore we cannot think 
ourselves out of the Cartesian thinking”. 
 
Shearman’s generalised view should be seen and understood within the Western background 
because not all people of the world are necessarily entrapped in the Cartesian rationalist and 
reductionist thinking. So, “our thinking …” above does not necessarily speak for and represent 
traditional African thinking and experiences. This generalisation is a clear illustration of the 
developed tendency of the West to generalise its experiences and dualistic thinking to all people. 
In this framework, the mind for example, is studied independently. In the same logic, an 
individual or a human being is viewed as independent and capable of self regulatory, self-
controlled and independent behaviour within the influence of their community. The rationale 
behind this dualistic thinking lies in the belief that if we can control, explain, prove and measure 
the separate smaller elements of the complex system, we can then combine this knowledge to 
fully comprehend the complexity of the whole. On this reasoning, reductionism holds that the 
functioning of the system or organism can be explained by understanding its smaller elements 
(Fourie, 1998). It is for this reason that we argue that training psychotherapists in the Western 
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epistemology, which is what all psychotherapists in South African universities are trained in, 
essentially follows Cartesian conceptualisation, theorising and practice. The question is, within 
the African context, how legitimate and ethical are such training programmes? What is the 
function and purpose of continuing to “train” or “indoctrinate” Africans in philosophical 
frameworks that are alien to their cultural and existential realities? These questions are somewhat 
rhetorical because we have dealt with them already in the preceding sections. Their purpose here 
is to serve as the bridge for crossing over into African concepts proper. We shall begin with an 
exposition of the concept of umoya, moya or mowa. 
 
The African Conception of Moya 
 
In African traditional thought, moya is not seen as isolated and independent from other life 
forces. The visible and the invisible ontology levels of moya coexist. These two levels, according 
to the African traditional thought, coherently link the different levels of existence. The prevalence 
of these levels rests in 1) the recognition that in African traditional thought there is no relational 
hierarchy, but horisontal existential connectedness of different systems, that is, human beings, the 
living dead, the yet-to-be-born and “God” (Xikwembu, Mudzimu or uNkulunkulu) and, 2) the 
uninterrupted continuity of existence or life. This expression finds support in Bujo (1998, p. 16), 
who argues that “according to the African people’s belief, not only human beings can influence 
each other, but all forces pose a causal and ontological interdependence. Accordingly, natural 
forces can influence men and women ontologically and vice versa”. This is what is broadly 
understood as the cosmic unity which moya forms part of.  
 
The concept moya will probably resonate with and capture the true meaning of these complex 
forms of human existence. We therefore have to make reference to some African languages’ 
expressions of the concept moya.  
 
Does the term psyche as understood in Western thinking necessarily have the same meaning as 
umoya, mweya, mowa or moya in African traditional thought? It must be emphasised here that 
our use of the phrase African traditional thought in this instance does not deny the cultural and 
linguistic diversity that exists among African peoples. In fact, the argument for the adoption of 
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the term moya, is a call for the recognition and respect for diversity. However, we are mindful of 
commonalities among African cultures that create the African or “family atmosphere” and 
philosophical affinity and kinship among and between the indigenous people of Africa (Ramose, 
1999; Skhakhane, 1988; Wiredu, 1980). We are not suggesting that all Africans throughout the 
continent use the term umoya or moya for psyche. 
 
According to Skhakhane (1988) a common word used in the South of Zambezi languages to 
refer to the spirit is moya, umoya or mweya. Skhakhane (1988, pp. 6-7) on the other hand 
presents the following Zulu connotative variations:  
 
1. umoya obandayo   = cold wind 
2. ukuphuma umoya   = the exit of the spirit, to die 
3. ukuffaza umoya   = to sprinkle the spirit, to spread rumours 
4. umoya umubi    = bad spirit 
5. unomoya or o na le moea  = a person has a spirit 
 
Ramose (1999, p. 69), for example, draws our attention to the different (Sesotho) meanings of 
moya, moea or mowa applicable to different contexts, as follows: 
 
1. moya o a foka    = the wind is blowing 
2. O na le moya o mobe   = he has bad intentions 
3. Go na le moya o mobe  = the atmosphere is bad 
4. O tsenwe ke moya o mobe  = he is possessed by bad spirit 
5. Moya wa gagwe o ko fase  = he is low spirited or depressed 
 
In the above examples, the meaning of moya is varied and refers to different conditions and 
situations depending on the context within which it is used. The point to be emphasised about 
these various meanings of moya or umoya, is that this term cannot simply be translated into spirit 
without losing its meaning (Ramose, 1999; Skhakhane, 1988). Moya in the sentences above, 
except where it refers to wind, is not separate or independent of the human body. In the case of 
examples provided by Skhakhane and Ramose above, the appropriate meaning that is 
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coterminous in this study is Skhakhane’s number 2, ukuphuma umoya, translated as, the exit of 
the spirit or to die. The expression of moya in the context of this study can metaphorically be 
expressed (in Sesotho) as: 
 
Moya o tswile nameng (mmeleng) = the spirit has deserted the flesh or body or;  
Moya o ile badimong or o iketse badimong = the spirit has gone to the living-dead or died. 
 
These examples add to the varied meanings moya has in the African context. In the above 
examples, the first example passes no judgment as to where moya has gone it just indicates that 
the person is dead. It is in this context that since it is not known where moya, “spirit” has gone, 
or even further, that no one can empirically prove where moya has gone. In such an instance, we 
argue that no comment should be made, because, ga re itse, we do not know. We also observe 
that there is no distinct separation in terms of the physical and “metaphysical” worlds in which 
the departed body and moya reside. The fact that moya has left the body means that it remains 
accessible even though it is in the sphere of the ontology of invisible beings.  
 
In the second example, there is a belief that moya and the living-dead are ontologically 
interconnected. Also, the fact that moya goes to badimo, the living-dead, indicates the inseparable 
characteristic between moya, badimo and the cosmic world. In traditional African thought, one 
cannot therefore talk of moya without recognising badimo, that is, those who are deemed to be 
present and influencing the life of the living at all relevant times. It is with the meanings 
embodied in the above examples in mind that we further argue against any arbitrary translation of 
terms from one epistemology to the other. In support of this argument, Ramose (1999, p. 69) 
posits that “the point about these various meanings of moya is that the word is not simply 
translated into spirit or soul without further ado. Accordingly, the notion of spirit or soul as a 
separate and distinct substance- in the Platonic sense subsisting independently of the body does 
not readily fit into African traditional thought”.  
 
From the perspective of African traditional thought, moya is seen as an inextricable part of the 
human being. In the wholistic conception of the human being, moya is oneness with the body. In 
view of the above exposition of moya, it is clear that individualism or claims that purport 
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independent reality separate from the physical world are contrary to the relational and wholeness 
ontology of most Africans’ conception of human existence and be-ing. Contrary to the Western 
conception of the spirit, moya exists in an intricate network of harmoniously interacting 
community of systems. Mkhize (2004, p. 44) supports this view by stating that “traditional 
African societies believe that there should be harmony and interdependence between elements in 
the cosmos. Disconnection between parts comprising the whole is undesirable and immoral or 
unethical. It must be emphasised that the African ethic rests on community and life at large as its 
basis. Thus, awareness of this framework is indispensable if one were wanting to understand 
people’s conception of moral reasoning”. From the African traditional thought, moya can 
therefore be “defined” as:  
 
Ways in which people culturally define and interpret their existence and be-ing in relation 
to the others and the cosmos, using methods of communication and connections such as 
rituals and cultural rites of passage. 
 
The understanding of moya will not be fully comprehended unless and only if it is situated 
within the Africa ontology.  
 
Ubuntu, Personhood and Be-ing as Embodiments of Moya 
 
In the African traditional thought, we cannot conceive personhood outside the ubuntu/botho 
philosophy. According to Ramose (1999, p. 40), “ubuntu then, is the wellspring flowing with 
African ontology and epistemology … and ubuntu may be seen as the basis of African 
philosophy”. Ubuntu can be described as humanness, be-ing human, knowing one’s fellow 
human beings and taking a keen interest in their well-being. This is the awareness that we are 
people because of our inextricable and dialogical relationships with the others. Our self-definition 
is a reflection of the others. Ubuntu then gives Africans their special identity, which is 
characterised by what Mangcu (2008, p. 78) refers to as “a fellow-feeling for justice towards 
others”. This philosophy is the foundation of the African ethic. This community-oriented way of 
living seems to be shared by most indigenous people, for example Drummond (2006, p. 3) states 
that in the Maori tradition of New Zealand, “knowledge is a shared treasure and a community 
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resource … service is in the interest of the group, and individual discoveries are taken back to the 
community”. The saying Motho ke motho ka batho in Sesotho captures the essence of ubuntu 
philosophy. Mkhize’s (2004) and Ramose’s (1999) analysis of ubuntu converge, although they 
use different approaches. They argue that ubuntu comprises of two words, ubu- and -ntu. Ubu- 
being indicative of an orientation towards the process of be-ing and becoming or unfoldment, 
while -ntu indicates a concrete substantive. “Umuntu is the specific entity which continues to 
conduct an inquiry into be-ing, experience, knowledge and truth. This is an activity rather than an 
act. It is an ongoing process impossible to stop unless motion itself is stopped. On this reasoning, 
ubu- may be regarded as be-ing becoming and this evidently implies the idea of motion” 
(Ramose, 1999, p. 41). Hermeneutically, inquiry and knowledge result from this experience of 
be-ing-in-motion, searching for meaning. Be-ing as an ontological and epistemological entity 
does not stop inquiring and interacting because it is perceived to be continuously in motion with 
other life forces. It is inconceivable to define the individual being without considering that the 
motion and unfolding in the be-ing is sustained by the dialogical context. 
 
Ubuntu philosophy has different dimensions from which it can be approached and understood, 
for example the philosophical exposition and the interpretation and practical implementation 
levels. Both Ramose (1999) and Mkhize’s (2004) analyses of the concept ubuntu above are 
examples of the philosophical expositions of ubuntu philosophy. D.S. Matjila’s (personal 
communication, April 17, 2007) views of the philosophy of ubuntu below represent the practical 
and implementation dimension. Although ubuntu philosophy is in both instances seen within the 
dialogical context, when approached from these different viewpoints (the philosophical 
exposition and the practical and interpretation), the logic and themes that result from such 
analyses are different. 
 
D.S. Matjila (personal communication, April 17, 2007), for example, raises dissatisfaction on 
how ubuntu is often portrayed as only reflecting the positive side of human beings, that is, caring, 
being empathic and being compassionate with fellow human beings. He argues that ubuntu 
philosophy also includes negative attributes such as witchcraft and jealousy. He maintains that 
since ubuntu embodies people’s daily ways of interacting with their environment, including their 
spiritual connectedness, its conceptualisation should reflect people’s daily realities such as 
 89
witchcraft and jealousy. People, and not animals, D.S. Matjila (personal communication, April 
17, 2007) argues, are the ones that are jealous and bewitching fellow human beings. D.S. Matjila 
(personal communication, April 17, 2007) does not draw a clear distinction between moya and 
serithi (commonly referred to as integrity), but instead uses them interchangeably. In this regard 
he argues for example that: motho o bolokwa or patiwa ka tlotlo ka gonne a na le serithi or moya 
(a human being is buried with respect because of their integrity, soul or spirit). It is for this 
reason that any person, irrespective of their social, political or economic status, will be buried 
with serithi (integrity) and, not allowed to rot unattended like animals. Serithi here is not used to 
denote a person’s status such as wealth or education, but to indicate that they carry the spirit or 
soul. Serithi accords human beings with a different existential presence to, for example, animals. 
This does not however mean that animals are less important or inferior species. In certain African 
cultures animals are highly respected and carry the family name or totem and in some instances 
dictate the fortunes and misfortunes of the family. We can here give an example of my family in 
Xitsonga culture.  
 
In our culture, there will in most of the cases be a chosen cow (homu ya swikwembu, the cow 
of the living-dead) which is treated with the greatest “human” respect. The respect does not cease 
to exist when this cow dies because the respect and status is passed on to other generations of 
cattle when the chosen one dies. Homu ya swikwembu (the living-dead) is regarded as a link 
between the living and the living-dead, and that is why it is named after the respected late 
member of the family or clan. The cow, which is regarded as Modimo or Xikwembu (“God”), then 
carries the serithi (integrity) of the family. The behaviour of the cow is therefore carefully 
monitored because “it” is seen as a carrier of messages or communicating significant information 
from the living-dead. If, for example, the cow behaves violently, the behaviour can be interpreted 
as unhappiness about something on the part of the living-dead. The cow is then used as a 
messenger, a go-between or “diagnostic” means between the dead and the living. This is why the 
cow carries such serithi and respect. In this sense, serithi is used to represent moya which is 
connecting the living and the living-dead. In our view, for example, the Sesotho expression: ga a 
tlotle batho bangwe or ga a tlhomphe batho bangwe (he does not treat others with respect or 
integrity) in Xitsonga, a nga hloniphi vanhu va ngwani, means that the person does not treat 
others humanly, with respect or in accordance with the spirit of be-ing motho or umuntu. The 
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saying in Xitsonga, munhu wa tika or motho o boima in Sesotho captures a person’s integrity in 
the sense of moya that a person carries, even if they are dead.  
 
Let us further illustrate serithi or moya of a person as understood above with the example of 
elephants. According to D.S. Matjila (personal communication, April 17, 2007), if an elephant 
has killed a human being, it does not mix with other elephants, it goes into seclusion for at least 
seven days (e a ikilela) to observe a moment of darkness or filthiness, because of the heaviness 
(boima or ku tika) of moya or serithi that a human being carries.  
 
If we move from the view that the psyche is the embodiment of the spirit, then the psyche 
cannot be conceived and understood in fragmented, divisible and simple measurable units of 
study. Conversely, moya, which connotes the concept of respect and integrity, cannot be 
understood outside the wholeness and collective cultural experiences of Africans and their 
environment. The division of the psyche into body and mind is alien to the African conception of 
the human being. It belongs to the legacy emanating from the Western fragmentation of be-ing. 
We therefore submit that moya, which represents the respectful spiritual be-ingness, collective 
and wholistic engagement between people and their cultural environment and supernatural 
powers, is ontologically and epistemologically consistent with the African philosophy of ubuntu. 
Moya should therefore be adopted as an ontologically and epistemologically legitimate term in 
understanding the human being in the African context. The exclusion of the concept moya from 
the Western scientific framework does not deprive it of its ontological and epistemological 
attributes. Instead, the exclusion speaks to the limits of Western “science”. It constitutes some of 
the core concepts in the construction and interpretation of indigenous psychology in dialogue 
with Western psychology  
 
The use of moya or serithi in psychology speaks to the African understanding of the human 
being as the subject of healing in general and psychotherapy in particular. Through the concept of 
moya, African philosophy calls into question the exclusivity of Western scientism. For 
“psychology” and “psychotherapy” in the African ontology to be meaningful and to be taken 
seriously, moya has to become an indispensable concept of “mainstream” psychology.  
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Concluding Remarks 
 
Viewed within its etymological context, the concept psyche, from which psychology is 
derived, is deeply rooted in the Western epistemological paradigm, more specifically the Greek 
and Hebrew traditions. The psyche has interchangeably been used with the concepts soul or the 
spirit. Whichever way the psyche is called, this concept is etymologically and ontologically 
conceived and understood within the rationalism of Western philosophies, theories, 
epistemologies and cultural experiences. On this basis, this concept cannot be universally applied 
to all indigenous languages without philosophical, conceptual and practical misrepresentations. 
Using the term psyche, soul or spirit in the African context only constitutes epistemologically 
and conceptually disguised cosmetic linguistic adaptations which continue to be at variance with 
the African socio-cultural experiences. Further, the dualistic way in which the psyche is 
conceptualised, is inconsistent with the wholistic African unitary ontology and philosophy.  
 
Hardly, then, can Africans be coerced into submitting to translations and universalisation of 
Western concepts as “authentically scientific virtues”. To be authentic according to Quijano cited 
in Ajei (2007, p. 153), means that “we have to stop being what we have not been, what we will 
never be, and what we do not have to be”. To advance this congruent level of being, appropriate 
African terminology must be adopted and used as scientifically authentic linguistic expressions 
and self-representations. This must be premised on the African philosophy of Ubuntu, which 
according to Ramose (2002) and Mkhize (2004) conceives being and knowledge as indivisibly 
linked. We subscribe to the view that knowledge and being cannot be understood outside the 
bounds of moya. We cannot exist and know unless we have moya which qualifies our being and 
existence in the ontology of the living and the transcendent. Moya is at variance with a dualistic 
philosophical framework. It is sustained by the African dialogical context that appreciates the 
interconnectedness between all the ontological cosmic forces. The understanding and practice of 
“psychology” and “psychotherapy” in the African context must accordingly be based on the 
philosophical, epistemological and ontological conceptions of personhood and being with moya 
as the core concept. We turn our focus to the African conceptions of “psychology” and 
“psychotherapy” in the next chapter. 
 92
CHAPTER 5 
 
In the mist of a vast amount of citable literature that clearly illustrates traditional Western 
psychology’s shortcomings when applied to the clients of African descent, it is now time for 
African scholars to redirect their energy towards the African deep structure in which African 
philosophical assumptions, worldviews, ethos, and ideology serve as a foundation for much 
needed paradigm shift … one of the challenges of African psychology is to wield core African 
concepts that can be used to heal people of African descent today. 
(Obasi, 2002, p. 52). 
 
Introduction 
 
Western psychology is based on certain philosophical and psychological presuppositions and 
conceptions about the human being and reality. Historically, these Western derived 
presuppositions and conceptions have achieved a great measure of universalisation and have been 
assumed to represent indigenous people’s experiences. Modern psychology, and we may add 
psychotherapy, as we study and practice them, have been conceived from this Western 
epistemology (Mkhize, 2004). On the basis of this historical background, such psychology and 
psychotherapy cannot accurately and authentically represent and reflect indigenous realities, in 
particular African experiences. The systematic exclusion of indigenous experiences as legitimate 
sources of knowledge and corresponding practice was the marginalisation and subjugation of the 
African conception of “psychology” and “psychotherapy”. This exclusion prevented the 
broadening of the landscape of psychological discourses. As such, the literature on psychology 
and psychotherapy has come to be associated with only the West. 
 
In most psychology texts in South Africa, the underlying psychological theories have 
remained profoundly rooted in Western conceptions of reality, language expressions and 
experiences. Theory is a reflection of most deeply held values and thinking of the theorist and 
theorising community (Grills, 2002). Therefore theory cannot be divorced from the cultural 
domain within which the theorising process is conceived and construed. In terms of the same 
logic, psychological practice and psychotherapeutic interventions are based on a particular 
philosophy of life and cannot be separated from their philosophising context. As psychology 
currently stands in South Africa and Africa in general, it is theorised and languaged from a 
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foreign epistemology. In an attempt to address this epistemological and theoretical inconsistency, 
most texts have provided and, occasionally used South African life experiences as examples 
filled with Western theories and boldly claimed and presented these cosmetically disguised 
alterations as “South African psychology and psychotherapy perspectives”. This disguised and 
superficial tendency offers no paradigm shift at all. It does not speak to the African experience, 
nor does it take into account the African languages as central to the effective self-representation 
and healing process. Psychology that is based on these precarious claims and misrepresentations 
cannot therefore claim to embrace the African ethos and reality. It does not have a legitimate 
African identity, effects and meaning in the lives of Africans. In essence, the effect of such 
psychology, as Grills (2002, p. 10) argues, will be “an insult to traditional African therapeutic 
practices to assume that one could teach or learn its praxis within the confines of a book or book 
chapter”. 
 
In this chapter, we argue for the establishment of African “psychology” and “psychotherapy” 
consistent with the African experience, knowledge systems and linguistic expressions. It will be 
based upon the underlying philosophical African understanding of the human being, illness and 
healing. To be consistent with African thinking, the “psychology” we are arguing for here should 
be understood and expressed using proper African history, culture and languages. We will start 
by presenting the conception of the African view of “psychology”, followed by that of 
“psychotherapy”. Before we can present such African conceptions, a crucial question to be 
interrogated and answered is whether this thing called African “psychology” does exist at all. 
 
Is there an African “Psychology”? 
 
The question of the existence or non-existence of an African “psychology” is fast becoming a 
contestable intellectual, linguistic, socio-political and philosophical discourse. The tendency to 
question Africans’ ability to conceptualise has been observed in all the fields in which the West 
claimed the status of sole championship, for example in philosophy. It is therefore not uncommon 
to hear of questions such as: Can Africans theorise, philosophise or psychologise? In the current 
study, I have continuously been asked what established theory is this research based on. The 
implication of this question is two-pronged; firstly, that the African lived experiences, cultural 
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identities, philosophies and presuppositions advanced in this study do not constitute “developed” 
authentic theory. Secondly, that, indigenous African knowledge systems, socio-political systems 
and practices cannot “authentically” and “scientifically” explain themselves unless they are based 
on Western “established” theories. We have come to see many studies on African experiences 
such as poetry, philosophy and drama being twisted to fit with and being explained in terms of 
Western theories and concepts. The use of expressions such as African psychology and African 
physical and metaphysical ontologies in the so-called African “psychology” texts without first 
questioning whether the terms psychology and metaphysics exist and apply to Africans’ 
conceptions are examples of such linguistic difficulties. In most cases this has been done by 
Africans themselves. In questioning this tendency, African philosophers such as Laleye (2002), 
Ramose (2002), Wiredu (1980, 2002), Kaphagawani and Malherbe (2002) and Outlaw (2002) 
have gone to great lengths arguing for the existence and recognition of African philosophy.  
 
In recent times psychologists such as Mkhize (2004) Sigogo and Modipa (2004), Grills 
(2002), Obasi (2002), Parham (2002), and Kruger et al. (2007) have argued for the recognition of 
African healing practices and “psychology”. If there is African experience and thought, there can 
be no doubt that there is African “psychology”. However, to answer this question, it is important 
to define the term “psychology” in the African context. Evidently, the need for African 
“psychology” for Africans is not only limited to the African continent. Other studies on African 
Americans such as those of Parham (2002), Grills (2002), Parham and Parham (2002) and Obasi 
(2002) have also confirmed that Western oriented psychology and psychotherapy are ineffective 
when applied to persons of African descent. There is therefore no justifiable reason why Western 
psychology is still taught and remains dominant in our curriculum because it is clearly at variance 
with the African experience. In terms of this reasoning, our view is that African “psychology” 
should be at the centre of curriculum development and teaching in learning institutions in South 
Africa. It is grossly inconceivable and unethical to teach African students meaningful 
“psychology”, if such psychology does not adopt African languages to express their experiences. 
If this trend continues to prevail, as is the case at the moment, psychology will continue to be 
perceived as a theoretical subject that bears no practical and healing relevance to African 
communities.  
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Psychology, like other social sciences in a changing social system such as South Africa, 
should reflect the social transformation, dynamics and developments consistent with the social 
and cultural experiences such as the adoption of appropriate language expressions of the 
indigenous communities. In this sense, Teffo (2008, p. 2) argues that “good education should do 
more than pass on norms, values and knowledge necessary for a creative and conscientious 
citizen whose ethos are rooted in the African culture as it changes”. The fact that the experience, 
content and language used to express and represent this reality in South Africa remains deeply 
rooted in the Western experience and ontology is indicative of very serious problems in our 
education system. One such problem is demonstrated by the fact that our educational institutions 
do not recognise traditional African artifacts, trajectories and other forms of knowledge 
production and preservation as authentic knowledge. Most of the time this kind of work is 
dismissed as being “unscientific”. Under these conditions, it means that in practice there are 
tensions and inconsistencies between what is taught and the cultural background and experience 
within which this teaching and learning take place. On this basis, the prevailing claim that there is 
transformation remains an illusion. 
 
The basis of the exclusion and marginalisation of indigenous African ways of knowing and 
doing is the untenable claim that only the West has a prior and superior knowledge to define 
“science”. We have challenged and shown this claim to be vacuous and unsustainable in Chapter 
1 and it will therefore not be pursued here. 
 
Towards a Definition of African “Psychology” 
 
In our view, to ask if there is an African “psychology” is tantamount to questioning the very 
existence of an African. The root of this question can be traced to the West’s exclusive claim to 
knowledge production, positioning itself as the only discoverer of authentic and scientific 
knowledge. Okere (2005a) has argued against this absurd claim to unique possession of scientific 
knowledge on the basis that all human cultures have experiences and possess some knowledge. 
This ability to experience and possess knowledge presupposes the ability to philosophise, 
theorise and to psychologise. 
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The existence of Africans is an existential reality. The very existence of Africans presupposes 
African culture and experience, which give rise to indigenous African knowledge systems. It is 
on this knowledge system and experiences that African “psychology” should be based and 
defined. Grills (2002, pp. 13-14) defines African-centred psychology as “a perspective that 
reflects an African orientation to the meaning of life, the world, and relationships with others and 
oneself … African-centred psychology is ultimately concerned with understanding the system of 
meaning of human beingness, the features of human functioning, and the restoration of 
normal/natural order to human development. It is used to resolve personal and social problems 
and to promote optimal functioning”. 
 
Grills’ definition goes far beyond an individual’s behaviour and cognitive processes within a 
particular context. Contrary to modern and post modern definitions of psychotherapy that are 
limited to the interaction between the therapist and the client, the African conception takes 
“psychology” and “psychotherapy” to the integrated and wholeness of entire ways of living. 
“Psychology” is for Africans about a people’s way of living and being in relation to their cosmic 
world. It incorporates all interacting and connected life systems, as well as the supreme beings 
and how these systems constitute meaning in life. These systems of knowledge embody all life 
experiences and processes, written and non-written, rational and irrational, controlled and non-
controllable, observable (physical) and non-observable (non-physical), living and non-living as 
well as known and unknown. On this basis, Africans’ conceptions of “psychology” represent 
very complex and yet coherent systems of networks. These systems cannot necessarily be 
reduced to, and limited by the confinements of a mentality that seeks to explain every experience 
and process in a rational way.  
 
In the context of psychology, rationality claims that human behaviour and the events of nature 
do not happen at random but follow an unvarying pattern which needs a rational explanatory 
mode. In this sense, rationality seeks to discover, control and apply these rational laws to control 
these interactive processes in order to successfully predict behaviour and social outcomes. This 
criterion constitutes the praxis of the West’s conception of how psychology should be defined 
and practised. This criterion is in our view limited, and by its very nature excludes indigenous 
ontological conceptions.  
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In Africa, a more culture and context sensitive praxis that will resonate with the African 
ontological conceptions of “psychology” and healing practices is therefore argued for. African 
“psychology” and “psychotherapy” must also be based on the African understanding of reality 
and experience. 
 
The following are, according to Grills (2002, p. 14), the core features of African centred 
“psychology”: 
 
1. Self-definition. The understanding and awareness that being defined in terms of otherness, 
other-defended and other-reliant is inaccurate and misplaced. Real self-definition for Africans 
means a conscious centring of perspective, analysis, theory and praxis in an African frame of 
reference. The African understanding of self-definition here situates the individual in the 
context of the community, with strong emphasis on inter-dependency.  
2. Spirit. That incorporeal, animating principle and energy that reflects the essence and 
sustenance of all matter. The spirit is both the holding space for life itself and a precondition 
for the existence of all matter. 
3. Nature. Consisting of all elements contained within the natural environment, that provides 
rules for living peacefully in society and provides a window to the inner working of the 
person … providing lessons on human functioning, the rhythms of life, and order of things. 
4. Metaphysical interconnectedness. The metaphysical component to the person that requires 
certain social and natural obligations that are accompanied by (ritual in life). The 
understanding that human beings do not exist alone in the universe, but are always interacting 
with and under the influence other forces. 
5. Communal order and self-knowledge. The understanding that we can only know ourselves 
through our relationships with others. In traditional African thought, being human is to 
belong to the whole community. Individuals exist because of the community they belong to 
and the community contributes to the conduct of its individual community members. 
 
We would like to add another feature, which is in our view also very important and applicable 
to most African cultures, namely: 
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6. Ancestor worship. This entails different forms of ritual in which the living communicate and 
connect with their living-dead through dialogue and other forms of expressions. African 
traditional thought does not view dying as the end of life and experience. The living-dead 
continue to be indivisibly connected to the living and the Supreme Being through dialogical 
engagement. Those who die transcend to a different form of existence and continue to 
communicate and influence the living. The living-dead are also expected to communicate the 
issues of the living to uMvelingqangi. A disturbance in these relationships is seen as a cause 
of misery, illness and unhappiness in people’s lives. 
 
The above definition of African “psychology” is not coterminous with current discrete 
definitions, conceptualisations and practices of categories of psychology that are detailed in our 
university textbooks and curricula. This definition does not only cover some parts, for example 
the mind and behaviour of the human being, but a person’s life in its entirety and, in relation to 
the community, natural context and the Supreme Being. If the above core features are to be 
adopted as the conceptual basis of an African “psychology”, then psychology as it currently 
stands is far from reflecting the African experience. These misconceptions then, calls for the 
Africanisation of “psychology” and “psychotherapy”. The concept Africanisation is so often 
negatively perceived by Western dogmatism on the naïve assumption that this imperative 
represents essentialism. In essence, such an instinctive attack on, and rejection of, Africanisation 
of the psychology curriculum for example, is motivated by the blind passion to protect the 
essentialism of Western epistemology under the guise of objectivity and universalism. Suttner 
(2008, p. 1), succinctly describes the fear associated with Africanisation in this way: “The notion 
of Africanisation is not an abstract question and has quantitative and qualitative implications. It is 
controversial for many because it is seen along with affirmative action and ‘playing the race card’ 
as one of the ways of devaluing merit and often also undermining the ethical basis that should 
guide a democratic order and educational system”. Contrary to these misguided fears, our view is 
that, the Africanisation of “psychology” and “psychotherapy” will create a praxis that will fully 
reflect the use of African languages, history, experiences, culture, their analyses and ways of 
understanding people and treatment modes of illnesses and healing. The understanding of 
“psychology” in Africa should integrate and situate the above African definition of “psychology” 
in the realm of moya and ubuntu, imbued with all human experiences within broader community. 
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Practically, this means that we have to adopt appropriate African vernaculars’ terminology, rather 
than rely on translations or foreign concepts to explain even African cultural experiences. 
 
Argument for African “Psychology” and “Psychotherapy” 
 
In Chapter 4 we have questioned the authenticity of translating and universalising the concept 
psyche in the African context. We also argued that from the etymological and ontological point of 
view, the continued Western use of the concept psyche under the guise of objectivity and 
universality in the African context has no scientific basis and cannot be sustained. We 
subsequently argued for the reinstatement and use of African concepts such as moya and ubuntu 
that are inextricably linked to the process of be-ing and personhood in the African epistemology. 
We will therefore adopt appropriate concepts in defining as well as understanding African 
“psychology” and “psychotherapy”. Secondly, the practical applicability of these concepts in the 
African ontological, epistemological and philosophical conceptions of being, and personhood in 
relation to illness and healing will also be presented. 
 
Our primary aim here is to deconstruct and reconstruct, through the voices and lived 
experiences of Africans or sites of knowledge that I visited through dialogical engagements, what 
Mudimbe (1988, p. 179) succinctly refers to as “the construction of an authentic African 
episteme”. The basis of such an episteme should be the African experience and ontology proper. 
Such construction requires that Africans should avoid trying to understand, develop and advance 
the African knowledge base, by using English or any Western language as a starting point 
(Gbadegesin, 2002). Heron (P’Bitek, 1989, p. 1) in supporting this view succinctly argues that 
“African writers who choose to use English or French set themselves certain problems. They 
wish to express African ideas, but they have chosen a non-African tool to express them. There is 
a grave danger that with the tool of language they will borrow other foreign things. Every 
language has its own stock of common images expressing a certain people’s way of looking at 
things. Every language has its own set of literary forms which limit a writer’s manner of 
expression. How many of these tools can a writer borrow before his African ideas are affected by 
the influence of foreign ideas implied in them”. The richness of African languages according to 
Mtimkulu (2002) lies in their use of metaphors, proverbs, phrases and idioms as forms of 
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expression. “Psychotherapists” working within the African context should take note of these 
forms of expression and use them to create an authentic way of connection with clients. 
 
In our view, it is self-delusional and intellectually dishonest to try to understand oneself and 
culture by using others and their culture as both a starting and a reference point. Rather, local 
knowledge systems and other cultural forms of expressions such as ku phahla swikwembu, 
cultural dances, praise songs, sculpting should inform our conceptualisation processes. In support 
of this view, Okere et al. (2005), argue that authentic knowledge is first of all local. Local in our 
view embodies the use of vernacular languages, cultural practices such as local conceptions of 
illness and treatment modalities as practiced by African indigenous communities. In the current 
study and in this chapter in particular, the imperative is to employ the terminology and languages 
that best represent local conceptions of thuto ya semowa “psychology”.  
 
Thuto ya semowa “Psychology” 
 
In Setswana, Sesotho or Sepedi, thuto in thuto ya semowa, dzondyo in Xitsonga, means 
education in a broad sense. The education process referred to here is not only limited to formal 
school knowledge imparting or acquisition in a mechanical sense. It means learning and being 
educated in life issues in general as well. Thuto or education in this sense means that a person is 
capable of assimilating knowledge or information from different sources and contexts other than 
those of the school orientation and to use it to handle and deal with life issues effectively. This 
effectiveness includes interacting, communicating and connecting with the self, other people and 
one’s environment in a respectful manner.  
 
In thuto ya semowa above, ya- means of, it describes the kind of thuto, and semowa means 
spiritual (life) matters. Spirituality embodies life forces’ interactions with all matter. The 
meaning derived from this life principle then guides one’s relationships with their ecology. 
 
Ecology embodies one’s relationships with the others and the environment in a respectful and 
balanced manner. It is virtually impossible to respect others unless people respect or know or are 
aware of themselves, the others and their environment. It is for this reason that health from the 
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African viewpoint is defined in terms of a harmonious balance between one’s relationship with 
the others, their environment and supreme beings. Self respect and self knowledge as we have 
seen in Grills’ definition of African centred “psychology” entails self awareness. One cannot be 
aware of the self unless one is alive and therefore has moya which gives life. It is when we are 
alive and have moya that thuto, education or learning can take place. Therefore the state of being 
alive and subsequently being able to learn or become educated is made possible by the presence 
of moya. Moya in this case represents the very essence of life which manifests in our being or 
existence, the energy force that enables us to experience life. Thuto ya semowa thus means being 
in a healthy relationship between the self, the others, the environment and the Supreme Being. 
For this reason “psychology” from an African worldview cannot be relegated to fragment 
“objective” and rationalised units of study such as cognitive, emotional and behavioural entities. 
By the same logic, thuto ya semowa cannot be fully comprehended if it is fragmented into 
individual units. As a phrase, thuto ya semowa captures the essence of its meaning, that is, a 
wholistic study of life. On this basis, the understanding of psychology when it is limited to the 
mind and behaviour is grossly misleading. This view is far from representing the African 
conception and understanding of thuto ya semowa or dyondzo ya moya. 
 
In most African languages, when concepts are viewed in isolation, such concepts are mostly 
inadequate to capture the essential meaning of certain expressions. Thuto ya semowa should 
therefore be seen as a whole phrase that represents the process of being and becoming integrated 
with one’s ontology. It means that the self, together with other natural forces, are continuously 
conserving or transforming with the view to experiencing peaceful and meaningful coexistence in 
the interest of all systems. Capturing and representing these processes sufficiently and accurately 
requires sensitivity and the use of relevant expressions on the part of baalafi ba semowa, 
“psychotherapists”. 
 
What then, is “Psychotherapy” from the African Experience? 
 
If we take the African definition of thuto ya semowa suggested by Grills (2002) as the basis 
for our argument for authentic African “psychology” and “psychotherapy”, then the various 
traditional Western conceived psychotherapy definitions such as those discussed in Chapter 3 are 
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at variance with the African conceptions of healing.  On this basis, a more culturally sensitive 
definition of kalafi ya semowa “psychotherapy”, which reflects the lived experiences of Africans 
is called for. To effectively construe such a definition, Grills’ (2002) core features of an African-
centred “psychology”, namely self-definition, spirit, nature, metaphysical interconnectedness, 
communal order, and we may add, ancestoral worship, should form the foundation of such a 
construction. These features should be accompanied by the healer’s sensitivity and understanding 
of the African conception of being and becoming, reality, the self and ontology. On the basis of 
the above understanding of being, Kalafi ya semowa, “psychotherapy” from the African 
experience can be defined as:  
 
The sensitive facilitation and creation of a healing space or ritual between the healer and 
individuals, families and communities, to define themselves with a view to establishing 
meaningful connections with the others, nature and other cosmic beings such as 
badimo/amadlozi, ancestors and uMvelingqangi, the Supreme Being.  
 
The facilitation of this healing ritual takes different expressive and linguistic forms such as 
poetry, dance, songs and mophaso, depending on the specific cultural belief system of the client. 
The exact applications of some of these different modes of healing rituals in therapy do not form 
part of our interest in this study and will therefore not be pursued here. It is, however, necessary 
to point out at the “therapeutic” effects and importance embedded in the connection between the 
client and the healer. Language forms a very critical connection tool and asset between the healer 
and the client. Different linguistic expressions and forms convey different meanings and have 
particular effects in the healing process.  
 
In a study on the applicability and accuracy of reflecting of emotions using English in an 
African therapeutic context, Mtimkulu (2002) found that the Western understanding of 
reflections of emotive words such as love, anger, frustration, sadness in Rogerian therapy differ 
considerably with the understanding and reflections of such words in Setswana. In Rogerian 
therapy, for example, a reflection, you are feeling sad, is from the African viewpoint accurately 
captured by the phrase o utlwile botlhoko mo moweng, o tshwenyegile mo moweng or o dubegile 
mo moweng kgotsa maikutlong. The direct translation of “you are feeling sad” would be o 
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tshwenyegile or o nyamile mmoko. This direct translation could be misleading and incomplete 
because it does not necessarily imply that a person’s life is affected in totality. In most 
indigenous languages, when reflecting sadness, kutlobotlhoko, in someone, the level and extent to 
which a person is sad (affected) is qualified by for example mo moweng or mo maikutlong. If we 
revert back to our earlier argument that mowa is inextricably linked to life itself, if a person is 
angry their life is invariably affected, semowa sa gagwe se a amega P.M. Sebate (personal 
communication, May 7, 2008). Therefore we cannot understand sadness in discrete and 
fragmented terms, separate from one’s whole life. Sadness or kutlobotlhoko affects one’s life. 
 
On the other hand, feeling sad may mean feeling low-spirited, mowa o o kwa tlase, in which 
case it may mean feeling depressed. The latter changes the former meaning completely from 
sadness to depression. In this instance, caution must be exercised when translating feelings 
directly from English to African languages as this may result in inaccuracies and 
misrepresentations. From an African point of view, despite the difference in meaning between 
mowa o o kwa tlase and go tshwenyega mo mowing. S. Shole (personal communication, 
September 22, 2008), argues that the idea of one’s mowa as the embodiment of life force being 
affected is carried through and maintained in both phrases. This then, further illustrates that 
fragmenting mowa from the total life experience is not consistent with African thinking. In most 
African languages emotive concepts cannot simply be captured by a single concept because in 
many instances these concepts have different meanings depending on the context.  
 
Although Mtimkulu’s study was on reflections of feelings in Setswana in Rogerian therapy, 
the root of the problem of inappropriateness and ineffectiveness of such endeavours lies in the 
notion of translatability. For many years, and even currently, African clients have had to speak to 
their therapists in English due to the feeble claim that it is difficult or even impossible to conduct 
effective therapy using vernacular languages. Mtimkulu’s findings dispelled the misconception 
that African languages are limited in vocabulary in the therapeutic context. The inappropriateness 
of reflecting emotions using Western emotive concepts supports our argument against the view 
that Western concepts can readily be translated into African languages without linguistic and 
context related nuances (Kruger, et al. 2007; Ramose, 1999). Any attempt to translate Western 
concepts to African ones will inevitably erode the intensity and meaning of such concepts. The 
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overall conclusion reached in Mtimkulu’s study revealed that the intensity and meaning of words 
or concepts in African languages is embedded in explanatory phrases, proverbs, metaphors and 
idioms and the context within which these concepts are used. Given these African modes of 
expression, the argument that African languages are limited in therapeutic vocabulary cannot be 
sustained. Instead, therapeutic processes should explore and find expression in these rich modes 
of communicative expressions. By this reasoning, the logical practical step to be taken is to 
replace the concept “psychotherapist” with the appropriate African term.  
 
Towards African “Psychology”, Dyondzo ya swa Moya or Go ithuta ka tsa Semowa 
 
The concept “psychology” is both inappropriate and inconsistent with the understanding of 
dyondzo ya moya in Xitsonga or go ithuta ka ga semowa in Setswana, loosely translated as the 
study of the psyche or the soul. In traditional African communities, ku dyondz hi swa moya or go 
ithuta ka tsa semowa entails an attempt to understand different interacting systems of life in 
broad and wholeness sense. According to Grills (2002) such “psychology” entails self-definition, 
spirit, nature, metaphysical interconnectedness and communal order and self-knowledge. Ku ti 
dyondza hi swa moya or go ithuta ka tsa semowa encompasses various cultural practices, 
knowledge systems, religion as well as ways of responding to life’s issues in the world. Dyondzo 
ya moya or thuto ya semowa embodies education and learning about life, or the study of life in its 
totality and intricate forms, understood as dyondzo ya swa vutomi or thuto ya tsa botshelo. 
Dyondzo ya moya or thuto ya semowa is not a subject or course that intellectually deals with 
some areas of functioning in people, which can be studied in isolation, devoid of lived 
experiences. It represents Africans’ communal day-to-day life experiences which are inextricably 
linked to their cosmology. When we talk dyondzo ya moya or thuto ya semowa in the African 
sense we are referring to moya as it relates to vutomi or botshelo, or impilo, life. P.M. Sebate 
(personal communication, May 7, 2008), in supporting this indivisible relationship between moya 
and botshelo posits that “semowa sa motho se tsamaisana le botshelo jwa gagwe”, the soul of a 
person is linked to his/ her life. Vutomi or botshelo cannot be experienced unless there is moya, 
therefore moya is a necessary condition for one ku hanya or go tshela, to be alive. However, how 
people lead and experience their life is based on certain belief systems and these beliefs guide 
their cultural practices and rituals. Dyondzo ya moya or thuto ya semowa, “psychology”, forms 
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part of this community of ritual practices and belief systems. In this sense tumelo ya semowa, 
“spiritual belief”, is inextricably linked to people’s religion. Spirit(uality)/ psyche religion 
shapes ways by which people conduct their impilo, vutomi or botshelo. Spirituality and religion 
are deeply embedded in people’s cultures based on a specific social ecology. One cannot fully 
comprehend peoples’ thuto ya semowa or dyondzo ya swa moya, “psychology” and go alafa 
semowa, “psychotherapy” unless such understanding is situated within their culture, religion, and 
belief systems. We now turn to the relationship between spirit(uality) and religion. 
 
The Concept of “God” and Religion in the African Ontology 
 
B.L.M. Motsatsi (personal communication, May 9, 2008), M.D. Mothoagae (personal 
communication, May 13, 2008) and N. Masuku (personal communication, May 13, 2008) argue 
that Africans have their own unique conception of religion and belief systems that guide their 
existence and ways of responding to life issues. Accordingly, Africans’ conception of “God” is 
totally different from that of the West. According to Masubelele (in press), traditional Zulu 
people used the terms uNkulunkulu (the Great-Great) or uMvelingqangi (the First-to-Appear) 
interchangeably to refer to the Supreme Being. Swa moya or tsa semoya, “spirituality”, cannot be 
understood without relating it to people’s conception of their Supreme Being. This Supreme 
Being is believed to be responsible for the provision of umoya or moya which gives human 
beings their vutomi, botshelo, impilo or life status. The Western conception of this Supreme 
Being is of the invisible “God” who is the creator of the world, and exists in a separate and 
different ontology ... the omnipotent, omniscient, omnibenevolent, all-wise and eternal “God” 
(Wiredu, 2002).  
 
On the contrary, Wiredu (2002, p. 21) argues that the African conception of this Supreme 
Being is “… that He, together with the world constitutes the spatio-temporal ‘totality’ of 
existence … because he is not apart from the universe”. For Africans, interdependence in the 
form of communal and cosmic co-existence is the driving force behind effective relations 
between people, their environment and this Supreme Being (the First-to-Appear). Byaruhanga-
Akiiki (1988) and Bujo (1998) do not focus on the linguistic nuances of the Supreme Being, they 
used the term “God”. However, they also support the African understanding that views “God” to 
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exist among and with the people. He is not aloof and separate from his subjects. According to 
Byaruhanga-Akiiki, “God” is seen as the ancestor number one in West Africa. It is important to 
note that Bujo and Byaruhanga-Akiiki’s understanding of the concept “God” correlates with 
Modimo in Setswana or Sesotho, Xikwembu in Xitsonga, Uthixo in Xhosa, Mudzimu in Venda or 
uNkulunkulu in Zulu.  
 
In the context of this study and the ontological linguistic argument advanced in this chapter, 
we would like to argue that the Western conception of “God” is not the same as the African 
conception of uMvelingqangi in Zulu or Lowe in Setswana. Essentially, Bujo and Byaruhanga-
Akiiki have adopted the Western concept “God”, and translated it into the African equivalence. 
This is misleading because the First-to-Appear is not “God” of the West. The translation or the 
avoidance of using vernacular terms in reference to the Supreme Being has to be viewed within 
the West’s missionary colonial preoccupation to conquer Africa. In this regard Masubelele (in 
press), argues that “the concept of the Supreme Being was originally known by the Zulu people 
and was changed and cast into a Christian mould, using foreign terms, on the basis that using 
vernacular terms might convey unbiblical connotations about God … . The missionaries 
perceived the use of traditional terms as inappropriate, and that their use would contaminate the 
Christian concept of God of the Bible because of their association with Zulu religious practices 
such as ancestor worship and creation myths”. It is on this basis that we argue that the Biblical 
conception of God is not and cannot be equated to Lowe/uMvelingqangi.  
 
uMvelingqangi or Lowe (the First-to-Appear) is believed to be the “father” of Africans’ tumelo 
ya ntlha, the first belief, and is at the core of the African religion M. Aphane (personal 
communication, November 16, 2007), B.L.M. Motsatsi (personal communication, May 9, 2008) 
and N. Masuku (personal communication, May 13, 2008). Legend and stories have it that 
uMvelingqangi or Lowe is the first Supreme Being to appear on earth from time immemorial. He 
co-exists with His people and the living-dead on the same horisontal relational plane. 
uMvelingqangi is human, munhu or motho, whose origin nobody knows. His existence and 
influence on the cosmos is believed to be imminent and real. 
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This religious dimension of the African understanding of reality means that “God” is always 
linked to all attempts to explain experience including the healing of affected individuals. In this 
way illness from the African perspective is conceived as a spiritual affliction manifesting itself in 
physical pain or sentimental discomfort. Accordingly, healing can be complete only if it treats 
both the spiritual and the physical aspects of illness. 
 
To advance the African belief of the existence of The First-to-Appear above, the 
morphological analysis of the term uMvelingqangi (personal noun) by M.R. Masubelele 
(personal communication, August 14, 2008) and K.G. Nkumane (personal communication, 
August 14, 2008) is provided: 
 
1.  um = class 1 noun prefix of magoro a /ditlhopha tsa maina. U-(muntu) or mo-(tho), here the 
prefix a substantive noun = person. It is important to distinguish between personal nouns and 
class 3 noun prefixes for impersonal nouns, which have the same um- such as umuthi and 
umfula. 
2. vela(i) = verb stem. If um(veli) = the comer, is used, then umveli becomes a concrete 
substantive noun. Ukuvela means to appear and the one that appears is umveli. 
3. ngqangi = adverbial stem describing the verb (vela). The action of coming, being everywhere 
at the same time, ukuvela from nowhere, is evoked. Appearing from nowhere is ubiquitous. 
uMvelingqangi is present everywhere but nowhere, if He were to be found this would bind 
Him to the limits of space, place and time. The place/space where umveli comes from and the 
time at which He appeared is not known by anyone.  
4. Since nobody knows, then we talk about the unknown unknowable.  
 
When we consider the idea of present everywhere from nowhere in 3 above, and unknown 
unknowable in 4 together, it emerges that Lowe is coterminous with time and space. The space 
inhabited by Lowe is therefore larger and older than that of our planet “earth” as it cannot be tied 
to a particular time frame. Thus Lowe does not come from somewhere to planet “earth”. He is, 
instead, already IN and through planet earth. Understood in this way, Lowe/uMvelingqangi is the 
African philosophic way to anthropologise the Supreme Being, making Him a motho, a person, 
and thereafter ascribing to Him qualities that no other human being has, for example,  
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a) infinity  
b) eternity 
c) ubiguitousness (omnipresence). 
 
Thus the Supreme Being in this understanding is the ineffable that may not be spoken of.  
 
Lowe or uMvelingqangi’s presence cannot be proved in Western rational terms, but is visible 
through His dialogical and relational influence on His subjects and their environment. It is for 
this reason that we argue that the African uMvelingqangi relates and heals through dialogical 
engagement, not mystery. uMvelingqangi and tsa semowa or “spirituality” are inextricably 
linked and constitute the foundation of the African conception of religion. According to 
traditional African thought, there is no one above Lowe. He commands such respect that ga a 
rogiwe B.L.M. Motsatsi (personal communication, May 9, 2008), cannot be sworn at or ridiculed. 
Therefore uMvelingqangi or Lowe is an integral part of the community of human beings. 
Although powerful and highly respected, uMvelingqangi does not possess the power to punish, 
but he inflicts pain to the living as a way of communicating something significant. The African 
uMvelingqangi takes no pleasure in killing because, whoever dies, and their moya will join Him 
in the form of the “living-dead”.  
 
Bosemowa, “Spirituality” “Defined” 
 
Byaruhanga-Akiiki (1988, p. 15) defines “spirituality” as “a total life experience of a people 
such as their religious, social, political and economic sphere of life, their entire culture”. 
Accordingly, these human dimensions, as Byaruhanga-Akiiki argues, are not in themselves 
separated one from the other in Africa. It is rather believed that, to the Africans, their bosemoya, 
“spirituality”, is indivisibly linked to their fore-fathers, known as badimo or amadlozi. 
Traditional Africans do not conceive reality in a divided physical and bosemoya dualism. In this 
instance, bosemowa defines people’s total engagement and relationship with their fellow human 
beings, the living-dead and uMvelingqangi.  
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Contrary to this understanding, Tshenkeng (1988, p. 29) defines spirituality as “the belief, 
attitudes and practices of believers, during their endeavour to reach out towards super-natural 
beings … spirituality simply means ones relationship with ones God or spirits”. According to A 
dictionary of Christian Spirituality, quoted in Skhakhane (1988, p. 4) the word spirituality 
describes “those attitudes, beliefs and practices which animate people’s lives and help them to 
reach out towards super-sensible realities…interior life and life of the soul”. The problem we 
have with Tshenkeng’s definition is that he approaches and presents “spirituality” in an either/or 
dualistic manner, in which “God” and “spirits” are distinctly separate from each other, and in a 
way that positions “God” above bosemowa. A Dictionary of Spirituality divides “spirituality” 
into “interior life” and “life of the soul”. Traditional African thought sees “uMvelingqangi or 
Lowe” and “bosemoya” in wholeness terms, where uMvelingqangi the Supreme Being, is above 
the living and the living-dead. On this basis, Lowe or uMvelingqangi is an invisible Being 
inhabiting the ontology of invisible beings.  
 
In the same logic, if spirit(uality) describes those attitudes, beliefs and practices which 
animate people’s lives and help them to reach out to those supersensible realities, then to 
fragment them constitutes dualism and contradicts the idea of wholeness as conceived by 
Africans. In a much more inclusive and consistent definition, Skhakhane (1988, p. 13) posits that 
“spirituality is not a reflection of God and Trinity, spirituality is what each community has 
accepted as a basic principle for the welfare and therefore a driving force of their action in an 
attempt to attain that very goal in life”  
 
In all the above definitions of “spirit(uality)”, the key concepts are wholeness, life 
experiences, visible ontology and relationships. Life can only be experienced in a relationship at 
the ontological level. If “spirituality” were to be divided into “interior life” and “life of the soul”, 
then “bosemoya” would have to be “divided” into two contradictory and irreconcilable 
ontologies.  
 
P.H. Nkuna (personal communication, May 27, 2008), argues that “Africans do not 
conceptualise moya outside life itself, therefore ku dyondza hi swa moya, the study of the spirit or 
psyche embodies kudyondza hi swa vutomi and moya”. Therefore dyondzo ya swa moya is more 
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than the study of the psyche (mind and body) in the Western sense. The Western fragmented view 
of healing does not resonate with the African concept of healing, kalafi ya semowa, ukwelaswa 
ko moya, ku tshunguriwa/horisiwa moya, loosely translated as spiritual rehabilitation or healing 
or what is referred to as “psychotherapy”. The African conception of dyzondzo ya swa moya 
encompasses people’s understanding of life issues, including their religion, culture, traditional 
practices and rituals in the broader cosmic networks of relationships. In this sense, thuto ya 
semoya or dyondzo ya moya refers to the intricate networks of people’s interaction with their 
cosmology. A disturbance in these networks of relationships constitutes bolwetse/vuvabyi, ill-
health. B.L.M. Motsatsi (personal communication, May 9, 2008), argues that “go alafa go 
tsamaelana le tumelo le meetlo e e rileng mo MaAferikeng”, spiritual healing is consistent with 
certain religious beliefs and cultural practices among Africans. Swa moya or tsa semowa is in our 
view the daily driving force towards people’s peaceful co-existence with themselves, the others 
and their environment. uMvelangqangi or Lowe forms an indivisible part of this ontology. We 
will now discuss the African conception and practice of the healing process, ku alaphiwa moya or 
kalafi ya semowa.  
 
The African Conception of ku alaphiwa moya/ kalafi ya semowa 
 
In traditional African thought, moya, bolwetse or vuvabyi, illness, and go alafa or ku alapha, 
healing, is relationally conceived. Ku alaphiwa moya or kalafi ya semowa from the African 
epistemological paradigm is much broader than the Western professional definition of 
psychotherapy. Healing of any kind, emotional, physical, cognitive and behavioural, is always 
understood in relation to their context and the influence of higher cosmic forces. Bolwetse or 
vuvabyi, illness or “spiritual” disturbance of any kind, is seen by traditional Africans as a 
representation of relationships in distress and unpleasant human experiences. These human 
experiences are indivisibly linked to their ecology in such a way that a disturbance in one of these 
areas or parts will inevitably affect bosemoya of that person. Bosemoya represents the overall 
existence of a human being and is inextricably linked to people’s relationships with fellow human 
beings and their cosmic world. Similarly, healing or intervention is located within a network of 
intricate and interdependent relationships at different levels.  
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The above conception of be-ing constitutes the basis on which Africans understand healing 
and respond to illness. For traditional Africans healing and illness are the results of troubled 
relationships. Invariably, troubled relationships affect bosemowa of a person. Therefore an 
afflicted person is likely to have his/her moya disturbed. A disturbed or hurt moya requires kalafi 
ya semowa, spiritual healing by ngaka ya semowa, a spiritual healer M.D. Mothoagae (personal 
communication, May 13, 2008). 
 
According to P.H. Nkuna (personal communication, May 27, 2008), there are different levels 
and ways of responding to a fellow human being’s misery, pain and hurt. The empathic, 
supportive and humane way of helping or visiting a person in distress is known as ku chavelela in 
Xitsonga. Nkuna maintains that ku chavelela provides the “spiritual” healing experience or kalafi 
ya semowa and takes different forms on different levels. During difficult times such as when 
one’s house has been broken into and goods stolen, the Shangaan people would respond to such 
situations by hi ku chavelela, a supportive visit to a person in distress. Nkuna identifies three 
levels of ku chavelela:  
 
1. Ku vulavula /the conversational level. At this level, friends and neighbours visit the victim of 
crime and provide a conversational space. A close relative or neighbour may come for a sleep 
over to spend time talking to the victim. This allows the victim to vent his or her feelings 
resulting from and associated with the traumatic experience. 
2. Ku pfunana/the helping-hand level. At this level, people literally bring items that will serve as 
consolation or replacements for some of the stolen goods. A friend may for example bring a 
radio or a television set which will assist the victim to still experience some comfort despite 
the loss. 
3. Ku phahla level. This level entails the belief that the misery or break-in happened as a form of 
punishment meted by the living-dead. Visitors perform the ritual yo phahla, appeasing the 
living dead, singing and beating drums. In this way, they are responding to the living-dead, 
communicating with them at an interactive level. Nkuna argues that these levels of 
intervention swi horisa moya, are very “therapeutic” and are premised on the philosophy of 
ubuntu, a genuine concern and empathy for fellow human beings.  
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M.D. Mothoagae (personal communication, May 13, 2008) gives yet another intervention of 
kalafi ya semowa, by citing an example of how most Africans would help very young children 
whose mother died. He further adds that in this case, an old lady would whisper in the ears of 
these children when they are fast asleep at night: “Mmalona ga a yo, o tseerwe ke phiri”, your 
mother is not here, she has been taken away by a wolf. It is believed that once this ritual has been 
performed, these children would never ask of their late mother’s whereabouts again. Mothoagae 
also supports Nkuna’s conversational level intervention, but he gives the example of a woman 
whose husband passed away. According to traditional African culture, the widower does not stay 
alone because such an act ga se botho, it is inhuman. In such a situation, designated women 
would keep the widower company for days, weeks and in some instances months to provide the 
necessary conversational support day and night. During this time, the deceased learns new coping 
skills while she gets the support of experienced women. It is precisely for this reason that in 
traditional African thinking, ethically, the elderly are not taken to old age homes because they are 
seen as providing guidance and life wisdom to the younger generations (Bujo, 1998). 
 
Ku ongola/alaphiwa moya, in Xitsonga, kalafi ya semowa in Setswana or ukwelapha ko moya 
in Zulu and Western psychotherapy are two totally different procedures. The conception of 
illness and kalafi ya semowa from the African perspective and Western therapy suggest two 
diverse cultural philosophic systems. For traditional Africans, healing is a complex process of 
connectedness between various cosmic forces and is inextricably linked to people’s belief system 
and religion. An illness or disturbance in one’s moya needs kalafi ya semowa, ku alaphiwa moya, 
“spiritual” intervention. 
 
From the traditional African belief system, no meaningful and effective healing will take 
place, unless the intervention recognises and integrates all systems in the network of 
relationships. Healing is therefore much broader than relieving the individual body from its 
physical and emotive pain. Illness is not understood only in terms of its physicality, but as a 
symptom of disturbed relationships between people, people and their environment and between 
people and their supreme cosmic forces. Heavy emphasis is put on the relational quality between 
these interacting systems (Sogolo, 2002; Van Wolputte et al. 2002). Let us consider the following 
expressions to demonstrate this point. In Northern Sotho or Setswana, when a person is receiving 
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treatment, the expression is, Motho o a alafiwa, in Xitsonga, Munhu wa alaphiwa, in Zulu, 
umuntu uyelaswa, translated as, a person is receiving treatment. There is no such thing as tlhogo 
e a alafiwa or nhloko ya alaphiwa, translated as the headache is treated. Even if the person has a 
headache, it is the person’s headache that is treated, not headache in isolation from the person. It 
is for this reason for example, that Africans do not treat part of the human being, but the 
wholistic, relational, historical-cultural and contextual being. A traditional healer will for 
example not treat the “body” or the “mind” of a patient, but the living person. On the basis of the 
foregoing, kalafi ya semowa or ukulaphiwa ko moya “psychotherapy” in African philosophic 
terms is inconceivable and meaningless without the recognition and inclusion of badimo or the 
living-dead. The living-dead are seen as the intermediaries between the living and uMvelingqangi 
or Lowe. This chain of unbreakable networks of relatedness is seen as key to healthy and 
harmonious co-existence of this triadic existence. 
 
Clearly, if we were to limit and conceptualise kalafi ya semowa in the Western psychotherapy 
conception sense, the levels and processes of engagement and healing indicated by P.H. Nkuna 
(personal communication, May 27, 2008) and M.D. Mothoagae (personal communication, May 
13, 2008) would be reduced to technocratic and mechanical intervention techniques. In the final 
analysis, kalafi ya semowa does not dispense with the Western conception of psychotherapy. 
Nkuna and Mothoagae’s wholistic approach to illness or life trauma form the nerve fibre of the 
African conception of the healing process. 
 
Construction and Adoption of Appropriate Terminology in the Healing Process 
 
The university setup, for example its buildings, administrative procedures, graduation 
ceremonies, curriculum, library, lecturing methods, and examination processes to mention but a 
few, defines and determines the epistemology upon which the university is based. Similarly, the 
conceptualisation of learning, the content of the learning material, theories to be taught and 
academic standards have to be consistent with the epistemological foundations on which the 
university is established. However, in many African universities and in South Africa in particular, 
the content in the psychology curriculum is disproportionally alien to the African existential 
realities and worldview. The prescribed learning materials in most South African universities are 
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based on American and European cultural experiences. It is for this reason that we argue against 
the alienation of indigenous African experience from the learning curriculum.  
 
During colonial and apartheid rule years and, ironically, even in the democratic era, the 
content of psychology learning and training material continues to use Western conventions, 
prescriptions and standards of teaching and learning. This status quo remains because, as the 
claim goes, there are little or no written “psychotherapy” books on Africans. We dispute this 
dubious argument about “little or insufficient” written materials on indigenous experiences. The 
many artworks, sculptures, trajectories, stories and songs which have such important teaching 
values, meaning and healing effect, just prove the abundant traditional knowledge base we have. 
This claim suggests that indigenous people do not possess knowledge, experience and culture. 
This can only be true if we use Western standards and methods of knowledge production and 
preservation, to evaluate Africa’s existence and worth. This view is maintained in the 
unsubstantiated claim that Africans “do not write adequately”. The more than 70% of Africans 
who “consult” dingaka and practice their cultural traditions in their households is enough 
evidence that indigenous healing practices constitute a greater part of African kalafi ya semowa 
or ku alaphiwa ka moya.  
 
Consistent with the African understanding of bolwetse or vuvabyi, illness and healing, we 
propose the use of the Sesotho term ngaka ya semowa or in Xitsonga nganga ya ximoya (and not 
psychologist or psychotherapist) when dealing with issues pertaining to bosemowa or 
“spirituality”. Ngaka ya semowa or nganga ya ximoya should be used because psychotherapist 
and ngaka ya semowa conceptually and operationally refer to two different ontological realities 
and healing processes. 
 
Bongaka or byinganga in the African Context 
 
The Western conception of doctor, loosely translated as inyanga/ngaka is fragmented 
according to specialities. An example provided by Gordon (2001, p. 171) of “the Zulu noun 
inyanga used for ’traditional’ doctor and udokotela for ‘modern’ doctor” indicates this 
fragmentation embodied in some linguistic translations. Gordon argues that usually Bantu 
 115
languages have different nouns for African “traditional” and “modern” doctors. What Gordon 
seems not to realise is that inyanga is a Zulu concept conceptualised from within lived Zulu 
cultural experiences. It is therefore a word consistent with the Zulu culture and ontology. 
Udokotela on the other hand is not a Zulu concept, it is Zulunised and translated from the English 
term “doctor”. Inyanga and doctor are conceived from two distinctly different ontologies and 
epistemological paradigms, and cannot therefore mean the same thing. To position inyanga at the 
level of udokotela is to underestimate the real meaning and intensity of inyanga and the healing 
practice embodied in the Zulu traditional culture. This systematic subjugation, downgrading and 
simplification of the richness embodied in traditional African concepts should no longer find 
expression in our thuto ya semowa or dyondzo ya swa moya texts.  
 
At this stage it is both vital and appropriate to clarify the use of the term ngaka, inyanga or 
nganga. Although the Zulu inyanga and uDokodela may mean different things operationally, it is 
interesting that in Setswana, the concept ngaka captures the Western meaning of doctor, 
depending on the context within which it is used. The phrase ke ya ngakeng may mean I am 
going to the doctor or traditional healer. We are also fully aware of the different classifications of 
“types of (di)ngaka” in the African context (Setiloane, 1975, p. 46). However, in the interest of 
the scope of this study, we will discuss bongaka as a generic term. M.K. Mothoagae (personal 
communication, September 13, 2007) argues that the different classifications of dingaka, for 
example those that use ditaola (bones) and those that use bo semowa and relational influences, 
ngaka ya sedupe or ngaka e tshojwa, do not necessarily suggest that some are more effective than 
others, but rather indicates different approaches to healing. The process of bongaka is here not 
fragmented into specialties as in the Western conception of the term, that is, those “professionals” 
that only specialise in the treatment of the “body”, the “emotions”, the “spirit” or the “mind” of 
the person. These specialities fragment a human being into separate entities of studies and 
treatment and are therefore not wholistic. The realisation of this cultural imperative requires that 
Africans revert back to practising and engaging in community rituals that connect them with their 
badimo/amdlozi and ontology. 
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Community Rituals and the Healing Process 
 
The essence of healing rituals can best be illustrated by observing two systems, the Western 
graduation degree awarding ceremony and the African go tswa in Setswana, or in Xitsonga Ku 
teke nyongo, “Coming out ceremony”. It is common these days for a university or college 
graduate to attend a graduation ceremony with just one member of the family in attendance or 
alone for that matter to receive the certificate. The certificate then becomes a confirmation of the 
graduate’s success. In most cases no rituals are performed, except the ostensibly uninvolved 
mechanical awarding of the certificate, accompanied by the controlled and, at times incongruent 
and staged, clapping of hands. For argument’s sake, let us assume that the graduation ceremony 
is in itself a ritual. This ritual or achievement is often seen as the graduate’s individual efforts. 
The complex connections and contributions of other systems that have constituted the immediate 
and bo semowa, “spiritual” world of the graduate are recognised, but they are not regarded as 
necessary conditions for the accomplishments of the individual, the graduate, the self. According 
to this Western paradigm, the individual or self in isolation has certainly used his/her thoughts 
and ideas, which were translated into knowledge that resulted in the individual obtaining the 
certificate or qualification. This view is maintained by the modern tendency of defining a person 
in terms of self-actualisation and individual performance. In this individualistic approach, the 
person takes precedence over community influence and contribution.  
 
By contrast, in traditional African thought, achievement can never be attributed to an 
individual, but to the family and community. The relational dimension and dynamic of being 
forms an important ethic in the person’s existence, because as Bujo (2003, p. 22) states, “to be 
human always means sharing life with others”. According to Placide Tempels quoted in Bujo 
(2003, p. 113), “the Bantu cannot conceive of … the human person as an independent being 
standing on his own. Every human person, every individual is as it were one link in a chain of 
vital forces; a living link both exercising and receiving influence, a link that establishes the bond 
with previous generations and with the forces that support his own existence. The individual is 
necessarily an individual adhering to the clan”. Any achievement finds symbolic expression 
through family, clan and community rituals such as mphahlo in Xitsonga or ukuphahla in Zulu, 
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appeasing the living-dead or showing appreciation for their support and influence in the 
achievement.  
 
Most indigenous people locate achievement within its particular social context. The individual 
is defined in terms of genealogy, family, tribe, community and clan. Therefore individuals carry 
the clan, community and family identity with them and, in this sense their behaviour, good or 
bad, is attributed to these levels of communal organisations. If an individual achieves good things 
or does bad things, the question mostly asked is ke ngwana wa ga mang? translated as, whose 
child is she/he? This question seeks to relate the individual’s behaviour, achievement or mischief 
in their family of origin, community or clan. In Southern Africa, the term ubuntu indicates the 
way in which individual identity is identified and acknowledged in terms of the community to 
which the individual belongs (Drummond, 2006; Mkhize, 2004). In the same way, knowledge is 
not understood as an abstract isolated activity, but rather as a lived experience that reflects the 
cultural network structures such as politics, economics and ditumelo or cultural beliefs. Life 
events such as birth giving and training as ngaka ya semowa are celebrated in the form of family 
and community rituals. In some communities these rituals imply the coming into be-ing or the 
introduction of a new person in the family, clan, community and cosmic network. We will use the 
ritual of ku teka nyongo, “the coming out” ceremony, to demonstrate the communal nature of 
rituals. Rituals are cultural beliefs and forms of expressions and connections performed by 
individuals, groups of people or communities in communication with the living-dead and the 
Supreme Being. 
 
Ku teka nyongo by rithwasana as a Ritual 
 
Contrary to the earlier Western university scenario we sketched, B. Semenya (personal 
communication, April 25, 2007), states that the “Coming out ceremony”, go tswa or ku teka 
nyongo (the final test) is seen by most Africans as a healing ritual which gives birth to new 
meaning and direction to the social discourse of the family and community. Go tswa or ku teka 
nyongo is an intense and rigorous ritual of introducing a person that has just gone through the 
process of go thwasa to the family, clan and community. The knowledge that lethwasana 
possesses is not his or her personal achievement, instead, it is to be used for the benefit of the 
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community. This is how knowledge has to be understood in traditional African healing contexts. 
Knowledge is a shared treasure that emerges from community experience that must enrich 
community stability and health. Lethwasana is thus a servant of the people. This introductory 
ritual serves to declare to the community that there is a newly transformed member who will 
serve as a link or agent between the community and the living-dead.  
 
Ku teka nyongo is the final “examination” to determine if lethwasana is indeed connected ka 
bosedimo with the living-dead. Ku teka nyongo means go tsaya sedimo, that is, to incorporate the 
spiritual beingness passed onto lethwasana by the living-dead.  In traditional African thought 
there are two significant parts in an animal that are designated for ku teka nyongo or go tsaya 
nyoko, and these are blood and gall bladder. According to B. Semenya (personal communication, 
October 24, 2008), Africans do not shy away from blood because blood signifies life and gall 
bladder signifies sedimo, “spirituality”. The gall bladder therefore connects xingomantanda 
“spiritually” with the living-dead. By finding the hidden gall bladder, this becomes proof and an 
indication that lethwasana is successfully accepted and connected with the living-dead. On the 
other hand, if lethwasana does not locate the hidden gall bladder this is, according to Semenya, 
an indication that swikwembu swi ti fihlele xingomantanda or badimo ba iphitlhetse lethwasana, 
ancestors do not want to reveal themselves to lethwasana. Ku teka nyongo successfully depends 
on the connection lethwasana has with the living-dead. It is for this reason that when Africans 
communicate and appeal to the living-dead to reveal themselves bosemowa will say, “lona ke 
lona le bonang”, meaning, the ancestors are the ones who know and can see beyond the naked 
eye, the invisible.  Therefore the slaughtering of an animal has communal bosemowa, (spiritual) 
significance beyond the mere physical activity, the intention of which is to end up in people 
eating the meat. 
 
The ritual is characterised by the collective involvement of family members, community 
members, the masters, govelas, qualified dingaka, those who have been there before and moya ya 
swikwembu in Xitsonga or mewa ya badimo in Setswana. This process follows a very long time 
of initiation, which we will not discuss in detail here. The training to become ngaka can take 
anything between two to six years, during which the apprentice or lethwasana stays with and gets 
supervision from the govela or master (Setiloane, 1975). Lethwasana stays in training until 
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he/she can start working independently and appear, “go tlhaga”. At this point he/she is called 
letlhagana. As part of an ongoing evaluation process which continually takes place during 
training, a gall bladder is hidden for the lethwasana or xingomantanda or rithwasana in  
Xitsonga, to identify and reveal to the community audience.  
 
It must be pointed out here that although xingomantanda and rithwasani are synonyms, one 
cannot directly use the word xingomantanda when addressing the rithwasani since this word has 
a derogatory meaning towards the rithwasani. It is, however, permissible for two people to refer 
to rithwasana as xingomantanda in their absence. Swikwembu or badimo are invited to join the 
ceremony through the sacrificial offering such as slaughtering an animal and spilling of blood. 
This ritual includes drumming, dancing, singing and ululations. This process does not follow any 
predetermined formula and behavioural prescriptions. It is not a mechanically manipulated and 
controlled process. It is for this reason, for example, that during this ritual, it is not known who of 
the dingaka that previously went through twasa training will go into a trance. It is therefore 
possible, depending on the memories that the drums and songs evoke, that several people may go 
into a trance simultaneously, and start speaking in “tongues”. Dingaka and some of the relatives 
do, however, understand these languages as they are connected by moya to badimo. Messages 
from the living-dead are thus conveyed to appropriate people during this phase of the trance. The 
drums and dance have a communication value to the audience and participants. They create a 
context of connections, because the living-dead or badimo hear and connect with the govelas and 
lethwasana through drumming as their communication mode. For lethwasana to successfully 
identify the gall bladder, she or he needs very strong relationship connections with their semowa. 
It is presumed that these connections will give lethwasana clues and guidance to the hidden gall 
bladder. This process constitutes the invivo evaluation of lethwasana in the presence of the 
community. In this way, lethwasana’s transition to become ngaka is witnessed and endorsed by 
the community the lethwasana will be serving. Community thus becomes the context that defines 
bongaka and healing. Being ngaka and the healing activities cannot be performed outside family 
and community context. The knowledge and expertise that ngaka possesses are a shared 
community treasure that places ngaka in a framework of family, community and bosemowa 
networks.  
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The Meaning of the Hidden Gall Bladder Ritual 
 
The belief here is that moya, which is an essential life force, connects lethwasana the 
community, the living-dead and uMvelingqangi. Through bosemoya or “spiritual guide”, which 
connects lethwasana, the living-dead and uMvelingqangi, then lethwasana, will be guided by 
these higher forces to locate the hidden gall bladder. In this sense, lethwasana or xingomantanda 
power to locate the gall bladder rests with the living-dead. Xingomantanda is a messenger who 
performs what the living-dead want, who direct him/her what to do. The living-dead’s power is 
experienced and revealed through xingomantanda whose task is to carry their wishes and 
directives. Finding a gall bladder will firstly be indicative of their prospective healing 
competencies, and secondly, it demonstrates their unbreakable connections with the living-dead 
and uMvelingqangi or Lowe as their Great-Great Ancestor. Thirdly, the gall bladder is then tied 
on their head, as a sign of recognition, identification and an entry into the field of healers. But 
their training continues as they are expected to work closely with an experienced govela for 
several years after training. The gall bladder on the head symbolises a rebirth and “professional” 
identification of the newly qualified ngaka. Failure to identify the gall bladder during the 
evaluation ritual or ceremony implies that lethwasana will be taken back to the govela or inyanga 
for further training, until a satisfactory level of healing proficiency is achieved, finding the 
hidden gall bladder being a prerequisite. On the other hand, success in identifying the gall bladder 
intensifies the belief that this bosemoya “ancestral spirits” will guide lethwasana to effectively 
identify, “diagnose” and treat clients or patients’ undisclosed diseases or problems effectively in 
practice. 
 
Lethwasana or xingomantanda remains unqualified until he/she has taken the examination “in 
vivo”, and experientially demonstrated through this ritual of transformation that they are 
effective and competent. This ceremony then becomes a collective confirmation that the 
lethwasana or xingomantanda is now a qualified ngaka, nganga, or inyanga. It is important to 
state that this ceremony is not only for go tswa or ku teka nyongo of the rithwasana. It is also 
used as a means to communicate, celebrate, heal, connect all these different levels of the systems, 
ku phahla swikwembu or go phasa badimo, and to celebrate the emergence of a transformed new 
individual, ngaka. The community then rejoice in the bonds of their connected common 
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humanity. The practical indication of the existence of these connections manifests and takes place 
through the rituals of ku phahla swikwembu or go phasa badimo.  
 
Ku Phahla Swikwembu or Go Phasa Badimo Ritual 
 
It is also critical to indicate that in the African traditional belief system, the process of go 
phasa badimo or ku phahla swikwembu , translated as to appease ancestors, is not only carried 
out at the graveside where the ancestors are buried. It can also be performed at home in a 
designated place. However, someone from the family must drag rihlampfu in Xitsonga, a branch 
of a tree from the grave-side to this designated place called gandzelo. The belief in this ritual is 
that by dragging the tree branch, ku koka rihlampfu, the ancestors are physically brought home, to 
be among family members and to be accessible. This is how the living, the living-dead and 
uMvelingqangi live in the same ontology. The gandzelo is then treated as a very sacred place, 
visited only on special occasions when performing rituals that require the attention, participation 
and endorsement of the living-dead. This kind of ritual locates and connects lethwasana with the 
community of the living, the living dead and the cosmic realm. It positions community at the 
centre of all ritual activities. The ritual is also a further indication that in the traditional African 
thinking, we do not heal the individual but the relationship between people. Gatherings such as 
ku phahla swikwembu have healing effects, and are “therapeutic” and meaningful to most 
Africans. 
 
Rituals in Relation to Personhood and Community 
 
To fully understand and appreciate the process of healing in traditional African thought, it is 
critical to explain how personhood and community are conceptualised in this epistemological 
paradigm. Unlike Western fragmented modes of thinking, relatedness, collaboration and 
interdependence are central in locating personhood in community. This relatedness extends 
beyond people’s interaction and further includes their engagement with the community of the 
living-dead and uMvelangqangi. According to Mkhize (2004, p. 47) “because of the 
interdependence between individuals and the community, personhood cannot be defined solely in 
terms of physical and psychological attributes. It is through participation in a community that a 
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person finds meaning in life”. In the above discussion, a human being is relationally as well as 
contextually defined and understood in wholeness terms. Relational in the African understanding 
means being in space in a three dimensional way, that is, being connected to the yet-to-be-born, 
the living and the living-dead. Ramose (1999, p. 64) argues that “African traditional thought 
defines personhood in terms of wholeness. The African concept of a person as wholeness does 
not deny human individuality as an ontological fact, as an analytic finitude, but ascribes 
ontological primacy to the community through which the human individual comes to know both 
himself and the world around him”.  
 
The ritualistic process as discussed above does not evolve through mystery. All the activities 
described occur through active dialogical engagement of the different ontologically connected 
systems. We now discuss the process of bongaka, and healing.  
 
Bongaka and Healing 
 
Illness or vuvabyi in Xitsonga, from the point of view of nganga or ngaka is not, in the first 
place, interpreted as some accidental foreign moya, or any other physical bacteria or virus that 
invades the individual’s body or spirit. Illness is interpreted in terms of its relatedness to other 
life forces. In support of this view Mkhize (2004, p. 43) argues that “life forces are constantly in 
interaction with each other. It is possible for unknown forces to intervene in the order of events 
without our awareness”. 
 
The practice of bongaka or byinganga entails healing people through relationship influence. 
Even if medication is used, the aim is sometimes to protect bad relationship influences that 
manifest in physical ailments or behavioural symptoms. From the traditional African ontology, 
illness is a symptom of disturbed or dysfunctional relationships with one’s ecology. To be ngaka 
or inyanga is not an individual’s prerogative; it is a sacred choice made by the living-dead and 
has a very strong communicative value in the family system. Ngaka is an agent of the living-dead 
who are assumed to have all the powers to dictate the failures and successes of the healing 
process. It is for this reason that when the afflicted va yima-yima or ba batlisisa, the first step is 
to pay what is in Northern Sotho called khunolla moraba, in Tshivenda, luputulula thevhele. This 
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is not the Western consultation fee, but a symbolic gesture. Here permission is sought from the 
living-dead to enter the healing space that connects the ku yima-yima context with the invisible 
ontology. Only after this can ngaka proceed with the divination of go laola and go tlhatlhoba or 
ku hlahluba. 
 
The process of becoming ngaka is identifiable in many different ways such as getting sick, 
behaving in an odd manner or even becoming psychotic. Such behaviour is interpreted as an 
indication that the afflicted person has been chosen by the living-dead to be nganga. As such, the 
sacred healing knowledge is therefore not accessible to everyone through theoretical knowledge, 
science-oriented thought system and technical textbook training (Bodibe, 1988; Chavunduka, 
1994; D.K. Koka (personal communication, September 22, 2004). A deeper understanding of the 
value and meaning that imbue relationships is very critical in becoming inyanga.  
 
From the African philosophy viewpoint, this engagement implies that the relationship between 
the living and the living-dead is relationally and existentially defined. Secondly, this 
understanding of relating is not readily available to controllability, measurability and provability 
generally offered by categories of explanation associated with rational scientific systems of 
thought. On this basis, it may well be seen as misleading, irrational, meaningless or untrue by 
those who subscribe to the rationality-driven Western thinking. We do not necessarily see these 
different conceptions of relationships as negative. On the contrary, our view is that since every 
culture has its own model of explanation, the African conception of relationships creates 
possibilities for a context sensitive praxis, more inclusive and comprehensive of alternative 
explanations.  
 
If we move from this premise, the West and Africa can each use their different and preferred 
models of explanation of consultation, diagnosis and healing, thereby render the superiority of 
one over the other irrelevant (Sogolo, 2002). Under such conditions, the ideal situation would be 
for these knowledge systems to appreciate their differences and the richness embodied in 
diversity. In this way their engagement would be respectful and at equal dialogical levels, and not 
as in the current situation where the West has imposed itself as the only superior and authentic 
psychotherapy explanatory model over other indigenous knowledge systems.  
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Explanatory Modes of Problems and the Healing Context 
 
To consult, in the general use of the word, means seeking information or advice from 
someone, who supposedly has some higher competencies and knowledge in the area of one’s 
interest. From the Western paradigm, consultation is motivated by the need for explanation, 
prediction and control of the situation, in this instance illness. In the realm of psychotherapy, 
consulting implies that clients seek explanations for the causes and possible control measures of 
the illness or situation confronting them. The aim and function of psychotherapy is, from the 
perspective of Western thinking, to aid the client to function optimally as a social being, to 
behave and communicate differently, develop alternative understandings or meanings of their 
situation (Fourie, 1998; Snyders, 1985; Swart & Wiehahn, 1979). Clearly, consulting 
psychotherapeutically according to the above authors implies seeking explanations or 
interventions that will create order and regularity where there is discord and disorderliness of the 
client’s situation or system. Therefore the aim of psychotherapy is to assist and create new 
meaning in the individual or family system. In this sense psychotherapy is limited to and 
confined to the individual and family system. 
 
Traditional African dingaka tsa semowa and their models of explanation, on the contrary, are 
not necessarily governed by the preoccupation to rationally control or stop illness phenomena or 
situations. The aim of ngaka ya semowa is to bring balance and harmony between different 
interacting systems in relation to their ontology. Interventions here go far beyond the individual 
and family systems, to include even the living-dead. The focus is on the communicative and 
symbolic value of the information that they obtain from ngaka ya semowa or spiritual healer. The 
information gathered here provides the afflicted with much broader explanations and meaning of 
the situation in relational and cosmic terms.  
 
According to Sogolo (2002) there are varying explanatory models in traditional African 
thought which are personal in nature. These explanatory models are mainly concerned with 
explanation, prediction and control of natural phenomena, and secondly they involve theoretical 
entities albeit of different kinds. Sogolo examines the nature and function of these explanatory 
models basing his discussion on two basic notions of causality, the primary (non-mechanistic) 
 125
and secondary (mechanistic) discourses. Both are concerned with prediction and explanation, but 
Sogolo disagrees that traditional African explanatory models put emphasis on control of natural 
phenomena. His criticism of Horton’s argument that the former is more successful in achieving 
and providing predictions, explanations and control than secondary ones is motivated by his firm 
belief that not all Africans’ explanations are control-driven. We support Sogolo in this view on 
the basis that Africans are rather interested in the interdependence and coexistence of all living 
systems and making meaning out of such processes. He further argues that the interpretation of a 
phenomenon will depend on the functional interest of the person interpreting the situation Let us 
consider the current poverty and economic situation in South Africa, to demonstrate Sogolo’s 
primary and secondary explanatory models. Due to high levels of poverty, poor living conditions, 
poor service delivery, unemployment and high food price increases caused by amongst other 
things the world economic dynamics, social and political conditions, most people seek to explain 
the causes of their conditions or situations through primary or non-mechanistic explanatory 
models. The West will rationally explain and predict the possible effects on people’s lives, and 
then devise means to curb or control the phenomena concerned. The current Western and 
European rational and control driven response to the economic crisis clearly indicates this control 
based epistemology. On the contrary, traditional African thinkers may see this crisis as 
communication of punishment from the living-dead concerning bad things people are engaged in 
the world. Traditional Africans may not in this instance be interested in stopping this punishment 
but rather in understanding the phenomena, and relating it to all other systems. For Africans, such 
explanation may be sufficient to provide kalafi ya semowa to the people affected by the above 
material conditions. Depending on how people understand and interpret the phenomena, both 
primary and secondary explanations may provide adequate answers that match the material 
conditions and interests of each group (for example, poverty, financial stress, lack of jobs) that 
the afflicted are faced with.  
 
Faced with these conditions, the West will seek different explanatory models for their 
situations, most likely giving rational explanations and the possible control measures necessary to 
deal with the situation. Africans may respond by calling for the cleansing of the nation by calling 
dingaka to perform rituals, for example slaughtering animals, to communicate with the living-
dead to avoid future predisposition to such harsh conditions. Our view is that indeed primary and 
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secondary explanatory models are applicable to both the West and traditional African, but the 
motivation behind their application is not always control-driven. It is important to realise that 
neither explanatory model is better than the other because as Horton, cited in Sogolo (2002), 
points out, “the prevalent explanatory models adopted by a given culture are determined by the 
peculiarities of that culture”. Whether outsiders regard these explanations as “scientific”, 
primitive or “psychologically appropriate” or not is irrelevant, so long as they are meaning-
making rituals and consistent with the culture and belief systems of the people concerned. 
Sogolo’s (2002, p. 197) observation in this regard is that “normally, any explanation that draws 
on supernatural forces is regarded as incompatible with the principle of science upon which 
modern medicine rests. In fact, the scientist would see such an explanation (sacred healing gift 
for example) as a direct violation of the principles of science”. In order to be compatible with the 
principle of science, the psychotherapist will during consultation do an “objective” interactional 
analysis of the client (Vorster, 2003), provide a rational systematic explanation of the client’s 
profile, in most cases using tests in order to arrive at a diagnosis. We cannot therefore, on the 
basis of the above explanatory model equate consultation with go itlhola in Setswana or ku 
lavisisa or kambisisa in Xitsonga. Go itlhola or Ku lavisisa entails the idea of seeking 
information about one’s botshelo or vutomi/rihanyo and matters relating to swa moya or tsa 
semowa. But dealing with life issues, botshelo and tsa semowa, “spiritual” matters entails one’s 
relationships with other people, the living-dead and uMvelingqangi.  
 
The context sketched above cannot be equated or translated to consulting in the Western 
sense. The process of consulting in the Western sense and ku lavisisa or go batlisisa are 
conceived from two ontologically distinct paradigms and they cannot therefore be implemented 
in the same way on the same level of intervention and healing. The two philosophies are not and 
cannot be identical since to be identical they must dissolve into one philosophy (Ramose, 1999). 
It is for this reason that we argue that an attempt to translate go batlisisa or ku lavisisa into the 
Western understanding of consulting will completely erode the meaning and process of go itlhola 
in the African sense.  
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Go Itlhola or Ku Lavisisa, “Consultation” Process 
 
The process of go itlhola, “checking oneself” in most cases, if one is not a target of mischief 
or witchcraft is informed by Africans’ firm belief that human beings are by nature capable of 
negatively affecting others through relationships or other mechanisms such as muti. It is for this 
reason that most Africans situate health and illness within the realm of relationships and between 
people. Illness does not therefore happen by chance, but has a communicative value for the 
afflicted. Illness may for example be due to jealousy, hatred, feelings of inadequacy and 
competition. When illness or problems are experienced, the afflicted will, for example, suspect 
the discord or disturbance in their relationships with family members, neighbours, co-workers or 
the living-dead. According to Van Wolputte et al. (2002, p. 24), “health is not defined as the 
absence of disease, and not even as the well-being of the individual body. Health is a relational 
quality.” When the afflicted goes to go itlhola, their relationship with the onto-triadic nature of 
being, that is, the living, the living-dead and uMvelingqangi will mostly be reflected upon. In 
support of this argument, Sigogo and Modipa (2004, p. 323) indicate that “it is a common 
understanding that physical and mental illness is a result of a distortion or disturbance in the 
harmony between human nature and the cosmos”. 
 
Go itlhola, or ku lavisisa with ngaka in the African view is not openly shared with everybody 
due to the respect accorded to this triad. Sharing with every one may upset the living-dead who 
are perceived to be the protectors of life of the living. According to Setiloane (1975, p. 58), “it is 
considered improper for anyone to go to go itlhola ‘consult’, ‘ditaola’ alone. One should always 
be accompanied by a friend or relative. If a person goes alone, he/she is suspected of planning 
some boloi” (to bewitch). In most cases, a person will take someone with to ngaka, who is not 
necessarily affected. If one has not been accompanied for whatever reason, they would tell 
someone close, a trusted friend or relative that, ke ne e ke ile go itlhola, a ni yile ku tilavisiseni, I 
went to check myself. This is uncommon in the Western consultation sense.  
 
Another striking feature of the go itlhola process is that there are “no visible” filing systems, 
yet ngaka does not mix or lose the afflicted persons’ information. The afflicted person’s file rests 
with badimo. This is because such information is, through moya, stored by the supernatural 
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power of badimo because the power to heal rests only with swikwembu or badimo for guidance. It 
is for this reason that we are not talking of patients but the afflicted in this context. They are 
called the afflicted because whatever sickness or problems it brings them to lavisisa or ku yima-
yima is considered to be due to disturbed relationships. Most Africans will understand when one 
says Ke ya go itlhola/ke ya go ipatlisisa, translated as: “I am going to investigate or check my 
situation”. Ku yima-yimani or tsamaya o ye go batlisisa literally means to “visit” the traditional 
healer or ngaka. It is for this reason that we cannot translate go batlisisa to the Western 
understanding of consulting because if we do, the meaning of the process of ku yima-yima 
changes completely. The process of go batlisisa or ku yima-yima as carried out by ngaka is 
completely different to the Western consultation procedure. Ku lavisisa does not only entail the 
process of checking oneself or disturbed relationships, it also means reinforcing one’s proactive 
stance of protecting oneself against being possibly bewitched in future. It is therefore common 
for Africans to go itlhola even if there are no problems in their lives. For most African 
communities, it is common practise, for example, to go itlhola before getting married, starting a 
family and performing a ritual or if there is a function such as a wedding in the family. Go itlhola 
is therefore not only problem-directed but also protection-driven. 
 
The African Conception of Go Tlhatlhoba or Ku Hlahluba “Diagnosis” 
 
The traditional African conception of go tlhatlhoba or ku hlahluba, “diagnosis” identifying the 
client’s problem or complaint, emanates from the view that the problem does not reside inside the 
individual but within relationships. It is from this understanding that the healer, ngaka ya 
semowa, does not “diagnose” the individual or problem, but rather identifies the disturbed 
relationship. It is with this understanding, according to D.K. Koka (personal communication, 
September 22, 2004) and A.T. Mohale (personal communication, September 22, 2004), that there 
is no such thing as “individual therapy” in African traditional thought, since healing is directed at 
the relationship level of the system. Accordingly, ku hlahluviwa or go tlhathobiwa, is directed at 
the relationship and not the individual. An individual is merely the bearer or messenger of the 
problems or “symptoms” of the relationship in the system. 
 
 129
To put this relational quality and ku yima-yima or go itlhola practice aspect into perspective, 
let us consider an example of a traumatised man who came for thuso ya semowa due to the 
experience of having been hijacked at gun point. After expressing his fears and trauma resulting 
from this experience, this man insisted that he was going to Venda over the weekend to perform 
certain rituals related to the hijack incident. His reasons for performing the rituals were that: 1) 
He had to check with his vhadzimu what he did wrong to be punished in this way, 2) to appease 
vhadzimu and to thank them for having spared his life.  
 
The interpretation of the problem above is relationally defined. The communication values and 
meanings embedded in different relationships, good or bad, aid in formulating a wholistic plan to 
assist the afflicted. For any treatment to succeed, tumelo, belief system of the afflicted should be 
acknowledged and appreciated. There is a very close link between thuta-botshelo and religion. 
This shows how people’s bosemoya and kalafi ya semowa as well as their subsequent healing are 
influenced by their belief system. 
 
Conclusion 
 
In our introduction to this chapter we set out to investigate if indeed there is an African 
“psychology” and “psychotherapy”. Our discussion has revealed that these Western concepts are 
at variance with the African conceptions and practice of healing and should therefore be replaced 
with appropriate African concepts. The implication of this is that there will be consistency 
between how “psychotherapists” train and practice, and the cultural experiences within which 
they train. At the moment, theories and treatment interventions taught to students in 
“psychotherapy” training programmes are irrelevant to the cultural experiences of Africans. 
Under these conditions, there cannot be any logical and sustainable reason to continue to use 
alien concepts in training students to be “psychotherapists” in the African context. No doubt 
studying these Western concepts could be educationally rewarding as a matter of comparison. 
 
There is certainly a point in alerting students to other and different conceptions of psychology 
and psychotherapy. Doing so will broaden their knowledge base and enable them to learn from 
others as well as to teach others new things. The African concepts bosemoya, thuto ya semowa, 
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kalafi ya semowa, go thlatlhoba, ngaka, ubuntu and uMvelingqangi talk to the African existential 
experiences and culture and should therefore be adopted and used in the training of 
“psychologists”. Training is in our view a ritual. Therefore African rituals should form part of 
training context in our training institutions. The implication of this approach for indigenous 
people will be that the complex African meaning of bosemowa, thuto ya semowa, and kalafi ya 
mowa and ubuntu will become central in the healing processes of clients. This will pave the way 
and set appropriate contexts within which “psychotherapists” can use metaphors, idioms, 
proverbs and phrases that African clients understand and relate to. 
 
In the light of the arguments presented in the above discussions, there is an urgent need for the 
development and adoption of the relevant terminology in the psychology and psychotherapy 
curriculum which reflects the cultural experiences of Africans. The basis of such thuto ya 
semowa, “psychology” should be that: 
 
1.  The content of the training material used should be premised on the indigenous African 
experiences and culture as its point of departure.  
2. The training programme in thuto ya semowa should recognise and include in its content and 
process, traditional healers and their healing processes and, oral tradition as a viable scientific 
method of knowledge production, preservation and dissemination. 
3. This dyondzo ya swa moya should be flexible to accommodate the plurality of voices (such as 
how we have adopted different African languages in this study), since there are vast 
differences even among Africans themselves. 
4. The theoretical and philosophical basis of such dyondzo ya swa moya training programmes 
must be the philosophy of ubuntu. 
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CHAPTER 6 
 
Rethinking Psychology and Psychotherapy 
 
Introduction 
 
The thesis defended in this study is that the dominant Western paradigm of scientific 
knowledge in general and, psychology as well as psychotherapy in particular, is anchored in a 
defective claim to neutrality, objectivity and universality. To demonstrate this, indigenous ways 
of knowing and doing in the African experience were counterpoised against the Western 
understanding and construction of scientific knowledge in the fields of psychology and 
psychotherapy. The cumulative conclusion arising from our demonstration is the imperative to 
rethink psychology and psychotherapy in order (i) to affirm the validity of indigenous African 
ways of knowing and doing as epistemological claims that are second to none; (ii) to show that 
the exclusion of the indigenous African ways of knowing and doing from the Western paradigm 
of scientific knowledge illustrates the tenuous and questionable character of its epistemological 
and methodological claims to neutrality, objectivity and universality. Indeed the Western claim to 
scientific knowledge as described speaks to its universality at the expense of the ineradicable as 
well as irreducible ontological pluriversality of the human experience. This chapter aims to put 
together in summary form the pathway to the substantiation and demonstration of the thesis 
defended in this study. 
 
Dialogues with Participants in Context 
 
Researchers used to regard participants as “subjects” from whom research data is collected for 
analysis and possibly for deriving some guidance for future activities. This approach positions 
participants as controlled “research tools” that are not supposed to influence or be influenced by 
the researcher or the research process. This thinking, as Mouton (1990) argues, is a necessary 
prescription for research activities that qualify knowledge as “objective” and “scientific”. 
Perceived failure to adhere to this superficial and unspontaneous interaction with participants is 
regarded by most Western thinkers as “unscientific”. Our view in this regard is that, if science is 
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to be true and congruent to its claim, that is, that it represents a “universal mirror”, then we have 
to see a plurality of voices and realities recognised by, and reflected in, this “mirror”. In the post-
colonial era, and closer to home the post-apartheid era, the “mirror of science” continues to 
reflect only selected truths, experiences and realities, under the guise of science. This thinking 
privileges Western science as the only legitimately advanced knowledge system, advanced to the 
extent that it can homogeneously represent other knowledge systems. This is contrary to the 
principle of “universality” and “objectivity”, even within the Western understanding of these 
concepts. Properly construed, universality implies that all knowledge systems, irrespective of 
where they come from and who constructs them, will be represented in the “mirror” of pluriversal 
knowledge systems. What is clear though, is that thus far Western science has largely refrained 
from acknowledging that there are other forms of knowing and doing.  
 
The dialogues with participants in this study have clearly indicated that knowledge and 
experience transcend these purportedly universalistic and empiricist prescriptions. For science to 
be taken seriously and to be respected, these Western presuppositions need to be deconstructed 
and reconstructed. They must be considered and applied in a culture-sensitive manner rather than 
in accordance with their current unilateralism.  
 
In keeping with the epistemological paradigm and ontology of African experience, participants 
in this study are seen as sites of knowledge with which the researcher must establish dialogue 
with the view to enriching and deepening our conceptualisation and understanding of African 
indigenous knowledge systems. In this sense, our dialogue with carefully selected participants in 
this study – namely, chiefs, traditional healers, academics and ordinary people in seven provinces 
of South Africa – provided very provocative and insightful knowledge. Furthermore, these 
dialogues indicate that knowledge, irrespective of where it comes from and who generates it, is 
useful and meaningful within particular contexts and cultures. Indeed, scientific knowledge is 
found in libraries and books, but convention-free and uncodified knowledge is embodied in 
people’s different forms of expressions and performances, rituals, metaphors and cultural 
practices. To transmit and appreciate these African knowledge systems and forms of learning, 
education is necessary as a mode of transmission. Education in Africa, and South Africa in 
particular, should reflect the dialogical character of the encounter of multiple realities. This 
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underlines the need for heightened sensitivity to the pluriversality of bei-ng and the imperative 
for wholistic thinking. The education enterprise, even beyond the boundaries of Africa, is yet to 
attain this status.  
 
In our critical analysis of the etymology of the concept of psyche, we discovered that one 
cannot talk of the psyche, the very essence of life, without reflecting on a people’s culture, 
religion, belief system, ontology, spirituality, language and their relationship with the cosmic 
world. The concept psyche, psychology as understood within the narrow individual mind-body-
context that characterises the current thrust of the Western conception of psychology, does not 
adequately discern the wholistic understanding of life. Instead, it talks to the Western paradigm of 
scientific knowledge, with its foundation firmly confined to rationalism and empiricism. This 
limited understanding calls for the imperative to rethink psychology and psychotherapy. On this 
basis, the phrase thuto ya semowa/ dyondzo ya swa moya is deemed to embody life issues in their 
entirety. Understood in this way, kalafi ya semowa, and not psychotherapy, will attend to 
people’s cultural, spiritual, religious and belief system using their preferred linguistic expression. 
The untenable view that advances the argument that there are no appropriate “scientific” terms in 
African languages is, on this reasoning, misplaced. Dyondzo ya swa moya (the study of life/mowa 
in its entirety) and kalafi ya semowa are more suited to the African conceptions of reality and be-
ing, and should therefore replace psychology and psychotherapy in the African context. 
 
Eurocentric Paradigms and African Languages 
 
In Chapters 4 and 5 we described the dominance of Western paradigms in determining the 
African experience. We argued that any attempt to first think of psychology and psychotherapy 
from the Western paradigm, and then to try and translate these concepts into the so-called 
“equivalent” African concepts, creates philosophical, epistemological, ontological, cultural and 
linguistic incompatibilities. Existing literature on psychology, including texts that claim to argue 
for African-based “psychology” and “psychotherapy”, continue to privilege Western concepts. 
 
In our view, the usage of the concept Africa in each of the above scenarios does not change 
the meaning of “psychology”. What is interesting though, is the fact that the concept psychology 
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is never tampered with and remains a constant in these texts. Keeping the concept psychology 
constant in these so-called African “psychology” texts presupposes that Africans and Westerners 
understand psychology in the same way. This study has systematically indicated that this is not 
necessarily true. There are significant differences between psychology and thuto ya semowa and 
psychotherapy and kalafi ya semowa.  
 
African Languages and Development 
 
Unlike what has happened in the field of psychology in the post-colonial period, we have 
witnessed more and more African philosophy scholars in countries such as Ghana and Nigeria 
using their indigenous Akan, Yaruba and Igbo cultures and languages to present, express and 
advance different philosophical arguments. Their philosophical presentations in these native 
indigenous languages have proven that local languages’ vocabulary is sufficiently equipped with 
concepts that advance any form of knowledge, experience and thought. There is therefore no 
reason why Africans should still use foreign concepts in “psychology” to develop and present 
their knowledge systems. In support of indigenous language use, Mangena (2008, p. 26) argues 
that “most citizens of many countries that are advanced in education generally and science and 
technology in particular do not speak English. They learn and work through their languages. On 
the African continent, except for the Arabic north, a foreign language is a precondition for almost 
all facets of human development. The education system, the learning of trades, the conduct of 
business and the administration of affairs of states are conducted in a foreign language. This is 
the legacy of our colonial past. This might explain in part why the African continent lags behind 
in development”. This self-degrading and low opinion of ourselves, our culture and our 
languages’ ability to present and teach from our indigenous language perspective, seems to be a 
serious drag in our attempt to develop our knowledge systems. 
 
We have argued in this study that knowledge and experience are culture-based. Similarly, any 
model of development or advancement of a people’s culture must be based on their framework of 
reality if it is to be meaningful and successful. Any kind of human interaction and 
communication takes place in a specific cultural context, and this includes business, educational 
and psychological activities. It is this cultural context that creates the rules and dynamics 
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according to which such activities have to be conducted, interpreted and developed. Development 
does not comprise of only the physical dimension, it also has cultural as well as bosemowa 
dynamics. We subscribe to this view on the basis that Africans do not necessarily have to 
understand and develop “psychology” from the Western perspective. They can and are entitled to 
use local indigenous languages to conceptualise and develop their own understanding of the 
practice and field of thuto ya semowa moya/dyondzo ya swa moya which is consistent with their 
paradigm and cultural experiences.  
 
Our view is that in South Africa, the reason why fields of study such as psychology, sociology 
and philosophy are not conceptualised, developed, taught and practiced using indigenous 
languages is a function and reflection of the distinctly fragmented Western approach to 
knowledge. Our education system is still Eurocentric in its approach and therefore at variance 
with African ways of knowing and doing. The organisation of our education systems, which is 
one of the many knowledge producers, is also based on this fragmented paradigm. Over the 
years, the so-called “content” subjects have been kept separate from vernacular languages. This 
approach has created a distorted view that languages deal only with language issues, with little or 
no relationship and relevance to “content” subjects. It is on this basis that we observe a clear 
separation, lack of dialogue and mutual engagement between psychology and vernacular 
language departments in our higher institutions of learning. Since the introduction of a new 
political dispensation in 1994, vernacular languages have ironically come to be seen as a liability 
rather than a useful resource. In our considered opinion, the move to the opposite is not only 
desired but an imperative. Not doing this will delay the Africanisation of higher learning 
institutions in general.  
 
Contrary to the current lack of (or at best fragmented) inter-disciplinary relations that 
characterise psychology and indigenous languages, a more collaborative, consultative, inter-
dependent culture between traditionally fragmented disciplines is argued for. This will go a long 
way towards Africanising “psychology”. There is therefore an urgent need to recognise the value 
embodied in inter-departmental and inter-faculty research collaborations. As the dialogues in this 
study have shown, the same collaborations need to be forged between academics, dingaka and 
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ordinary community members because these subsystems or sites of knowledge constitute very 
useful cultural experiences and knowledge landscapes.  
 
Conclusion 
 
The above is the delineation of the pathway pursued in this study to support and substantiate 
our thesis. The method, insight and argument we have advanced have pertinently demonstrated 
our thesis and defended its sustainability. 
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